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   1	  
Chapter	  1:	  Overview	  
Introduction	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  real	  estate	  capitalism	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  private	  profit-­‐driven	  market	  forces	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  city-­‐planning	  efforts	  on	  the	  other	  (Murray,	  p.	  130).	   	  In	  the	  past	   several	   years	   protests	   from	   Brazil	   to	   Bulgaria	   to	   Turkey	   reflect	   growing	  dissatisfaction	   with	   this	   tension	   as	   profit-­‐driven	   urban	   governance	   systems	   spread	  (Xypolia	  &	  Gokay	   2013;	   Sweet	   2014;	   Kuymulu	   2013).	   Although	   the	   particular	   causes	  differ	   in	   each	   country,	   the	   protests	   challenge	   the	   premise	   of	  market-­‐enabled	   reforms	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  passing	  urban	  development	  costs	  on	  to	  average	  consumers	  (Miraftab	  2012).	   In	   all	   the	   protest	   cases	   public	   dissatisfaction	   grew	   as	   formerly	   publically	  provided	   spaces	   and	   services	   were	   converted	   to	   private	   management.	   The	   shift	   to	  private	   management	   and	   the	   resulting	   protests	   reflect	   increased	   fragility	   as	   living	  conditions	   persistently	   deteriorate	   without	   public	   capacity	   to	   finance	   large-­‐scale	  infrastructure,	   support	   affordable	   housing	   and	   provide	   public	   services	   (Birch	   &	  Wachter	   2011).	   Urban	   residents	   find	   living	   costs	   increasing	   without	   a	   commiserate	  increases	  in	  wages	  making	  them	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  price	  changes	  and	  shocks.	  As	   urbanization	   increases	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   similar	   fragility	   is	   emerging	   with	  increasing	   dependence	   on	   private	   urban	   development.	   Over	   the	   past	   twenty	   years	  many	   African	   city	   governments	   dismantled	   government-­‐run	   urban	   development	  systems	   in	   favor	  of	  more	  market	  oriented	  policies	  (Parnell	  &	  Pieterse	  2010).	   In	  many	  African	   cities	   a	   small	   formal	   tax	   base	   limited	   fiscal	   resources	   for	   public	   service	   and	  infrastructure	   provision.	   In	   response,	   recent	   reform	   programs	   aimed	   to	   improve	  institutional	   responsiveness	   and	   service	   provision	   through	   capital	   investment	   from	  wealthy	   investors.	   In	  practice,	   the	   costs	  of	  private	   investors’	   full-­‐service	   communities	  price	   out	   the	  majority	   of	   local	   consumers	   and	   respond	   to	   speculative	   demand	   rather	  than	  demand	  for	  shelter.	  	  
	  	   2	  
As	   reforms	   proceeded	   urban	   amenities	   became	   a	   scarce	   commodity	   that	   exacerbates	  income	   inequality	  and	  relegates	   the	  majority	   to	  slums	  (Okojie	  &	  Shimeles	  2006).	  This	  reality	  of	  urban	  development	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  relevance	  of	  planning	  and	  policy	  grounded	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  Western	  countries	  (Robinson	  2006).	  The	  policy	  reforms	  and	   the	   underlying	   urban	   development	   theory	   fail	   to	   recognize	   the	   importance	   of	  preexisting	  conditions	  to	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  of	  efficient	  urban	  forms	  and	  improved	  livelihood	  for	  all	  residents.	  When	  accounting	  for	  preexisting	  conditions	  in	  the	  West	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  flexible,	  capable	  and	  deep	  private	  markets	  rely	  on	  regulatory	  enforcement	  of	  strategic	  goals	  by	  public	  institutions	  for	  urban	  development	  to	  successfully	  meet	  shelter	  needs.	   This	   contradicts	   the	   assumption	   that	   universal	   market	   forces	   appear	   to	   meet	  shelter	  needs	  with	   limited	   regulation	  and	   fluid	   land	  markets.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	  West,	  recent	   urban	   development	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   reflects	   entrenched	   business	  structures	   and	   plural	   governance	   systems	   producing	   visually	   similar	   modular	   urban	  forms	   instead	   of	   responses	   to	  market	   fundamentals.	   The	   result	   is	   increasing	   fragility	  and	  inequality	  instead	  of	  improved	  living	  conditions	  and	  opportunities	  as	  expected	  by	  reform	   programs	   and	   reduced	   urban	   planning	   regulations.	   In	   African	   cities	   access	   is	  increasingly	   associated	   with	   illegal	   networks	   or	   political	   organizations	   (McDonald	  2008;	  Simone	  2006;	  Pieterse	  2008;	  Coquery-­‐Vidrovitch	  2014).	  Tanzania	   serves	   as	   a	   good	   site	   to	   analyze	   recent	   changes	   in	  urban	  development	  with	  increasing	  inequality	  and	  large-­‐scale	  investment.	  The	  reform	  program	  in	  Tanzania	  was	  clear	  because	  pursued	  one	  of	   the	  most	   comprehensive	   socialist	  planning	  programs	   in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  from	  the	  late	  1960’s	  to	  early	  1990’s	  (Hyden	  1980).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  universal	  housing	  provision	  was	  a	  pillar	  of	   the	  socialist	  program,	  which	   led	  to	  central	  government	  control	  of	  a	  large	  housing	  and	  land	  portfolio.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  focus	  on	  dispersing	   industrial	   production	   and	   encouraging	   rural	   agriculture	   drew	   resources	  away	   from	   urban	   areas.	   Economic	   crises	   across	   the	   economy	   led	   the	   Tanzanian	  government	  into	  a	  far-­‐reaching	  liberalization	  program	  in	  the	  early	  1990’s	  (Tripp	  1997).	  The	   reform	   program	   included	   land	   and	   housing	   market	   deregulation,	   increasing	  planning	   autonomy	   at	   the	   municipal	   level	   and	   growing	   democratic	   representation	  through	  a	  multi-­‐party	   system	   (Shivji	   1998).	  The	   combination	   is	   reshaping	   the	   face	  of	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cities	  across	  Tanzania	  through	  high-­‐rise	  redevelopment	  in	  the	  central	  business	  district	  (CBD)	  and	  satellite	  cities	  on	  the	  periphery.	  	  Yet,	  these	  new	  developments	  also	  reflect	  decreasing	  affordability	  and	  unresponsiveness	  to	  low-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐income	  demands	  for	  space,	  particularly	  housing.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  in	  2010	  Tanzania	  had	  a	  housing	  deficit	  of	   three	  million	  units	  (NHC,	  2010).	  The	  deficit	  indicates	  that	  reforms	  failed	  to	  release	  urban	  development	  to	  match	  demand	  for	  shelter.	  A	  recent	  national	  survey	  of	  Tanzanian	  households	  found	  that	  even	  though	  GDP	  growth	  has	  been	  persistently	  above	  seven	  percent	  for	  the	  last	  decade,	  there	  have	  been	  almost	  no	  decreases	  in	  poverty	  rates	  (National	  Household	  Budget	  Survey,	  2012).	  Furthermore,	  national	  gains	  in	  income	  were	  entirely	  accounted	  for	  by	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  the	  largest	  city.	  Yet,	   the	   gains	   in	  Dar	  were	   tempered	  by	   increased	   inequality	  within	   the	   city	   implying	  that	  growth	  largely	  benefited	  a	  small	  pool	  of	  residents.	  Thus,	  the	  reform	  programs	  are	  also	   leading	   to	   increasing	   tension	   about	   the	   rights	   to	   the	   city	   and	   distribution	   of	  benefits	  as	  inequality	  increases	  and	  a	  small	  minority	  consolidates	  the	  benefits	  of	  urban	  development.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  problem,	  the	  research	  project	  investigated	  urban	  development	  since	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  state	  centric	  urban	  development	  to	  a	  private	  sector	  oriented	  process	   in	   Tanzania.	   The	   research	   examines	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   urban	  development	  in	  three	  cities	  since	  the	  formal	  end	  of	  socialism	  in	  1991.	  The	  case	  studies	  were	   chosen	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   result	   of	   these	   policy	   changes	   under	   different	   local	  conditions	   with	   a	   variety	   of	   community	   responses.	   The	   sites	   of	   observation	   provide	  variance	  in	  economic	  and	  social	  conditions	  within	  the	  same	  country.	  The	  cases	  examine	  urban	   forms	   created	   by	   similar	   underlying	   factors	   including	   entrenched	   business	  structures,	   plural	   governance	   systems,	   limited	   community	   voice	   and	   land	   use	  constraints.	  The	  case	  studies	  demonstrate	   that	  variance	   in	   the	  configurations	  of	   these	  factors	  produces	  different	  social	  outcomes	  even	  if	  the	  physical	  forms	  are	  similar.	  	  
Previous	  Research	  The	   research	   builds	   on	   a	   body	   of	   work	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   as	   postcolonial	   urban	   theory,	  specifically	   with	   reference	   to	   African	   cities.	   	   Recent	   theory	   departs	   from	   earlier	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postcolonial	   analysis	   in	   suggesting	   the	   development	   of	   alternative	   theories.	   Early	  postcolonial	   analysis	   dealt	   with	   the	   direct	   effects	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   colonialism	  (Freund	   2007).	   Postcolonial	   urban	   theory	   advocates	   incorporating	   the	   “ordinary”	   or	  “shadow”	   realities	   outside	   the	   formal	   economic	   power	   structures	   of	   the	   West	   as	   a	  means	  of	  “worlding”	  urban	  theory	  (Robinson	  2006;	  Legg	  &	  McFarlane	  2008;	  McFarlane	  2008;	  Bunnell	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Short	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Ferguson	  2006a;	  Murray	  2004;	  Roy	  2011).	  Roy	   and	   Ong	   (2011)	   suggest	   that	  worlding	   the	   experience	   of	   cities	   across	   a	   broader	  context	  would	  entail	  accounting	  for	  conditions	  outside	  the	  few	  command	  centers	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  They	  submit	  that	  the	  broader	  experience	  will	  reveal	  relations	  between	  the	  urban	  and	  the	  global	  therein	  creating	  a	  more	  useful	  urban	  theory	  (Scott	  &	  Storper	  2014).	   The	   resulting	   theory	   questions	   global	   convergence	   of	   urban	   development	   by	  suggesting	  that	  consideration	  of	  local	  agency	  reveals	  a	  myriad	  of	  urban	  experiences	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  one	  global	  urban	  norm.	  	  Worlding	  acknowledges	  cities	  outside	  a	  small	  set	  of	  command	  centers	  to	  account	  for	  the	  ‘ordinary’	   cities	   (Storper	   1992;	   Rogerson	   1997;	   Cooper	   2001;	   Cheru	   2002;	  Mosley	  &	  Uno	   2007;	   Rao	   2006;	   Robinson	   2002;	   Mbembe	   &	   Nuttall	   2004).	   Postcolonial	   urban	  theory	   suggests	  grounding	  urban	  studies	   in	   investigations	  of	   subnational	  government	  agencies	   and	   households	   (Parnell	   &	   Pieterse	   2010;	   Sawyer	   2014;	   Pieterse	   2011).	  Through	   a	   comparative	   micro	   level	   analysis	   postcolonial	   theory	   aims	   to	   correct	   the	  overzealous	   neoliberal	   expectation	   that	   public	   goods	   provision	   was	   manageable	  through	   private	   actors	   alone	   (Robinson	   2011).	   The	   analysis	   generally	   reveals	   elite	  enclaves	  segregated	  from	  the	  informal	  unserviced	  reality	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  city	   in	  the	   global	   south,	   and	   particularly	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   (Coquery-­‐Vidrovitch	   2014).	  Postcolonial	  urban	   theory	   raises	  questions	  about	   the	  viability	  of	  using	  a	   few	  Western	  experiences	   to	   theorize	  about	  urban	  development	  but	   it	  does	  not	  provide	  hypotheses	  about	  why	  the	  processes	  are	  different.	  What	  creates	  the	  fragility	  that	  leads	  to	  protests	  across	  the	  urban	  world?	  Postcolonial	  urban	  theory	  makes	  every	  city	  different	  without	   looking	  at	   the	  recurrent	  underlying	  structures	  and	  processes	  (Scott	  &	  Storper	  2014).	  Case	  studies	  of	  one	  major	  city	   fail	   to	   explore	   regional	   and	   national	   influences	   or	   variance.	   A	  more	   holistic	   and	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empirical	   understanding	   of	   the	   dynamism	   and	   inconsistency	   of	   regulation	   across	   a	  whole	  country	  would	  enable	  a	  policy	   that	  can	  more	  closely	  align	  with	   the	   interests	  of	  local	   leaders	   or	   perhaps	   more	   importantly	   enable	   smaller	   landholders	   to	   engage	   in	  formal	   land	   development.	   In	   many	   ordinary	   cities	   entrenched	   business	   structures,	  plural	   governance	   systems,	   limited	   community	   voice	   and	   land	   use	   constraints	   drive	  increasing	  fragility	  and	  inequality	  rather	  than	  market	  forces.	  	  
Research	  Problem	  With	   that	   gap	   in	  past	   research,	  questions	   regarding	  ownership	  and	   land	  use	  in	  urban	  areas	  emerged	  as	  central	  to	  policy	  and	  planning	  during	  the	  post-­‐socialist	  transition	  in	  Tanzania.	   Numerous	   attempts	   have	   been	   made	   to	   replace	   the	   socialist	   ideology	   of	  public	   ownership	   with	   a	   practice	   of	   private	   real	   estate	   development.	   Policymakers	  intended	   the	   reform	   process	   to	   unlock	   housing	   and	   land	   markets	   that	   had	   failed	   to	  provide	  new	  supply	  or	  maintain	  existing	  assets	  (URT	  2000a).	  The	  expectation	  was	  that	  profit	  driven	  action	  would	  better	  respond	  to	  market	  needs	  for	  middle-­‐	  and	  low-­‐income	  housing	  and	  thus	  improve	  quality	  of	  life	  (Brueckner,	  2009;	  World	  Bank,	  1993	  &	  2001;	  UNCHS	   1997;	   Malpezzi	   and	   Sa-­‐Aadu	   1996).	   Another	   expectation	   was	   that	   removing	  excessive	   building	   regulation	   would	   enable	   self-­‐help	   processes	   (Mukhija,	   2001).	   The	  
research	  puzzle	  is	  why	  the	  transition	  process	  did	  not	  occur	  as	  policy	  and	  planning	  models	  
expected	   but	   rather	   created	   a	   glut	   of	   visually	   similar	   high-­‐end	   urban	   forms	   with	  
increasing	  inequality	  and	  fragility.	  	  Perhaps,	  the	  most	  evident	  result	  of	  the	  divergence	  between	  expectations	  and	  reality	  is	  the	   emergence	   of	   large-­‐scale	   urban	   development.	   The	   type	   and	   number	   of	   projects	  contradict	  expected	  outcomes	  from	  national	  policy	  programs	  targeted	  at	  increasing	  the	  supply	   of	   low-­‐income	   housing	   and	   facilitating	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   private	   real	   estate	  market.	  The	  new	  stock	  is	  targeted	  at	  the	  elite	  with	  access	  to	  financing	  and	  large	  capital	  reserves.	  While	  construction	  of	  new	  housing	  added	  stock,	  rental	  and	  sales	  prices	  rose	  rapidly	  creating	  a	  very	   large	  gap	  between	  supply	  and	  demand.	  As	  a	   result,	  Tanzanian	  development	   decisions	   are	   detached	   from	   underlying	  market	   fundamentals.	   So	   then,	  the	  specific	  research	  question	  is:	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How	  are	  local	  institutions	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  interacting	  to	  create	  
urban	   development	   outcomes	   that	   fail	   to	   address	   the	   poor	   majority	   or	  
improve	  living	  conditions?	  	  The	  research	  is	  significant	  because	  it	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  process	  of	  urban	  development	  in	   resource-­‐constrained	   cities.	   The	   work	   builds	   on	   studies	   examining	   the	   effects	   of	  political	  interests	  by	  local	  government	  and	  elite	  business	  actors	  (Murray	  2008a;	  Murray	  &	  Myers	  2006).	  It	  contributes	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  public-­‐private	  dynamics	  in	  low-­‐	  to	  moderate-­‐income	  cities	  so	  that	  we	  can	  explain	  why	  policy	  outcomes	  fail	  to	  improve	  living	  conditions	  in	  cities.	  A	  more	  systematic	  understanding	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  local	   politics	   and	   policy	   will	   enable	   nuanced	   and	   operational	   urban	   development	  policies	  as	  urbanization.	  Continues	  across	  the	  Global	  South	  	  
Research	  Approach	  and	  Methods	  Since	   the	   objective	  was	   to	   uncover	   the	   processes	   driving	   or	   hindering	   new	   forms	   of	  urban	  development,	  I	  conducted	  three	  case	  studies,	  each	  with	  two	  sites	  of	  observation	  at	  the	  subnational	  level.	  The	  analysis	  follows	  the	  “most	  different	  systems”	  comparative	  analysis	  where	  the	  outcomes	  observed	  are	  similar	  but	  the	  underlying	  processes	  differ	  (Meckstroth	  1975).	  The	  variation	  allows	  me	  to	  better	  understand	  cooperative	  actions	  to	  achieve	  public	  and	  private	  goals.	  Thus,	  I	  gain	  insight	  into	  how	  urban	  regimes	  dissolve,	  transform	  or	  endure.	  Furthermore,	  examining	  three	  cities	  allowed	  me	  unpack	  emerging	  spatial	   forms,	  new	  architectural	  models,	  private	   sector	   structure	  and	   the	   role	  of	   local	  government	  in	  planning.	  Case	  study	  research	  design	  is	  appropriate	  because	  I	  analyze	  an	  on-­‐going	  contemporary	  process	  (Ragin,	  2008;	  Ragin	  &	  Becker,	  1992;	  Yin,	  2008).	  The	  case	  study	  methodology	  is	  often	   criticized	   for	   lack	   of	   rigorous	   research	   standards	   and	   generalizability	   (Ragin	  1997;	  King	  et	  al.	  1996).	  Critics	  point	  out	  that	  case	  methods	  are	  rarely	  replicable	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	   to	  confirm	  the	  results	  of	  a	  study.	  Critics	  claim	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  case	  study	  sites	   is	   also	   problematic	   because	   the	   results	   do	   not	   vary	   but	   rather	   exemplify	   the	  phenomenon	   the	   researcher	   is	   attempting	   to	   understand,	   referred	   to	   in	   statistics	   as	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selecting	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  The	  criticism	  misses	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  case	  study	  research	  that	  examines	  a	  process	  (Ragin	  1997).	  Thus,	  selecting	  sites	  that	  have	  similar	  outcomes	   allows	   the	   researcher	   to	   analyze	   different	   processes	   leading	   to	   a	   similar	  outcome.	  Thus	  case	  studies	  may	  be	  better	  used	  to	  make	  analytical	  generalizations	  than	  statistical	  quantitative	  analysis.	  Given	  that	  the	  research	  was	  conducted	  in	  a	  minimally	  researched	  and	  remote	  location,	  the	   criticism	   about	   case	   study	   replicability	   must	   be	   addressed.	   As	   a	   first	   step,	   the	  analysis	  and	  datasets	  was	  shared	  with	  key	  informants	  to	  better	  ground	  and	  verify	  the	  interpretation	  process.	  Several	  research	  protocols	  were	  also	  employed.	  Undue	  bias	  was	  avoided	  by	  constant	   comparisons,	  where	  difference	   sources	  of	  data	  are	   compared	   for	  similarities	   and	  differences	   to	   help	   establish	   the	   veracity	   of	   emerging	   information.	   In	  addition,	   sub-­‐national	   datasets	   about	   urban	   development	   collected	   by	   a	   variety	   of	  agencies	   enabled	   constant	   comparisons	   to	   better	   verify	   information	   collected	   in	   the	  field.	   The	   case	   study	   sampling	   is	   theoretically	   driven	   maximizing	   opportunities	   to	  develop	   concepts	   and	   avoid	   bias.	   Finally,	   fieldwork	   research	   was	   continued	   until	  saturation	   with	   no	   new	   themes	   or	   concepts	   emerging.	   These	   efforts	   provided	   some	  safeguard	   against	   making	   conclusions	   without	   rigorous	   information	   and	   research	  controls.	  The	   research	   design	   has	   both	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses.	   The	   strengths	   include	  replication	  of	  cases	  across	  several	  economic	  contexts	  covering	  a	  variety	  of	  business	  and	  urban	  regime	  types.	  Subnational	  replication	  is	  rarely	  conducted	  in	  the	  African	  context	  and	   is	   designed	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   variance	   in	   urban	   governance	   across	   individual	  countries.	  Another	  strength	  is	  that	  all	  the	  cases	  share	  a	  consistent	  national	  political	  and	  policy	  structure,	  which	  in	  theory	  should	  be	  equally	  influencing	  each	  site.	  One	  weakness	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  consumers	  of	  new	  urban	  development.	  Due	  to	  time	  and	  data	   constraints,	   the	   research	   only	   examines	   urban	   development	   actors	   and	   overall	  trends	   in	   prices	   rather	   than	   individual	   experiences	  with	   new	  development.	   Thus,	   the	  case	   studies	   rely	  on	  key	   informants	  and	  other	  proxies	   to	   identify	  winners	  of	   the	  new	  developments.	  Another	  weakness	  is	  that	  I	  am	  an	  American	  doing	  research	  in	  Tanzania	  and	   thus	   my	   ability	   to	   converse	   in	   Swahili,	   the	   language	   of	   business,	   is	   not	   fluent.	   I	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attempted	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  language	  barrier	  by	  taking	  Swahili	  courses	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	   as	  well	   as	   a	   three-­‐month	   intensive	   emersion	   course	   offered	   through	   the	  State	  University	  of	  Zanzibar.	  Nonetheless,	  conclusions	  are	   limited	  by	  the	  viewpoint	  as	  an	  outsider.	  Methodology	  The	   research	   followed	   a	   subnational	   urban	   comparative	   model	   in	   selecting	   and	  conducting	  case	  studies.	  The	  model	  provides	  variations	   in	   local	  economic	  drivers	  and	  land	   use	   history	   while	   holding	   constant	   socioeconomic	   conditions,	   political	   rules,	  governance	  structure	  and	  financing	  mechanisms	  (Sellers	  2003;	  Campbell	  2003;	  Snyder	  2001b).	   The	   research	  methodology	   allowed	  me	   to	   gain	   insight	   into	   the	   responses	   by	  private	   developers,	   local	   citizens,	   and	   both	   local	   and	   national	   government	  representatives.	  The	  model	  differs	   from	  many	  studies	   in	  African	  urban	  studies,	  which	  focus	  one	  major	  city	  rather	  than	  examining	  regional	  and	  national	  markets.	  	  The	  main	   analysis	   focuses	   on	   case	   studies	   of	   three	   cities:	   Arusha,	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   and	  Mwanza.	   The	   following	   figure	   shows	   the	   ranking	   of	   the	   twenty	   largest	   towns	   in	  Tanzania	   according	   to	   preliminary	   Census	   results	   from	   2012	   (Figure	   1).	   Census	  statistics	   show	   that	   between	   1967	   and	   2002	   the	   urban	   population	   in	   Tanzania	  quadrupled	   but	   the	   overall	   urbanization	   rate	   of	   1.7	   percent	   annually	   is	   still	   low	   by	  global	   standards	   (World	  Bank	  2009).1	  Although	   there	   are	   now	   thirty-­‐two	   towns	  with	  populations	  exceeding	  50,000	  compared	  to	  eleven	  in	  1978,	  there	  are	  few	  large	  cities	  in	  Tanzania.	  In	  fact,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  remains	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  city	  with	  nearly	  4.4	  million	  inhabitants.	   The	   next	   largest	   city	   is	   Mwanza	   with	   approximately	   700,000	   people	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  are	   several	  definitions	  of	  urban	  areas	   in	  Tanzania,	  which	   leads	   to	  a	   relatively	   large	  variance	   in	  urbanization	  statistics.	  The	  smallest	  estimate	  is	  based	  on	  administrative	  designations,	  which	  using	  2002	  census	   statistics	   resulted	   in	   17	   pecent	   urbanization	   rate.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   NBS’s	   definition	   categorizes	  enumeration	   areas	   resulting	   in	   an	   urbanization	   rate	   of	   23	   percent.	   Another	   definition	  measures	   areas	  with	  densities	  higher	  than	  150	  people	  per	  km2	  leading	  to	  a	  33	  percent	  urbanization	  rate	  (World	  Bank,	  2009).	   The	   implication	   is	   that	   the	   political	   designations	   do	   not	   capture	   the	   full	   reality	   of	   communities	  dealing	  with	  urban-­‐like	  conditions.	  Furthermore,	  the	  current	  definitions	  may	  also	  distort	  the	  primacy	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  because	  areas	  surrounding	  secondary	  cities	  are	  often	  still	  designated	  as	  rural	  areas.	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followed	  by	  Arusha	  with	  about	  415,000.	  The	   inset	   table	  also	  shows	  that	  growth	   in	  all	  three	  cities	  outpaced	  overall	  population	  growth	  since	  1978.	  Furthermore,	  growth	  in	  the	  two	   smaller	   cities	   exceeded	  Dar’s	   growth	   between	   1978	   and	   2002	   but	   slowed	   down	  since	  2002.2	  Furthermore,	  the	  three	  cities	  generate	  well	  over	  80%	  of	  the	  country’s	  GDP	  (NBS	   2012b).	   The	   three	   cities	   account	   for	   a	   large	   share	   of	   national	   formal	   urban	  development	  and	  FDI	  (URT	  2013e).	  Finally,	  by	  choosing	  cities	  beyond	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  the	  sampling	  methodology	  responds	  to	  urban	  theorists’	  calls	  to	  examine	  new	  metropolises	  outside	  the	  major	  ones	  (Elsheshtawy,	  2008,	  p.	  32)	  
Figure	  1:	  Tanzania	  Urban	  Population	  Rank	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculations	  based	  on	  URT	  Census	  1978,	  1988,	  2002	  and	  2012	  The	  commonalities	  between	  these	  cities	  relate	   to	  colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	   functions.	  They	   were	   all	   originally	   structured	   as	   towns	   to	   support	   colonial	   extraction	   and	  governance	  (McHenry	  1976;	  Lugalla	  1995).	  They	  all	  have	  large	  under	  serviced	  informal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  increase	  in	  urban	  population	  is	  due	  to	  administrative	  boundary	  changes	  or	   actual	   demographic	   shifts	   due	   to	   limited	   spatial	   data.	   So	   then,	   census	   data	   is	   considered	   the	   best	  approximation	  of	  urban	  growth.	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housing	  developments	  with	  an	  overtaxed	  road	  infrastructure,	  which	  occurred	  as	  public	  investment	   in	   infrastructure	   and	   services	  waned	   throughout	   the	   post-­‐colonial	   period	  (Kombe	  1994;	  Kombe	  2000).	  All	   three	   cities	  experienced	   increases	   in	  population	  and	  sprawl	   due	   to	   liberalization	   policies	   introduced	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   (Bah	   2003;	   Kombe	  2005).3	  The	   three	   cities	   also	   have	   key	   differences.	   The	   cities	   are	   at	   different	   points	   of	   urban	  development.	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   is	   a	   larger	   sprawling	   city	  with	   a	  pattern	  of	  development	  largely	  determined	  by	  past	   informal	   investments.	  Large	  plots	  of	  available	   land	  are	  on	  the	   outskirts	   of	   Dar	   es	   Salaam.	   In	   contrast,	   Mwanza	   is	   relatively	   compact	   with	  undeveloped	   areas	   still	   available	  within	   the	   central	   business	   district.	   Arusha’s	   urban	  development	   is	   somewhere	  between	   the	   two	  with	  more	  built	  up	   suburbs	  and	   central	  business	  district	  than	  Mwanza	  but	  not	  yet	  as	  sprawling	  as	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  The	  drivers	  of	  these	   differences	   include	   the	   local	   political	   and	   programmatic	   history,	   the	   local	  economic	   drivers,	   the	   land	   use	   history	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   undeveloped	   land.	   Dar	   es	  Salaam	  is	  the	  commercial	  capital	  of	  Tanzania.	  Arusha	  is	  the	  tourism	  capital	  of	  Tanzania.	  Mwanza	   is	  a	   regional	   trading	  center.	  These	  characteristics	  allow	  me	   to	  determine	   the	  impact	  of	  national	  constants	  and	  local	  variants	  over	  the	  last	  fifty	  years,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  of	  market-­‐driven	  policy	  reforms.	  	  Within	  each	  case	  study	  I	  selected	  two	  sites	  of	  observation	  with	  a	  combination	  of	  public	  and	   private	   investment.	   In	   each	   case	   study	   city,	   I	   selected	   a	   high-­‐rise	   redevelopment	  site	   and	   a	   satellite	   city	   site	   (Table	   1).	   These	   two	   investment	   types	   encompass	   new	  urban	   development	   forms	   in	   Tanzania.	   The	   site	   selection	   is	   similar	   to	   one	   used	   by	  Daher	   in	  Amman	  Jordan	  where	  he	  divided	  sites	   into	  gated	  communities	  and	  exclusive	  towers	   (Daher	   2005).	   In	   Amman,	   these	   forms	   represent	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   municipal	  government’s	   approach	   to	   urban	   development	   where	   the	   primary	   role	   is	   to	   provide	  utilities,	   future	   development	   planning,	   and	   heritage	  management.	   Furthermore,	   these	  forms	   represent	   elite	  withdrawal	   from	   the	   existing	   city	   either	  pursuing	   a	   garden	   city	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  Tanzanian	   liberalization	  process	  began	   in	  the	   late	  1980’s	  but	  housing	  and	   land	  markets	  were	  not	  addressed	  until	  later	  in	  the	  process	  thus	  the	  research	  spans	  1991	  to	  2012.	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utopian	  experience	  or	  “living	  above	  the	  city	  in	  the	  clouds”	  (Daher	  2005,	  p.62).	  In	  order	  to	  discern	  the	  process	  of	  development	  in	  Tanzania	  I	  selected	  sites	  that	  had	  a	  variety	  of	  characteristics.	   All	   sites	   included	   government	   and	   private	   investors.	   The	   types	   of	  partnerships	   between	   investors	   varied	   as	   well	   as	   the	   resulting	   type	   of	   investment.	  Finally,	  the	  community	  response	  to	  the	  sites	  ranged	  from	  direct	  protest	  to	  pressure	  on	  the	  area’s	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  (MP)	  to	  no	  organized	  response.	  These	  variations	  allow	  me	  to	  consider	  a	  range	  of	  causes	  and	  effects.	  
Table	  1:	  Characteristics	  of	  Sites	  of	  Observation	  	   Dar	  es	  Salaam	   Arusha	   Mwanza	  
Location	   CBD	   Periphery	   CBD	   Periphery	   CBD	   Periphery	  
Site	   Upanga	   Kigamboni	   Kaloleni	   Usa	   Mirongo	   Kiseke	  
Developer	   Local	  Investor	   &	  Parastatal	  
Local	  Investor	   &	  Ministry	  
Local	  Investor	   &	  Municipality	  




Yes	   No	   No	   Yes	   No	   No	  
Partnerships	   Mixed	   Mixed	   Private	   Private	   Private	   PPP	  
Predominant	  
Type	  
Residential	   Residential	   Hotel	   Residential	   Office	   Residential	  
Community	  
Response	  
None	   Pressure	  on	  MP	   Protest	   Protest	   None	   None	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  The	  dissertation	  fieldwork	  took	  place	  between	  August	  2011	  and	  September	  2012.	  Early	  semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   revealed	   that	   the	   motivations	   and	   structure	   of	   urban	  development	   actors	  were	   still	   poorly	   accounted	   for	   in	   planning	   and	   policy	   literature.	  Thus	  the	  original	  intention	  to	  conduct	  a	  household	  survey	  would	  not	  reveal	  these	  issues.	  I	   conducted	   96	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   interviews	   ranging	   from	   15	   minutes	   to	   2	   hours.	   The	  interviews	   included	   individually	   specific	   questions,	   sector	   specific	   questions,	   and	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general	   urban	   questions	   administered	   to	   all	   respondents.	   Interviewees	   were	   chosen	  because	   they	  were	  key	   figures	   in	   contemporary	  urban	  development	  nationally	  and	   in	  the	  case	  study	  cities.	  These	  interviewees	  helped	  me	  understand	  different	  perspectives	  on	   the	   practices	   of	   actors	   from	   local	   government,	   central	   ministries,	   pension	   funds,	  parastatals,	   banks,	   private	   businesses,	   and	   non-­‐profits.	   The	   combination	   of	   these	  perspectives	   provided	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   urban	   development	   process.	   Other	  interviewees	  were	   local	   residents	  who	   shared	   their	   experiences	  with	   the	   new	   urban	  development.	   These	   interviews	   gave	   some	   indication	   how	   urban	   development	   is	  changing	  local	  livelihoods	  but	  the	  sample	  size	  and	  informality	  of	  the	  interviews	  do	  not	  provide	  detailed	  insight.	  In	  most	  cases,	  interviews	  were	  obtained	  using	  references	  from	  previous	   interviewees	   or	   snowballing.	   The	   appointments	   were	   generally	   made	   by	  phone	  and	  conducted	   in	  a	   combination	  of	  English	  and	  Swahili.	  Generally,	   I	   conducted	  the	   interviews	   myself	   but	   in	   some	   cases,	   particularly	   in	   Mwanza,	   a	   local	   colleague	  accompanied	   me.	   In	   these	   instances	   the	   interviews	   were	   largely	   in	   Swahili	   and	   we	  would	  discuss	  the	  veracity	  of	  information	  and	  the	  overall	  tone	  of	  the	  interview	  after	  we	  completed	  our	  appointment.	  	  I	   also	   collected	   and	   analyzed	   secondary	   data	   on	   urban	   development.	   Although	   there	  have	  been	  several	  attempts	  to	  collect	  pricing	  and	  ownership	  information	  the	  effort	  has	  yielded	  limited	  results,	  therefore	  there	  is	  no	  up	  to	  date	  property	  or	  population	  registry.	  I	  had	  originally	  hoped	  to	  use	  transaction	  and	  ownership	  information	  but	  the	  data	  was	  not	  available	  to	  outsiders.	  In	  fact,	  in	  some	  instances	  basic	  planning	  documents	  were	  not	  even	   available.	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   a	   frustrating	   lack	   of	   secondary	   data	   on	   the	  property	  market.	  	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  a	  way	  around	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  in	  either	  Arusha	  or	  Mwanza,	  thus	  those	  case	  studies	  do	  not	  address	  price	  dynamics.	  Although	  in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   I	   collected	   information	   from	   a	   free	   weekly	   newspaper	   archive,	  Advertising	  Dar,	  which	  gave	  me	  some	  insight	  into	  how	  pricing	  had	  changed	  across	  the	  city	  and	  over	  time.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  national	  data	  on	  construction	  costs,	  construction	  contract	   expenditures,	   real	   estate	   investment	   and	   annual	   bank	   reports.	   These	   data	  helped	  me	  understand	  the	  change	  in	  urban	  development	  investment	  over	  time.	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At	  each	  case	  study	  site	  I	  conducted	  a	  land	  use	  analysis	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  verified	  the	  data	  by	  using	  satellite	   imagery.	   I	  verified	  field	  notes	  on	  existing	   land	  use	  with	  current	  Google	  Earth	  imagery	  and	  then	  compared	  with	  historical	  Google	  Earth	  imagery.	  In	  each	  city	  I	  also	  analyzed	  the	  macro	  level	  change	  in	  urban	  forum	  using	  census	  data	  from	  1967	  through	  2012	  to	  create	  a	  density	  profile.	  In	  addition,	  I	  analyzed	  the	  evolution	  of	  housing	  and	   urban	   planning	   policies	   by	   examining	   national	   policy	   documents,	   laws	   and	  municipal	  plans	  since	   the	  end	  of	  colonialism.	  The	  analysis	  reveals	  an	   increasing	   focus	  on	   local	   capacity	   to	   implement	   and	   manage	   urban	   planning	   projects,	   which	   gives	  further	  credence	  to	  the	  subnational	  research	  design.	  The	  analysis	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	   the	   changing	   sociopolitical	   and	   economic	   conditions	   in	   which	   urban	   development	  takes	  place	  in	  Tanzania.	  
Conclusion:	  Main	  Findings	  and	  Future	  Research	  The	   project	   contributes	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   urbanization	   outside	   the	   western	  context	   through	   a	   comparative	   approach	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   urban	   development	   in	   the	  global	  south	  compared	  to	  our	  model	  of	  urban	  regimes	  in	  the	  American	  context	  and	  the	  questions	   raised	   by	   African	   urban	   planning	   literature.	   South-­‐South	   globalization	  increasingly	  influences	  the	  form	  of	  urban	  development.	  That	  is,	  the	  analyzed	  forms	  are	  based	  on	  ideals	  generated	  in	  Singapore,	  China	  and	  Dubai.	  In	  fact,	  designs	  replicate	  best	  practices	   from	   these	   markets.	   In	   Tanzania,	   these	   forms	   contribute	   to	   a	   modular	  urbanism	   that	   is	   brought	   about	   by	   a	   plural	   and	   opaque	   development	   process.	   Urban	  development	   is	   driven	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   informal	   and	   formal	   rules,	   which	   are	  determined	  by	  local	  land	  use	  history,	  the	  structure	  of	  business	  elites,	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  control	   by	   the	   central	   government.	   In	   internationally	   connected	   and	   economically	  dynamic	  cities	  the	  interaction	  can	  create	  a	  price	  inflationary	  moment	  causing	  a	  bubble	  and	  development	  cascade	  (Adams	  &	  Füss	  2010;	  Brunnermeier	  &	  Julliard	  2008;	  Bunda	  &	  Ca’	   Zorzi	   2009).	   The	   result	   is	   a	   glut	   of	   development	   for	   high-­‐income	   consumers	   and	  marginalization	  of	  existing	  low-­‐income	  majorities.	  Instead	   of	   minimizing	   government	   agencies’	   role	   in	   urban	   development	   recent	  governance	   changes	   created	   a	   competition	   to	   capture	   the	   benefits	   of	   increasing	   land	  value.	   Plural	   governance	   systems	   allow	   the	   manipulation	   of	   contradictory	   planning	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schemes	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  existing	  powerbrokers	  (Schlyter	  2004).	  They	  have	  access	  not	  only	   to	   land	   claims	   but	   also	   financing	   mechanisms	   from	   both	   domestic	   and	  international	  capital	  (Jenkins,	  2006).	  Rather	  than	  unleashing	  market	  forces	  the	  changes	  in	   regulation	  and	  ownership	   increased	   the	  dominance	  of	  existing	  business	  structures,	  coalitions,	   power	   distribution	   and	   informal	   leveraging	   for	   elites	   to	   continue	   gaining	  power.	   The	   private	   sector	   remains	   a	   vague	   rhetorical	   policy	   device	   for	   planning	  agencies	  that	  need	  to	  give	  the	  appearance	  of	  reform	  and	  action	  in	  the	  face	  of	  legitimacy	  threats	  (Schlyter	  2004).	  The	  community	  response	  varies	  but	  seems	  to	  become	  violent	  when	  informal	  land	  use	  rules	  are	  no	  longer	  available	  in	  situations	  of	  land	  scarcity.	  Urban	  theory	  can	  move	  past	  the	  current	  cul-­‐de-­‐sac	  of	  question	  posing	  towards	  a	  more	  explanatory	   model	   accounting	   for	   existing	   conditions.	   Both	   enabling	   markets	   and	  postcolonial	  theory	  focus	  on	  the	  wrong	  problems.	  	  The	  result	  of	  both	  theories	  to	  date	  is	  an	  undue	  focus	  on	  the	  steps	  involved	  in	  getting	  a	  permit,	  obtaining	  title	  and	  accessing	  finance.	   The	   focus	   distracts	   from	   providing	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   that	   would	  reduce	   project	   costs	   so	   that	   urban	   development	   could	   respond	   to	   local	   shelter	   and	  business	   needs.	   Thus,	   a	  more	   beneficial	   focus	  might	   be	   empowering	   local	   entities	   to	  prioritize,	  plan	  and	  provide	   infrastructure	  and	  services.	  While	  measuring	   the	  steps	   in	  the	   construction	   process	   is	   important,	   the	   effort	   should	   not	   detract	   from	   ensuring	   a	  long-­‐term	  vision	  and	  development	  plan	  for	  a	  city.	  	  The	  research	  opens	  up	  many	  avenues	  for	  future	  work.	  One	  important	  question	  I	  did	  not	  answer	   is	   who	   is	   consuming	   the	   new	   urban	   development	   spaces	   and	   how	   are	   they	  gaining	  access.	  Another	  line	  of	  research	  would	  compare	  the	  experience	  in	  Tanzania	  to	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  Finally,	  looking	  across	  more	  protests	  to	  better	  understand	  insurgent	  planning	  and	  demands	  for	  greater	  voice	  across.	  These	  moments	  might	  shed	  light	  into	  rising	  urban	  opposition	  parties	  across	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  the	  potential	  to	  improve	   the	   status	   quo	   in	   urban	   areas.	   This	   research	   would	   create	   opportunities	   to	  generalize	  across	  different	  contexts	  about	  increasing	  inequality	  and	  fragility	  in	  the	  face	  of	  larger	  investment	  and	  development.	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Chapter	  Outline	  
Private	  Market	  Outcomes:	  The	  chapter	  investigates	  the	  roots	  of	  policy	  and	  economic	  theory	  that	  encourages	  private	  led	  urban	  development.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  detailing	  the	   enabling	  markets	   theory	   expectations	   and	   assumptions.	   Out	   of	   enabling	  markets	  theory	   grew	   a	   new	   type	   of	   urbanism	   that	   depends	   on	   standardized	   development,	  investment	  that	   is	  disconnected	   from	  local	  demand	  and	  forms	  that	  are	  detached	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  city.	  In	  particular,	  I	  submit	  that	  a	  type	  of	  modular	  urbanism	  resulted	  in	  redeveloped	  high-­‐rise	  central	  cities	  and	  satellite	  cities.	  Much	  like	  the	  suggestion	  of	  post-­‐colonial	  theorists,	  these	  outcomes	  are	  the	  result	  of	  failing	  to	  account	  for	  specific	  reality	  including	  entrenched	  business	  structures	  engaged	  in	  resource	  capture	  as	  well	  as	  plural	  governance	  structures	  that	  use	  urban	  development	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  of	  deflection.	  
Tanzanian	   Urban	   Policy	   History:	   The	   chapter	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   policy	   and	  institutional	   changes	   related	   to	   urban	   development	   since	   Tanzania	   gained	  independence	   in	   1961.	   While	   highly	   descriptive,	   the	   chapter	   provides	   a	   context	   for	  urban	  development	   in	  Tanzania.	  The	   analysis	   reveals	   two	   reform	  programs.	  The	   first	  followed	   a	   socialist	   ideology	   and	   the	   second	   a	   market	   oriented	   approach.	   The	  institutional	   power	   structure	   shifted	   along	   two	   dimensions:	   public	   to	   private	   and	  informal	  to	  formal.	  	  
Arusha:	  The	  chapter	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  land	  use	  history	  and	  investment	  in	   contributing	   to	   community	   protests.	   Politics	   of	   ownership	   (Ponte	   2004)	   results	   in	  negative	  reactions	  to	  changes	  in	  informal	  land	  use	  because	  the	  value	  of	  land	  is	  so	  high	  and	   attractive	   to	   investors	   from	  outside	   the	   local	  market.	   	   Arusha	   also	   highlights	   the	  variation	   in	   international	   influence	   across	   one	   country	   because	   the	   tourism	   industry	  attracts	   investors	   from	   abroad.	   The	   emerging	   modular	   forms	   in	   Arusha	   highlight	  private	   sector	   focus	   on	   the	   short-­‐term	   profitability	   rather	   than	   a	   coherent	   long-­‐term	  urban	  planning	  vision,	  which	  responds	  to	  local	  supply	  and	  demand	  drivers.	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam:	  The	  chapter	  examines	  the	  experience	  with	  redevelopment	  in	  Upanga	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	   to	  build	  a	  satellite	  city	   in	  Kigamboni.	  The	  case	  studies	  reveal	  central	  government	   agencies	   projecting	   power	   through	   policy	   and	   program	  pronouncements	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that	  create	  competition	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  private	  sector	  behaviors	  differently	   in	   the	   central	   city	   compared	   to	   the	   periphery.	   In	   the	   central	   city	   private	  investment	   is	   a	   networked	   web	   of	   businesses	   that	   obscure	   ownership	   and	   allow	  informal	   practices.	   On	   the	   periphery	   private	   investment	   is	   more	   limited	   and	   fails	   to	  compete	   with	   central	   government	   investments.	   Overall,	   the	   development	   process	  demonstrates	  modular	  urbanism.	  
Mwanza: The	   chapter	   details	   that	   Mwanza’s	   development	   does	   not	   exhibit	   modular	  urbanism	   but	   rather	   development	   connected	   to	   local	   demand.	   While	   Mwanza’s	  urbanization	   is	   increasingly	   dense	   and	   large-­‐scale	   investors	   are	   local	   with	   linear	  structures	  that	  do	  not	  obscure	  power	  structures.	  The	  governance	  structure	  is	  singular	  with	   some	   degree	   of	   regulatory	   capacity.	   The	   result	   is	   urban	   development	   that	  responds	  to	  local	  demands	  and	  precedes	  population	  growth.	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Chapter	  2:	  Private	  Market	  Outcomes	  
Introduction	  Accounting	  for	  for	  local	  conditions,	  as	  suggested	  by	  postcolonial	  theorists,	  reveals	  that	  private	   market	   reforms	   created	   conditions	   for	   the	   development	   of	   large-­‐scale	   urban	  forms	   targeted	   at	   a	   small	   portion	   of	   the	   population.	   These	   forms	   reflect	   a	   strategy	  employed	   by	   political	   actors	   and	   business	   elites	   to	   cut	   through	   on	   the	   ground	   issues	  related	   to	   the	   construction	   and	   development	   process.	   Issues	   include	   opaque	   land	  markets,	  infrastructure	  as	  a	  premium	  good,	  undeveloped	  financial	  markets,	  and	  poorly	  enforced	   planning	   regulations.	   In	   response	   urban	   development	   becomes	   a	   selective	  process	   of	   minimizing	   exposure	   to	   these	   issues	   through	   replication	   of	   similar	   forms	  without	   regard	   to	   local	   market	   demand	   for	   space.	   The	   resulting	   urban	   development	  meets	   speculative	   demand	   rather	   than	   theoretical	   expectations	   of	   responsiveness	   to	  shelter	   demand	   and	   improved	   livelihoods.	   Urban	   development	   is	   determined	   by	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  private	  and	  public	  entities	  and	  plural	  governance	  removing	  local	  agency	  of	  the	  majority.	  With	  private	  market	  reforms	  urban	  development	  became	  a	  political	  process	  controlled	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  local	  stakeholders.	  This	  helps	  explain	  that	  recent	  protests	  against	  private	  urban	  development	  are	  a	  response	  to	  a	  set	  of	   reforms	   that	   failed	   to	   consider	   existing	   conditions	   and	   left	   the	   majority	   with	   few	  options	  to	  access	  the	  city.	  	  In	   many	   countries	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	   the	   pressure	   to	   reorient	   urban	   planning,	  development	   and	   management	   grew	   as	   social	   experiments	   failed	   due	   to	   declining	  economic	  and	  living	  conditions	  (Krijnen	  &	  Fawaz	  2010;	  McCann	  &	  Ward	  2011;	  Wakely	  1988;	  Arku	  2006b;	  Pugh	  1994a;	  Pugh	  1994b;	  Pugh	  1995;	  Snyder	  2001a).	  Across	  many	  sectors,	  government	  agencies	  pursued	  courses	  of	  liberalization	  to	  minimize	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	   (Brenner	  &	  Theodore	  2002;	  Weber	  2002;	  Valenca	  2010;	  Bond	  2005).	   In	   the	  urban	  context,	  the	  pressure	  to	  reorient	  originated	  from	  advocacy	  groups	  delineating	  the	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“right	   to	   housing”	   for	   all	   urban	   residents	   (Turner	   1983;	   Pugh	   1994b;	  Mukhija	   2001;	  Mukhija	   2004).	  With	  pressure	   to	   change,	  municipal	   and	   central	   government	   agencies	  acknowledged	   growing	   urban	   failures	   and	   consulted	   international	   arenas	   for	   a	   new	  approach	   (Harris	   &	   Arku	   2006).	   Existing	   policies	   were	   revaluated	   across	   the	   globe	  through	   a	   series	   of	   international	   conferences,	   calls	   to	   action	   and	   large-­‐scale	   analytic	  programs	  (Pugh	  2001).	  	  The	  resulting	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  suggests	  a	  restructuring	  of	  the	  state	  at	  all	  levels	  where	   efficiency	   and	   competition	   drive	   government	   investment	   while	   relying	   on	  filtering	   to	  provide	  housing	   for	   the	  neediest	   (Krijnen	  &	  Fawaz	  2010;	  McCann	  &	  Ward	  2011;	  Gibbs	  et	  al.	  2013;	  Baer	  1991;	  Harris	  &	  Arku	  2006;	  Pugh	  2001).	  Market	  enabling	  emphasizes	  strengthening	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  community	  organizations	  and	  the	   individual	   (World	   Bank	   1993;	   UN-­‐HABITAT	   2008a;	   United	   Nations	   1992;	   UN-­‐HABITAT	  2006;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  1988;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  1996).	  The	  pluralistic	  conception	  of	  housing	   provision	   leverages	   cost	   savings	   on	   land,	   building	   materials,	   and	   finance	  through	   private	   and	   community	   resources	   to	   create	   a	  more	   affordable	   and	   equitable	  housing	   sector.	   Enabling	  markets	   theory	   suggests	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   deregulations	  will	  improve	  living	  conditions	  and	  urban	  form	  through	  competitive	  private	  investment.	  Yet,	   enabling	   markets	   theory	   does	   not	   fully	   account	   for	   the	   “ordinary”	   or	   “shadow”	  realities	  of	  urban	  development	   in	  many	  countries	   (Robinson	  2006;	  Legg	  &	  McFarlane	  2008;	  McFarlane	  2008;	  Bunnell	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Short	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Ferguson	  2006a;	  Murray	  2004).	  Widespread	  attempts	  to	  follow	  an	  urban	  development	  path	  underpinned	  by	  the	  enabling	  markets	   theory	   led	   to	   increased	  development	  but	  also	   inequality.	   Increasing	  inequality	   suggests	   that	  markets	   are	   not	   inherently	   competitive	  with	   a	  more	   limited	  government	   role	   (Mukhija	   2001).	   Instead	   in	  many	   “ordinary”	   cities	   the	   reality	   is	   that	  local	   governments	   have	   few	   resources	   for	   public	   good	   provision	   or	   regulatory	  enforcement.	   Furthermore,	   private	   sector	   investors	   are	   drawn	   from	   a	   small	   elite	  network	  of	  local	  powerbrokers.	  So	  even	  though	  policy	  ideas	  are	  transferred	  across	  the	  globe,	   implementation	   is	   grounded	   in	   local	   context	   and	   growth	   coalitions	   (McCann	  &	  Ward	  2011,	  pp.xiv	  –	  xv).	  In	  sum,	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  broke	  urban	  planning	  down	  into	  an	  assemblage	  of	  policy	  ideals	  without	  a	  means	  to	  account	  for	  local	  reality.	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The	  outcome	  of	  overlooking	  reality	  is	  modular	  urbanism	  with	  a	  glut	  of	  exclusive	  urban	  spaces	   in	   redeveloped	  high-­‐rise	   central	  business	  districts	   and	  satellite	   cities4	  (Watson	  2013).	  Modular	  urbanism	  is	  the	  production	  of	  identical	  urban	  forms	  without	  regard	  to	  the	   local	   context	   by	  mobile	   investors	   with	   access	   to	   liquid	   capital.	   It	   is	   the	   result	   of	  investors’	   and	   government	   agencies’	   drive	   for	   more	   consistent	   and	   predictable	   cash	  flow.	   So	   the	   outcome	   is	   standardized	   urban	   forms	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   capital	  movement	   rather	   than	   responses	   to	   local	   demands	   for	   space.	   Modular	   urbanism	   is	  observable	  in	  two	  forms	  –	  redeveloped	  high-­‐rise	  central	  business	  districts	  and	  satellite	  cities.	   These	   forms	   are	   large-­‐scale,	   contemporary,	   expensive	   and	   opportunistic.	   The	  traditional	   supply	   and	   demand	   drivers	   described	   by	   urban	   economics	   play	   a	   very	  limited	   role	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   these	   forms	   but	   rather	   a	   distorted	   secondary	   set	   of	  drivers	   aimed	   to	   protect	   investors	   and	   capital	   (Arnott	   2008;	   Malpezzi	   1994).	   These	  forms	   are	   mimic	   global	   ideals	   of	   efficiency	   and	   modernity.	   The	   project	   designs	   are	  homogenous	  with	  steel	  and	  glass	  towers	  targeting	  elite	  consumers	  with	  access	  to	  global	  flows	  of	  capital.	  Modular	  urbanism	  contributes	  to	  a	  splintering	  or	  collaged	  urban	  form	  with	  new	  developments	  separated	  from	  the	  informal	  unserviced	  reality	  of	  the	  majority	  of	   the	   city	   (Elsheshtawy	   2008,	   p.49;	   Coutard	   2008;	   Graham	   2001;	   Odendaal	   2011;	  Zerah	  2008;	  Davis	  1992;	  Davis	  2006;	  Caldeira	  1996;	  Marvin	  &	  Graham	  2001).	  	  The	   following	  chapter	  will	   first	  explore	  enabling	  markets	   theory	  and	   the	  policies	   that	  followed	   from	   it.	   Although	   the	   theory	  was	   first	   posited	   in	   the	   1980’s	   it	   continues	   to	  dominate	   urban	  management	  with	  widely	   adopted	   reform	   programs	   across	   not	   only	  Africa	  but	  the	  entire	  globe	  (Tibaijuka	  2009).	  Municipal	  governments	  across	  the	  global	  south	  dismantled	  rent	  control	  legislation	  and	  public	  housing	  portfolios	  (Tibaijuka	  2009;	  De	   Magalhaes	   2002).	   Then	   potential	   causes	   of	   the	   failure	   to	   transform	   urban	  development	   in	   many	   low-­‐income	   countries	   are	   detailed.	   Overall,	   relying	   on	   private	  investment	  to	  overcome	  planning	  issues	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  modular	  urbanism.	  Thus	   the	   chapter	   investigates	   the	   type	  of	  urban	  development	   that	  did	  proliferate	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  I	   will	   use	   the	   term	   satellite	   cities	   to	   encompass	   developments	   variously	   termed	   gated	   communities,	  satellite	  cities	  and	  new	  towns.	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the	  underlying	   realities	   that	  drive	   the	  proliferation	  of	   similar	  urban	   forms	   across	   the	  globe.	   The	   rapid	   proliferation	   of	  modular	   forms	   is	   explained	   by	   the	   interplay	   of	   two	  realities.	  The	  first	  reality	  is	  that	  modular	  forms	  reflect	  a	  political	  opportunity.	  Modular	  forms	  result	  from	  government	  agencies’	  interest	  in	  claiming	  cutting	  edge	  changes	  while	  avoiding	   the	   backlash	   against	   failures	   of	   locally	   driven	   forms.	   In	   particular,	   African	  leaders	   find	  modularity	  attractive	  when	   facing	  rising	  electoral	  challenges	   from	  urban-­‐based	   opposition	   parties.	   This	   becomes	   important	   when	   considering	   the	   Tanzanian	  case	  studies.	  A	  second	  reality	  is	  elite	  power	  consolidation.	  Modularity	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  elite	  networks’	  domination	  of	  business	  structures,	  coalitions,	  and	  power	  distributions.	  With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  modular	  urbanism	  the	  potential	  for	  expanding	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  city	  beyond	  the	  urban	  elite	  remains	  unmet	  by	  private	  sector	  led	  investment.	  
Enabling	  Markets	  Theory	  The	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  derives	  assumptions	  from	  urban	  economics	  and	  financial	  market	   theory	   instead	   of	   urban	   space	   as	   a	   human	   right	   guaranteed	   by	   citizenship	  (Elsheshtawy	   2008).	   According	   to	   the	   theory,	   resource	   constrained	   governments	  ineptly	   manage	   urban	   development	   as	   a	   social	   asset.	   A	   better	   alternative	   would	   be	  urban	   development	   driven	   by	   individual	   choice	   as	   suggested	   by	   urban	   economics.	   It	  follows	   that	   the	   supply	   of	   urban	   space	   becomes	   inelastic	   when	   regulation	   decreases	  consumers’	   options	   thus	   pushing	  up	  prices	   (Buckley	  &	  Mayo	  1988;	  Malpezzi	  &	  Mayo	  1997b;	  Malpezzi	  &	  Mayo	  1987;	  Green	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Malpezzi	  &	  Mayo	  1997a).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  ultimate	  shape	  of	  land	  use	  in	  a	  given	  city	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  rental	  threshold	  determined	  by	  a	  bid-­‐rent	  process	  where	  various	  uses	  vie	  for	  land	  and	  property	  assets	  (Alonso	  1960;	  Demsetz	  1967;	  Alchian	  &	  Demsetz	  1973).	  The	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  posits	  that	  bad	  regulations	   and	   institutions	   distort	   the	   bid-­‐rent	   process.	   The	   combination	   creates	   a	  vicious	   cycle	   of	   insecure	   unsustainable	   living	   conditions	   and	   housing	   disinvestment	  (World	   Bank	   1993;	   United	   Nations	   1992;	   UN-­‐HABITAT	   1988;	   Mabogunje	   1990;	  Strassmann	  1982).	  Within	  this	  theoretical	  framework,	  the	  aim	  of	  urban	  policy	  becomes	  profit	  maximization	  through	  market	  based	  real	  estate	  development	  coinciding	  with	  the	  highest	   and	  best	   use	   of	   the	   bid-­‐rent	   process	   (Malpezzi	   2000;	  Buckley	  &	  Mayo	  1988).	  The	  democratic	  nature	  of	  this	  process	  then	  creates	  efficiency	  and	  reduces	  costs.	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In	  addition,	  assumptions	  from	  financial	  market	  theory	  suggest	  that	  increasing	  access	  to	  financing	  mechanisms	  will	  further	  democratize	  urban	  development.	  The	  theory	  is	  that	  mortgage	   financing	  equalizes	  buying	  power	  across	   income	  groups	  by	  allowing	   lower-­‐income	   individuals	   to	   smooth	   their	   housing	   consumption	   across	   the	   term	  of	   the	   loan	  (Renaud	  1997;	  Tipple	  1994;	  Piazzesi	  et	  al.	  2007).	  Mortgages	  then	  reduce	  demand-­‐side	  bottlenecks	   and	   allow	   greater	   consumer	   choice.	   Meanwhile	   on	   the	   supply	   side,	  developers’	  ability	  to	  build	  improves	  with	  access	  to	  debt	  financing	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  overcome	   construction	   project’s	   large	   start	   up	   costs.	  With	  wider	   availability	   of	   debt,	  property	  functions	  as	  a	   financial	  asset	  managed	  by	  the	  individual	  and	  a	  for-­‐profit	  real	  estate	   industry	   (Mukhija	   2001;	  Ndubueze	   2009;	  Mukhija	   2004).	   As	   a	   result,	   land	   use	  distortions	   disappear	   and	   consumer	   choices	  multiply	   through	   increased	   construction	  projects	   made	   possible	   by	   fewer	   financial	   restrictions	   (Malpezzi	   1994).	   These	  assumptions	   lead	  to	  a	   focus	  on	  reforming	  mortgage	   finance	  markets,	   increasing	  home	  ownership	   and	   reducing	   direct	   public	   provision	   of	   construction	   projects	   (Chiquier	   &	  Lea	  2009).	  The	  reform	  process	  resulting	  from	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  calls	  for	  reduced	  subsidies,	  regulations	  and	  public	   institutions	  and	   increased	  private	   investment.	  The	   first	   step	   in	  the	   reform	   process	   is	   a	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   of	   policy	   options	   revealing	   the	   “right”	  regulations	   as	  well	   as	   the	   “wrong”	   regulations	   creating	   bottlenecks	   (Malpezzi	   1994).	  Viewed	   through	   the	   lens	  of	   cost	   benefit,	  many	   state	   sponsored	   subsidy	  programs	  are	  “wrong”.	   These	   programs	   lack	   financial	   sustainability,	   are	   untargeted,	   and	   are	  susceptible	  to	  government	  corruption.	  In	  place	  of	  these	  programs,	  the	  “right”	  subsidies	  are	  income	  targeted	  lump	  sum	  transfers	  enabling	  individual	  choice	  (Choguill	  2007).	  In	  turn,	   lump	  sum	  transfers	  remove	  the	   involvement	  of	   institutions	  creating	  bottlenecks.	  Fewer	  public	   institutions	   interfering	   leads	   to	   the	   second	   step	   in	   the	   reform	  program:	  implementing	  changes	  that	  decentralize	  decision	  making,	  privatize	  property	  assets,	  and	  deregulate	   land	   markets	   (Pugh	   1994b;	   Mukhija	   2001;	   Zanetta	   2004).	   The	   role	   of	  government	   agencies	   becomes	   reducing	   externalities	   to	   competitive	   urban	  development.	   In	   order	   to	   reduce	   externalities,	   government	   agencies	   should	   focus	   on	  provision	   of	   universal	   infrastructure,	   clear	   property	   rights,	   and	   mortgage	   market	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support	  (Fay	  &	  Opal	  2000;	  Noronha	  &	  Lethem	  1983;	  Migot-­‐adholla	  et	  al.	  1991).	  Within	  the	  enabling	  markets	  theory,	  reforming	  institutions	  to	  fulfill	  these	  roles	  is	  costless	  with	  seamless	  implementation	  of	  new	  regulations	  (Arnott	  2008).	  Reformed	  institutions	  and	  regulations	   “democratize”	   land	   and	   property	   markets	   leading	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  more	   efficient	   sustainable	   city	   serving	   all	   income	   segments.	   With	   more	   democratic	  markets,	   low-­‐income	   households	   benefit	   through	   filtering	   of	   older	   space	   due	   to	  increased	  space	  in	  the	  city	  (Baer	  1991).	  	  Problematic	  Assumptions	  within	  Enabling	  Markets	  Theory	  The	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  offered	  many	  insights	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  improve	  urban	  development,	  yet	  it	  doesn’t	  account	  for	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  limited	  access,	  financial	  resources	   and	   capacity	   within	   the	   existing	   system.	   The	   result	   is	   that	   the	   theory	   has	  limited	   applicability	   in	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   world	   attempting	   to	   solve	   urban	  development	  issues.	  The	  theory	  is	  predicated	  on	  several	  assumptions	  that	  don’t	  occur	  in	   many	   contexts,	   particularly	   in	   Africa.	   Missing	   variable	   bias	   occurs	   because	   the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  shelter	  and	  urban	  development	  issues	  in	  much	  of	  the	  global	  south	  are	  not	   accounted	   for.	   In	  many	   contexts	   urban	  development	   is	   not	   just	   about	   limited	  supply	   and	   availability	   of	   finance	   but	   rather	   overall	   access	   to	   jobs	   and	   affordable	  accommodation.	  The	   first	   problematic	   assumption	   is	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   distortions	   created	   by	  institutions,	   such	   as	   unclear	   property	   rights,	   urban	   development	   is	   a	   perfectly	  competitive	   market	   (Arnott	   2008).	   In	   theory,	   externalities	   are	   minimized	   through	  piecemeal	   policies.	   In	   practice,	   minimizing	   externalities	   requires	   large-­‐scale	  coordinated	  and	  expensive	   reform	  programs.	  For	   instance,	   land	   titling	  programs	  on	  a	  small	   scale	   create	   opportunities	   for	   resource	   grabbing	   by	  wealthy	   or	  well-­‐connected	  individuals.	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   mounting	   evidence	   that	   formal	   title	   decreases	  security	   of	   tenure	   and	   leads	   to	   increased	   economic	   polarization	   (Mitchell	   2006).	   The	  implication	   is	   that	   an	   informal	   market	   discount	   makes	   housing	   more	   accessible	   for	  many	  households	  (Payne	  et	  al.	  2009).	  With	  partial	  reforms	  land	  management	  systems	  remain	   ambiguous,	   plural	   and	   indeterminate	   creating	   increased	   power	   disparities	  (Peters	   2004,	   p.	   270).	   Creating	   clear	   property	   rights	   require	   comprehensive,	   well-­‐
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coordinated,	   expensive	   reforms	   by	   strong	   public	   agencies	   that	   are	   missing	   from	   the	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  of	  urban	  development.	  Another	  problematic	  assumption	  is	  that	  prioritization	  and	  sequencing	  of	  reforms	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  outcome	  leaving	  policymakers	  to	  muddle	  through.	  Consider	  the	  difficulty	  of	  municipal	   governments	   across	   the	   globe	   to	   smoothly	   transition	   to	   universal	  water	  and	   wastewater	   treatment,	   even	   in	   the	   Western	   context	   (Gandy	   2006;	   Gandy	   2004;	  Gandy	  2005;	  Gandy	  2002;	  Gandy	  2008).	  The	  provision	  of	  nearly	  universal	  water	  service	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  industrial	  city	  was	  a	  long-­‐term	  process	  that	  required	  a	  moral	  obligation	  by	  municipal	  management	  to	  extend	  service	  over	  many	  decades.	  The	  process	  required	  strong	  expropriation	  rights,	  relocation,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  municipal	  bonds	  as	  well	  as	  a	  strong	  public	  governance	  system.	  The	  messy	  history	  of	  infrastructure	  provision	  in	  the	  Western	  context	  is	  ignored	  in	  current	  theory.	  In	  contrast	  the	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  of	   enabling	  markets	   assumes	   that	  universal	  of	  water	  provision	   is	   costless	   and	   timely.	  The	   need	   to	   prioritize	   service	   provision	   prior	   to	   development	   is	   ignored	   in	   favor	   of	  reducing	   institutional	   control	  of	   land	  and	  construction	  markets.	  Without	  commitment	  to	   or	   resources	   for	   minimizing	   externalities	   through	   universal	   provision	   of	   services	  policymakers	   pick	   and	   choose	   politically	   and	   financially	   feasible	   programs.	   Urban	  planning	   becomes	   an	   expensive	   process	   of	   retroactively	   catching	   up.	   In	   many	   cities	  development	   occurred	   without	   services	   and	   relying	   on	   private	   capital	   to	   provide	  services	   is	   not	   feasible.	   The	   financial	   and	   political	   resources	   required	   to	   reduce	  externalities	   caused	   by	   uneven	   service	   and	   infrastructure	   provisions	   are	   rarely	  available	  in	  the	  global	  south.	  	  These	   partial	   reform	   programs	   inadvertently	   create	   plural	   governance	   regimes	   that	  reduce	   access	   and	   transparency.	   Plural	   land	   regimes	   are	   well	   documented	   in	   rural	  Africa	  where	  the	  coexistence	  of	  customary	  and	  statutory	  law	  creates	  ambiguity	  (Feder	  &	   Noronha	   1987;	   Payne	   et	   al.	   2009).5	  In	   the	   urban	   context,	   plurality	   results	   from	   a	  different	   process	   unrelated	   to	   colonialism	   and	   customary	   law.	   Decentralization	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Customary	   law	   allows	   community	   ownership	   and	  management	  while	   statutory	   law	   is	   focused	   on	   the	  rights	  of	  the	  individual.	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privatization	   multiplied	   the	   number	   of	   agencies	   with	   regulatory	   control	   of	   urban	  development	   creating	   unclear	   and	   overlapping	   institutional	   roles	   (Kelsall	   2002).	   In	  addition,	  these	  reforms	  created	  national	   level	  parastatals	  with	   large	  budgets	  and	  little	  local	   accountability	   or	   oversight.	   Therefore,	   local	   leaders	   have	   no	   incentive	   to	   follow	  reforms,	   which	   would	   imply	   reducing	   their	   power.	   Without	   incentives	   many	   reform	  efforts	  remain	  superficial.	  In	  fact,	  local	  leaders	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  continuing	  plural	  and	  complex	   governance	   regimes	   because	   it	   allows	   them	   to	   continue	   manipulating	   the	  market	   by	   granting	   multiple	   claims	   to	   one	   land	   parcel	   or	   maintaining	   slum-­‐like	  conditions	   (Peters	   2004;	   Amis	   1984).	   For	   investors,	   plurality	   creates	   the	   option	   to	  comply	   with	   one	   regime	   and	   avoid	   another.	   Individuals	   leverage	   the	   discrepancies	  between	   systems	   to	   their	   advantage	   making	   motivations	   unclear	   and	   increasing	  speculative	  development	  (Boone	  2003;	  Odgaard	  2003;	  Onoma	  2010).	  As	  a	  result,	  short	  term	   profits	   drive	   private	   investment	   more	   than	   encouraging	   locally	   relevant	  investments	   (Paling	   2012;	   Robinson	   2008;	   Baan	   et	   al.	   2007;	   Shatkin	   2014;	   Nuttall	   &	  Mbembe	   2005).	   The	   enabling	   markets	   theory	   justifies	   partial	   reforms	   therein	  multiplying	   governance	   regimes	   and	   creating	   opportunities	   for	   noncompliance	   with	  new	  regulations.	  	  Another	  problematic	  assumption	  within	  the	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  is	  that	  all	  qualified	  entities	  equally	  access	  the	  asset	  bidding	  process.	  The	  existing	  power	  structure	  in	  many	  cities	  in	  the	  global	  south	  does	  not	  offer	  equal	  access	  to	  bidding.	  The	  causes	  of	  skewed	  initial	  power	  structure	  include:	  uneven	  colonial	  distribution	  of	  land,	  rapid	  privatization	  programs	   in	   the	   1990s,	   and	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	   customary	   and	   statutory	   land	   title	  (Coquery-­‐Vidrovitch	  1991;	  Fekade	  2000;	  Quang	  &	  Kammeier	  2002;	  Iyer	  2005;	  Jenkins	  2009).	   In	   theory,	   the	   turn	   towards	   enabling	  markets	   opens	   urban	   development	   to	   a	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  locally	  and	  internationally.	  Yet,	  in	  practice	  there	  are	  few	  qualified	  individuals	   with	   access	   to	   capital	   to	   enter	   the	   for-­‐profit	   urban	   development	   market.	  More	   often	   than	   not	   property	   market	   ownership	   affords	   only	   a	   few	   well-­‐positioned	  individuals	   the	   opportunity	   to	   bid	   on	   any	   given	   sale.	   The	   pre-­‐existing	   ownership	  structure	   often	   blocks	   the	  majority	   from	   either	   land	   or	   property	   sales.	   The	   reality	   is	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evident	  in	  many	  developing	  cities	  where	  poverty	  is	  pervasive	  and	  many	  structures	  are	  self-­‐built	  (Arnott	  2008).	  Similarly,	   enabling	   markets	   incorrectly	   assumes	   that	   when	   formal	   rules	   are	  strengthened	   informality	   and	   opacity	   will	   disappear	   with	   universal	   access	   to	  information.	   In	   reality,	   opaque	   informal	   regulatory	   frameworks	   obscure	   long-­‐term	  market	  trends	  even	  with	  formal	  rules.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  assessing	  construction	  and	  sell	  out	   risk	   is	   impossible.	   Without	   a	   clear	   estimate	   of	   risk,	   private	   investors	   are	   highly	  unlikely	   to	   enter	   the	   market	   because	   transaction	   opacity	   creates	   pricing	   variability	  unrelated	   to	   market	   dynamics.	   For	   instance,	   in	   many	   cities	   basic	   information	   on	  ownership,	  sales	  prices,	  construction	  costs	  and	  rental	  rates	  does	  not	  exist	  on	  any	  large-­‐scale.	   So,	   prices	   vary	   based	   on	   an	   individuals’	   access	   to	   information	   through	  market	  pricing	   rumors	   or	   gossip.	   Pricing	   variability	   creates	   the	   opportunity	   for	   speculative	  development	   and	   power	   grabbing.	  Without	   reliable	   information	   to	   gauge	   supply	   and	  demand,	   large-­‐scale	   housing	   construction	   becomes	   highly	   risky	   and	   thus	   must	   be	  supplemented	  with	  alternative	   risk	   reduction	   techniques.	  Developers	  avoid	   long	   term	  risks	  by	   financing	   through	  pre-­‐sales	  reducing	   the	  need	   for	  construction	   financing	  and	  post	   completion	   sales	   (Shatkin	   2014,	   p.10).	   Without	   publically	   available	   sales	  information	  developers	  can	  set	  pre-­‐sale	  prices	  artificially	  high	  while	  also	  reporting	  low	  values	  to	  tax	  authorities.	  The	  pre-­‐sales	  model	  encourages	  developers	  to	  use	  individual	  previous	   experience	   about	   pricing	   creating	   over	   confidence	   about	   the	   market	   and	  encouraging	   overbuilding	   (Wang	   et	   al.	   2000;	   Shiller	   2000).	   Opacity	   disconnects	  property	   investments	   from	   local	   needs	   leading	   to	   speculation	   and	   often	  misinterpretation	  of	  demand	  all	  together	  (Watson	  2013).	  Information	   asymmetries	   created	   by	   an	   uncompetitive	   bidding	   process	   create	  opportunities	   for	   power	   consolidation	   and	   crowding	   out	   competition	   by	   elites	   rather	  than	  responsive	  markets	  (Valenca	  2010;	  Zaki	  &	  Amin	  2009;	  Abdullahi	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Daher	  2013).	   Well-­‐positioned	   individuals	   grab	   land	   and	   property	   as	   a	   diversification	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mechanism	   against	   cash	   holdings.6	  For	   example,	   in	   Indonesia	   and	   Cambodia	   well-­‐connected	   developers	   coopted	   urban	   development	   because	   of	   unclear	   planning	  processes	   so	   that	   benefits	   of	   development	   remained	   within	   a	   small	   group	   of	  powerbrokers	   who	   had	   limited	   alternatives	   for	   investment	   (Percival	   &	  Waley	   2012;	  Bunnell	   et	   al.	   2012;	   Firman	   2000).	   In	   turn,	   unequal	   power	   distribution	   leads	   to	  unreliable	  market	  data	  and	  further	  impedes	  the	  emergence	  of	  competitive	  markets.	  The	  result	   is	   that	   in	   many	   countries,	   particularly	   in	   Africa,	   formal	   land	   markets	   remain	  limited	  and	  a	  majority	  of	  property	   transactions	   take	  place	   in	  a	  misunderstood,	  poorly	  regulated,	   and	   unplanned	   property	   market	   (Amis	   1984;	   Gulyani	   &	   Talukdar	   2008;	  Watts	  2005).	  	  Finally,	   enabling	   markets	   theory	   reforms	   socializes	   the	   costs	   of	   urban	   development	  through	   infrastructure	   provision	   while	   privatizing	   the	   benefits	   to	   individual	   project	  owners	  creating	  incentives	  for	  speculative	  development	  (Obeng-­‐Odoom	  2009;	  Keivani	  et	   al.	   2008;	   Keivani	   &	   Mattingly	   2007).	   Individual	   speculative	   development	   is	  encouraged	   through	   strict	   development	   controls,	   financial	  market	   deregulation,	   slack	  credit	   controls	   and	   limited	   financial	   monitoring	   capacity	   (Herring	   &	   Wachter	   1999;	  Goetzmann	   &	   Wachter	   2001).	   Speculation	   contributes	   to	   a	   boom	   and	   bust	   cycle	  disproportionately	  affecting	  low-­‐income	  individuals	  by	  creating	  a	  development	  cascade	  where	  perceptions	  of	  high	  potential	   returns	  drive	  a	   rapid	   succession	  of	  project	   starts	  (Malpezzi	  &	  Wachter	  2005;	  Kim	  &	  Suh	  1993;	  Malpezzi	  1994;	  Kim	  &	  Kim	  1999;	  Roehner	  1999;	   Grenadier	   1996;	   Grenadier	   1995;	   Herring	   &	  Wachter	   1999;	   Van	   den	   Bergh	   &	  Edwards	  2005).	  Therefore,	  construction	  becomes	  detached	  from	  demand	  for	  space.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  urban	  development	  is	  a	  commodity	  that	  is	  susceptible	  to	  wide	  variations	  in	   value	   over	   time.	   These	   variations	   result	   in	   declining	   affordability	   and	   increasing	  economic	   vulnerability	   instead	   of	   the	   predictions	   of	   enabling	  markets	   theory	   (Kim	  &	  Renaud	  2009).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Some	   of	   the	   potential	   issues	   with	   cash	   include	   subjectivity	   to	   highly	   volatile	   interest	   rates,	   tax	  obligations	  and	  political	  machinations.	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Due	   to	   these	   oversights	   and	   false	   assumptions,	   reform	   outcomes	   contradict	   enabling	  markets	   theory	   (Watson	  2013).	   Studies	   from	  across	   the	   globe	  document	   increasingly	  exclusionary	  urban	  spaces	  despite	  the	  inclusive	  rhetoric	  of	  new	  urban	  policies	  (Bogaert,	  2011;	   Daher,	   2013;	   M.	   Davis,	   2006;	   Gibbs	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Zemni	   &	   Bogaert,	   2011).	   A	  majority	  of	  new	  construction	  targets	  high-­‐end	  luxury	  consumers.	  The	  glut	  of	  high-­‐end	  housing	   exacerbates	   existing	   issues	   with	   supply.	   Take	   the	   recent	   development	  experience	   Accra,	   Beirut,	   Dubai,	   Cambodia,	   Istanbul,	   Hanoi	   (Krijnen	   &	   Fawaz	   2010;	  Percival	   &	  Waley	   2012;	   Christiaanse	   et	   al.	   2009;	   Labbé	   &	   Boudreau	   2011;	   Quang	   &	  Kammeier	   2002;	   Arku	   2009a).	   All	   these	   cities	   experienced	   large	   increases	   in	   urban	  development	   without	   commensurate	   increases	   in	   affordability.	   Private	   investors	  maximized	   their	   returns	   through	   speculative	   investment	   in	   high-­‐end	   space	   while	  ignoring	   low-­‐income	   demands.	   Public	   entities	   had	   varying	   success	   in	   minimizing	  externalities	   through	   infrastructure	   provision	   and	   clear	   property	   rights,	   yet	   nearly	  universally	  failed	  to	  plan	  strategically	  to	  create	  more	  inclusive	  spaces.	  In	  sum,	  enabling	  markets	   reforms	   resulted	   in	   limited	   reductions	   in	   inequality	   at	   best	   and	  more	   often	  increased	  resource	  capture	  by	  local	  elite.	  	  
Political	  Maneuvering	  and	  Elite	  Capture	  Enabling	  markets	  reforms	  encouraged	  political	  maneuvering	  and	  elite	  capture	  resulting	  in	  similar	  modular	  urban	  forms	  across	  the	  globe.	  Modular	  urban	  forms	  expands	  on	  the	  concept	   of	  modularity	  described	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  oil	   industry	   in	  Equatorial	  Guinea	  (Appel	   2012).	   That	   is,	   modularity	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   process	   that	   disentangles	   oil	  companies	   from	   local	   sociopolitical	   issues	   through	   making	   investments	   mobile,	  compliant,	   and	   self-­‐contained	   (Appel	   2012).	   Modular	   forms	  make	   infrastructure	   and	  labor	   supporting	   oil	   drilling	   similar	   in	   any	   context.	   In	   turn,	   modularity	   offers	   more	  consistent	  returns	   increasing	   isolation	  from	  locally	  risky	  environments.	  More	  broadly,	  modularity	  reflects	  that	  capital	  ‘skips’	  from	  one	  location	  to	  the	  next,	  instead	  of	  flowing	  over	   space	   to	   spread	   investment	   evenly	   (Ferguson	   2005;	   Ferguson	   2006b).	   Global	  capital	   markets	   do	   not	   provide	   ubiquitous	   access	   but	   rather	   accumulate	   in	   a	   few	  geographic	  locations.	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Considering	   recent	  urban	  development	   reveals	  homogenized	  urban	  development	   that	  reduces	  exposure	  to	  issues	  facing	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  city	  through	  high-­‐rise	  redevelopment	  in	   central	   business	   districts	   and	   satellite	   cities.	  7	  	   In	   response	   to	   geographic	   fixity	   or	  stickiness	   investors	  search	   for	   similar	  design	  models	   that	  allow	   them	  to	  control	   costs	  and	   extract	   cash	   flow	   even	   if	   the	   asset	   is	   fixed.	   Large-­‐scale	   privately	   planned	  development	   achieves	   sales	   prices	   well	   beyond	   the	   local	   capacity	   to	   pay.	   The	   price	  points	   offer	   self-­‐contained	   living	  with	   a	   full	   suite	   of	   private	   services	   provided	   by	   the	  developer.	  Private	  provision	  of	  services	  transfers	  responsibility	  from	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  isolates	  development	  from	  the	  local	  issues	  (Zaki	  &	  Amin	  2009;	  Dowling	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Modular	  urbanism	  is	  also	  akin	   to	  enclave	  urbanism	  where	  there	  are	  specialized	  areas	  regulated	   through	   privatized	   governance	   regimes	   creating	   zones	   of	   exclusion	   and	  inclusion	  (Douglass	  et	  al.	  2012).	  Yet,	  it	  differs	  from	  enclave	  urbanism	  because	  it	  draws	  on	   global	   ideals	   and	   transfer	   of	   private	   capital	   tied	   to	   the	   enabling	   markets	   reform	  model.	  Profit	  maximizing	   investment	   from	  private	  sources	  does	  not	  correct	   inefficient	  land	  use	  or	   increase	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  (Barthel	  2010;	  Shatkin	  2008;	  Flyvbjerg	  2003).	  Designs	   are	   replicated	   without	   regard	   to	   local	   land	   use	   by	   recycling	   architects,	  construction	   companies,	   financial	   models,	   and	   policies	   distilling	   global	   experience.	  Modular	   urbanism	   adds	   a	   spatial	   dimension	   to	   mobile	   urbanism,	   which	   describes	   a	  network	   of	   actors	   and	   policies	   creating	   urban	   planning	   policies	   in	   the	   global	   era	  (McCann	   &	   Ward	   2012;	   McCann	   2011;	   McCann	   &	   Ward	   2011;	   Guggenheim	   &	  Soderstrom	   2010).	   The	   enabling	   markets	   theory	   created	   modular	   urbanism	   by	  minimizing	   public	   agencies’	   role	   to	   providing	   connecting	   infrastructure	   and	  encouraging	   private	   investment	   based	   solely	   on	   financial	   returns.	   The	   results	   are	  strikingly	   similar	   urban	   forms	   rather	   than	   contributions	   to	   the	   race	   for	   uniqueness,	  much	   commented	   on	   in	   the	   entrepreneurial	   cities	   literature	   (Acuto	   2010;	   Choplin	   &	  Franck	   2010;	   Barthel	   2010;	   Mohammadzadeh	   2011;	   Barthel	   &	   Planel	   2010).	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  John	   Friedmann	   referred	   to	   modular	   cities	   but	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   overcoming	   the	   rural	   urban	   divide	  (Freidmann,	   1996).	  His	   argument	   contributes	   to	   the	   policy	   assemblage	   supporting	   the	   use	   of	  modular	  urban	  forms.	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entrepreneurial	   cities	   literature	   considers	   the	   competitive	   process	   of	   attracting	  investment	   as	   urban	   leaders	   by	  developing	  unique	   assets	   expected	   to	   distinguish	   the	  city	   from	   its	   competition.	   Modular	   urban	   forms	   reflect	   a	   different	   process	   of	  homogenized	  design.	  Replication	  creates	  compliance	  across	  countries	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  achieving	  similar	  financial	  returns	  (Bogaert	  2011;	  McFarlane	  2008).	  The	  restructuring	  of	   the	  city	  with	  high-­‐end	  residential	  developments,	  shopping	  malls,	   luxury	  hotels,	  and	  office	   complexes	   is	   evidence	  of	  modular	  urbanism.	  These	   investments	   reflect	   a	  global	  drive	   for	   predictable	   profitability	   more	   than	   local	   responses	   to	   violence	   or	   urban	  growth	  issues	  (Dupont	  2011;	  Murray	  2004;	  Murray	  2008b;	  Murray	  2014).	  	  Modular	  satellite	  developments	  reflect	  a	  desire	  to	  overcome	  existing	  issues	  in	  the	  city	  center	  (Shatkin	  2007).	  Government	  agencies	  bypass	  existing	  issues	  while	  claiming	  to	  be	  addressing	   affordable	   housing	   and	   attracting	   international	   investment	   resulting	   in	  satellite	  cities	  (Tibaijuka	  2009;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2010a;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2008a;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2010c;	   UN-­‐HABITAT	   2010e).	   Satellite	   cities	   demonstrate	   a	   response	   to	   increasing	  congestion	  as	  well	  as	  public	  service	  provision	  failures	  by	  planning	  on	  the	  urban	  edges	  to	  avoid	  the	  thorny	  planning	  issues	  in	  the	  city	  center.	  Satellite	  cities	  provide	  a	  rhetorical	  solution	   to	  many	  existing	   issues	   including	  affordable	  housing,	   attracting	   international	  investment	   and	   infrastructure	   provision.	   Yet,	   satellite	   cities	   do	   not	   reference	   the	   US	  post-­‐modern	   process	   of	   gated	   community	   sprawl.	   The	   projects	   draw	   from	   the	   more	  recent	  Asian	  process	  of	   large-­‐scale	   full-­‐service	  city	  building	  (Roy	  2011;	  Shatkin	  2011;	  Grant	  2005;	  Society	  for	  International	  Development	  2011;	  Chen	  &	  Wang	  2009).	  Korean	  and	  Chinese	   firms	  designed	   the	   satellite	   cities	   across	  Africa	   (Society	   for	   International	  Development	   2011).	   The	   designs	   use	   experience	   from	   Vietnam,	   Korea,	   China,	   and	  Malaysia	  to	  guide	  development.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  predictable	  modular	  urbanism.	  Meanwhile,	   redeveloped	   high-­‐rise	   central	   business	   districts	   do	   not	   address	   larger	  structural	   issues	   in	   the	   city’s	  development	  pattern.	  Redevelopment	   rhetoric	   claims	   to	  be	   remaking	   the	   city	   for	   a	   sustainable	   future	  with	  dense	  high-­‐rises	   respond	   to	   issues	  related	  to	  dilapidated	  often	  low-­‐rise	  buildings	  considered	  an	  inefficient	  use	  of	  valuable	  land.	  Government	  agencies	  redevelop	  well	  located	  high	  value	  land	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  improving	  urban	  form	  for	  a	  more	  sustainable	  and	  modern	  future	  (Watson	  2009;	  Rabe	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2009;	  Merrill	  &	  Suri	  2007).	  Yet,	  redevelopment	  fails	  to	  address	  citywide	  issues	  related	  to	   energy	   use,	   urban	   form,	   affordability	   and	   infrastructure	   provision	   (Burgess	   et	   al.	  1997;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2010d;	  UNECE	  2009;	  Salat	  2010;	  Arku	  2009b;	  Pow	  &	  Neo	  2013).	  Real	   estate	  developers	   extract	   value	  as	  quickly	   as	  possible	  by	  building	  modular	  high-­‐rises	   in	   central	   business	   districts	   without	   supporting	   long-­‐term	   investments	   in	  infrastructure	  and	  community	  amenities	  that	  would	  create	  land	  use	  efficiency	  (Shatkin	  2014;	   Quang	   &	   Kammeier	   2002).	   Redevelopment	   draws	   on	   images	   of	   global	   cities	  where	   the	   service	   economy	   creates	   profit	   and	   increases	   the	   value	   of	   property	   in	  business	  districts	  (McDonald	  2008;	  Sassen	  2000;	  Weber	  2010).	  High-­‐rise	  buildings	  then	  shift	  from	  iconic	  structures	  to	  a	  modular	  urbanism.	  Modularity	  reflects	  elite	  retreat	  to	  “living	   above	   the	   city	   in	   the	   clouds”	   (Daher	   2013,	   p.104)	   without	   dealing	   with	  infrastructure	  and	  other	  planning	  issues.	  	  Government	  Agencies	  and	  Policy	  Demands	  Government	   agencies	   choose	  modular	   urbanism	   because	   it	   avoids	   negative	   feedback	  encountered	   in	   past	   models	   of	   urban	   development.	   Modular	   development	   is	   a	   less	  politically	   complicated	   alternative	   to	   universal	   service	   and	   infrastructure	   provision.	  Furthermore,	  past	  experience	  with	  smaller	  scale	  attempts	  to	  address	  wider	  provision	  of	  services	   often	   financially	   and	   politically	   costly.	   One	   example	   of	   the	   difficulty	   is	  neighborhood	   level	   upgrading	  where	   individuals	   are	   relocated	   to	  provide	   community	  infrastructure	   and	   improve	   services.	   The	   programs	  were	   pursued	   in	  many	   cities	   but	  proved	   difficult	   to	   scale	   up	   beyond	   a	   few	   neighborhoods	   (Arku	   2006a;	   Keivani	   et	   al.	  2008).	   The	   results	   were	   spatially	   limited	   and	   financially	   costly	   decreasing	   political	  interest	   in	   expanding	   the	   program.	   The	   programs	   often	   resulted	   in	   criticism	   about	  limited	   implementation	   monitoring	   capacity	   that	   demonstrated	   a	   lack	   of	   power	   and	  control	  by	  local	  politicians.	  In	  contrast,	  modular	  projects	  provide	  voters	  and	  opposition	  parties	  with	   evidence	   of	   action	   and	   allusions	   to	   the	   future	   of	   the	   city.	   Indirect	   public	  involvement	  in	  a	  politically	  charged	  issue	  creates	  modular	  urbanism	  where	  government	  agencies	   facilitate	   but	   do	   not	   directly	   manage	   development.	   Therefore,	   modular	  urbanism	   projects	   solve	   implementation	   issues	   without	   risking	   power	   redistribution	  through	   “getting	   the	   institutions	   right”.	   The	   search	   to	   limit	   implementation	   and	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negative	   feedback	   associated	   with	   the	   community	   input	   of	   previous	   models	   led	   to	  modular	  urbanism.	  	  With	   failing	  services	  and	  growing	  externalities,	  government	  agencies	  need	   to	  give	   the	  appearance	   of	   reform	   resulting	   in	   modular	   urbanism	   with	   a	   packaged,	   clear,	   and	  contained	   outcome.	   Reduced	   control	   implied	   by	   enabling	   market	   reforms	   led	  government	   agencies	   to	   develop	   new	   strategies	   to	   maintain	   power	   while	   reducing	  direct	   responsibility.	   Daher	   proposes	   a	   new	   set	   of	   state	   strategies	   including:	   utopian	  and	   emancipatory	   rhetorical	   devices,	   claims	   of	   social	   sustainability,	   socio-­‐spatial	  inclusion	   or	   exclusion,	   proliferation	   of	   iconic	   buildings,	   new	   governing	   bodies,	  informalization	   of	   decision	  making,	   shifts	   in	   the	   regulatory	   and	   subsidy	   process,	   and	  circulation	   of	   global	   capital	   (Daher	   2013).	   These	   strategies	   renew	   the	   presence	   of	  government	   agencies	   while	   reducing	   accountability	   and	   transparency	   leading	   to	  modular	   urbanism	   because	   it	   complies	   with	   the	   need	   to	   demonstrate	   reform	   and	  cutting	   edge	   policy	   making	   (Labbé	   &	   Boudreau	   2011).	   Government	   agencies	   project	  power	   even	   if	   a	   large	   share	   of	   financial	   benefits	   stay	   in	   the	   private	   sector.	   	   In	   brief,	  market	  oriented	  strategies	  facilitate	  the	  transfer	  of	  similar	  forms	  through	  a	  policy	  and	  political	  orientation	  grounded	  in	  enabling	  markets	  theory.	  Privately	   led	  development	  also	  provides	  access	   to	  cash	   flow	   for	  agencies	  with	   limited	  financial	  resources	   increasing	   incentives	  to	   ignore	   larger	   issues	   in	   favor	  of	  short-­‐term	  gains.	  Through	  privatization	  and	  decentralization	  many	  government	   agencies	  became	  land	  rich	  but	  cash	  poor.	  Modular	  urbanism	  offered	  a	  means	   to	   increasing	  capital	   flow	  through	   partnerships	   with	   private	   investors.	   Government	   agencies	   leverage	   their	  property	   portfolios	   to	   access	   to	   cash	   flow	   otherwise	   unavailable	   to	   these	   agencies.	  Therefore,	   modular	   urbanism	   allows	   individual	   agencies	   to	   gain	   from	   development	  without	   addressing	   overall	   reform	   needs.	   As	   central	   government	   agencies	   pursue	  enabling	   market	   reforms,	   modular	   urbanism	   gives	   the	   appearance	   of	   overcoming	  externalities	  while	  demonstrating	  political	  legitimacy.	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Elite	  control	  of	  private	  resources	  The	  existing	  private	  sector	  favors	  large-­‐scale	  modular	  development	  because	  it	  reduces	  development	  risk.	  The	  structure	  of	  private	  investors	  varies.	  Modular	  urban	  forms	  result	  from	   investor	   preferences	   to	   reduce	   local	   inputs,	   create	   political	   cover	   and	   hedge	  development	   risk.	   In	   addition,	   modular	   urbanism	   reduces	   competition	   because	   few	  individuals	   can	   engage	   in	   large-­‐scale	   projects.	   That	   is,	   development	   on	   small	   parcels	  and	  with	  modest	  units	  would	   lower	  the	  barriers	   to	  entry	  and	  create	  competition.	  The	  current	   business	   structure	   is	   entrenched	   and	   discourages	   competition	   by	   blocking	  smaller	  development.	  Competition	  presents	  risks	  for	  the	  existing	  private	  sector	  because	  prices	  and	  investment	  returns	  would	  drop.	  Instead,	  the	  existing	  private	  sector	  prefers	  to	   maintain	   rules	   and	   encourage	   development	   that	   blocks	   the	   majority	   of	   potential	  investors	   from	  entry.	  The	  outcome	   is	   an	  ad	  hoc	  and	  opportunistic	   approach	   to	  urban	  development	   where	   elites	   are	   well	   positioned	   to	   capture	   the	   benefits	   of	   production	  (Krijnen	   &	   Fawaz	   2010;	   Paling	   2012).	   In	   sum,	   existing	   power	   structures	   block	   the	  emergence	  of	  efficient	  and	  responsive	  markets.	  The	   packaged	   replication	   of	   modular	   urbanism	   matches	   the	   ephemeral	   nature	   of	  cooperation	  and	  visioning	  in	  existing	  cities.	  Modular	  urbanism	  results	  from	  short-­‐lived	  cooperative	  moments	  increasing	  opacity.	  Existing	  power	  brokers	  block	  the	  formation	  of	  a	   comprehensive	   vision	   for	   the	   future	   of	   urban	   development	   that	   would	   increase	  efficiency	  because	  it	  would	  introduce	  competition	  and	  reduce	  profits.	  Enabling	  markets	  theory	   led	   to	   a	   focus	   on	   engaging	   private	   sector	   resources,	   which	   in	   turn	   drew	   on	  existing	  urban	  regimes.	  Urban	  regimes	  are	  long	  lasting	  coalitions	  between	  the	  business	  community	   and	   political	   actors	   (Imbroscio	   2003;	   Imbroscio	   1998;	   Fainstein	   1995;	  Stone	  2005;	   Sellers	   2002;	  Mossberger	  &	   Stoker	   2001).	   Yet,	   in	  many	   cities	   an	  unclear	  vision	  for	  the	  future	  makes	  the	  formation	  of	  long-­‐term	  coalitions	  between	  business	  and	  political	  actors	  more	  unlikely	  (Burns,	  2006;	  Dowding,	  2001;	  Fainstein,	  1995;	  Imbroscio,	  1998,	  2003;	  Mossberger	  &	  Stoker,	  2001;	  Sellers,	  2002;	  Stone,	  1993,	  2005).	  The	  are	  no	  moral	   obligations	   to	   provide	   universal	   services	   or	   improve	   living	   conditions	   through	  particular	   investments.	   The	   relationship	   between	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   is	  opportunistically	  guided	  by	  resource	  capture	  instead	  of	  long	  term	  urban	  planning.	  The	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contrast	  between	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  cases	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  stable	  vision	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   coalitions	   (Shatkin	   2014;	   Douglass	   et	   al.	   2012).	   In	   India	  maximizing	   profits	   drives	   urban	   development	   resulting	   in	   few	   coalitions.	   Without	   a	  shared	   vision	   for	   the	   city,	   short-­‐term	   goals	   of	   political	   leaders	   or	   investors	   influence	  outcomes.	   Meanwhile,	   Chinese	   urban	   development	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   close	   coalition	  between	  parastatals,	  municipal	  governments	  and	  individual	  investors	  because	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  vision	  regulated	  by	  government	  agencies	  (Shatkin	  2011;	  Shatkin	  2007).	  	  Modular	  urbanism	  results	  from	  informal	  practices	  because	  projects	  are	  removed	  from	  the	  local	  context.	  Informality	  is	  an	  intentional	  strategy	  providing	  flexibility,	  organizing	  development,	   and	   benefiting	   individual	   visions	   and	   goals	   (Krijnen	   &	   Fawaz	   2010).	  Informality	   is	   used	   by	   all	   socioeconomic	   groups	   in	   the	   urban	   development	   process,	  from	   construction	   contractors	   to	   an	   individual’s	   source	   of	   income	   (Fay	  &	  Opal	   2000;	  Annez	   et	   al.	   2010;	   Robinson	   2002;	   Robinson	   2006;	   Simone	   2004a;	   Simone	   2010;	  Ghertner	   2011;	   Roy	   2011,	   p.233;	   Arnott	   2008).	   The	   appeal	   is	   universal	   because	  transactions	  and	  development	  occur	  without	  records	  avoiding	  taxation,	  regulation	  and	  compliance	  with	  zoning	  regulations.	  For	  business	  elites,	  informality	  allows	  construction	  outside	   formal	   construction	   codes	   and	   unclear	   ownership	   structures	   to	   guarantee	  market	  share	  without	  increasing	  interference	  from	  government	  agencies.	  Thus,	  in	  many	  instances	  the	  world-­‐class	  developments	  of	  elites	  are	  also	  violations	  of	  legal	  rules	  but	  are	  not	  often	  considered	  informal	  (Krijnen	  &	  Fawaz	  2010).	  For	  instance,	  an	  expensive	  office	  tower	  may	   violate	   zoning	   codes,	   fail	   to	   obtain	   building	   permits	   and	   tap	   into	   existing	  electricity	   connections.	  All	   of	   these	   tactics	   are	   the	   same	  as	   those	  used	  by	   low-­‐income	  slum	  dwellers	  considered	  illegal	  and	  informal.	  The	  complexity	  of	  informal	  rules	  allows	  well-­‐positioned	   elite	   to	   capture	   land	   and	   property	   value	   increases.	   Informality	  guarantees	  elite	  businesses	  profits	  and	  market	  share.	  Local	  business	  leaders	  then	  have	  an	   interest	   in	   continuing	   plural	   and	   complex	   land	   regimes	   because	   it	   allows	   them	   to	  engage	   in	   rental	   and	   development	   activity	   that	   is	   not	   sanctioned	   by	   formal	   codes.	   In	  turn,	   development	   disconnected	   from	   planning	   codes	   and	   local	   demands	   becomes	  possible.	   In	   sum,	   informality	   reduces	   local	   transparency	   and	   control	   over	   urban	  development	  allowing	  projects	  that	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  local	  context.	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Conclusion	  The	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  offered	  a	  more	  inclusive	  path	  to	  urban	  development	  than	  modernism	   but	   resulted	   in	   unexpected	   urban	   forms	   that	   increase	   inequality	  without	  improving	  living	  conditions.	  The	  policies	  motivated	  by	  the	  enabling	  markets	  ushered	  in	  modular	  urbanism	  because	  entrenched	  business	  structures	  and	  political	  maneuvering	  were	  enabled	  rather	   than	   fluid	  responses	   to	  demand	   for	  urban	  space.	  New	   legislation	  aimed	   to	   increase	   responsiveness	   to	   demand	   across	   all	   income	   levels	   and	   decrease	  construction	  process	  bottlenecks.	  Yet,	  achieving	  large-­‐scale	  coordinated	  and	  expensive	  are	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  that	  require	  large	  investments	  and	  institutional	  coordination.	  The	  market	  alone	  does	  not	  provide	  this	  coordination.	  The	  result	  is	  urban	  development	  that	  does	  not	  benefit	  the	  majority	  who	  are	  then	  left	  with	  few	  options	  besides	  protest	  as	  their	  livelihood	  becomes	  more	  fragile.	  Enabling	   markets	   theory	   rests	   on	   difficult	   to	   achieve	   assumptions	   about	   existing	  conditions	   leading	   to	   asymmetry	   and	   mismatched	   outcomes	   (Hansen	   2003).	  Competitive,	  efficient,	  and	  democratic	  markets	  for	  urban	  development	  remain	  a	  theory.	  Instead,	   elite	   capture,	   political	   posturing	   and	   informality	   lead	   to	   modular	   urban	  development	  that	  excludes	  the	  majority.	  Modularity	  is	  the	  result	  of	  investors’	  search	  for	  profitability	  and	  politicians’	  search	  for	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  mounting	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  status	  quo.	  The	  process	  creates	  an	  urbanism	  that	  is	  disentangled	  from	  broader	  sociopolitical	   and	   structural	   issues.	  Modular	   urban	   forms	   offer	   clear	   opportunities	   to	  transform	  a	  portion	  of	   the	  urban	   landscape	  without	  directly	  addressing	   the	   causes	  of	  informal	   growth.	   Modular	   forms	   overcome	   existing	   issues	   such	   as	   weak	   regulatory	  enforcement,	   corrupt	   institutions,	   and	   a	   nascent	   banking	   system	   without	   improving	  market	  efficiency	  or	  responsiveness	  to	  demand	  beyond	  the	  highest	  income	  individuals	  (Labbé	   &	   Boudreau	   2011,	   p.281).	   Modular	   urban	   forms	   offer	   clear	   opportunities	   to	  transform	  a	  portion	  of	   the	  urban	   landscape	  without	  directly	  addressing	   the	   causes	  of	  informal	  growth.	  	  Urban	   development	   depends	   on	   ephemeral	   relationships	   between	   the	   ruling	   political	  party,	  government	  agencies	  and	  business	  elites.	  These	  fleeting	  relationships	  encourage	  projects	   that	   maximize	   profits	   and	   short-­‐term	   political	   goals	   rather	   than	   improving	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livelihoods	  and	  urban	   form.	   In	  many	  cities,	   the	  existing	  power	  structure,	  poverty	  and	  informal	  rules	  make	   it	   impossible	   for	   the	  conditions	   fomenting	  equitable	  and	  efficient	  markets	   to	   arise.	   The	   resulting	   projects	   do	   not	   form	   the	   smooth,	   integrated,	   and	  efficient	   urban	   fabric	   anticipated	   by	   economic	   theory.	   Fundamentally,	   private	   sector	  driven	  urban	  development	   fails	   to	  address	   the	   limited	  provision	  of	   infrastructure	  and	  services	   creating	   urban	   form	   issues	   leading	   to	   increasing	   traffic,	   pollution	   and	   public	  health	   issues.	  A	   focus	  on	  private	  provision	  of	  urban	  space	  will	  not	   improve	   livelihood	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  city	  but	  rather	  increase	  fragility.	  
	  	   36	  
	  
Chapter	  3:	  Tanzanian	  Urban	  Policy	  History	  
Introduction	  Tanzania’s	  policy	  reform	  history	  demonstrates	  the	  failure	  of	  private	  market	  reforms	  to	  improve	   the	   efficiency	   of	   urban	   form	   or	   livelihoods	   of	   urban	   residents.	   After	  independence,	  two	  broad	  reform	  programs	  shaped	  the	  form,	  the	  rules,	  the	  stakeholders	  and	   the	   power	   structure	   of	   urban	   development	   in	   Tanzania.	   The	   first	   set	   of	   reforms	  instilled	   a	   socialist	   ideology	   known	   as	   Ujamaa	   entrenching	   the	   colonial	   legacy	   of	  “bureaucratic	   urbanism”	   (Hamouche	   2008,	   p.192).	   State	   driven	   investments	   define	  urban	   development	   in	   bureaucratic	   urbanism.	   The	   second	   set	   of	   reforms	   followed	   a	  market-­‐oriented	  ideology	  aiming	  to	  enable	  markets	  with	  “global	  urbanism”	  (Hamouche	  2008,	  p.209).	  International	  trends	  in	  large-­‐scale	  investments	  redefined	  urban	  policy	  to	  meet	  ideals	  related	  to	  a	  global	  urbanism	  defined	  by	  private	  sector	  investment.	  The	  same	  reform	   program	   also	   introduced	   a	   multi-­‐party	   political	   system.	   Tanzania’s	   reformed	  institutions	  and	  new	  policy	   tools	  did	  not	  overcome	  existing	   issues	  related	   to	   land	  use	  planning,	   infrastructure	  provision,	   investor	   capacity	   and	   coordination	  between	  public	  and	   private	   entities.	   These	   issues	   highlight	   the	   theoretical	   concerns	   raised	   in	   the	  discussion	  of	  enabling	  markets	   theory.	   It	  also	  sets	   the	  scene	   for	   the	  stakeholders	   that	  are	   important	   in	   the	   case	   studies	   as	   well	   as	   the	   important	   policies	   that	   created	   the	  conditions	  that	  will	  be	  examined.	  The	  policy	  reform	  process	  rearranged	  stakeholders’	  along	  two	  spectrums	  determining	  the	  power	  structure	  in	  Tanzania	  without	  fundamentally	  addressing	  the	  problems	  facing	  urban	  planning	   (Figure	  2).	  One	   spectrum	   is	   between	  public	   and	  private.	   The	  other	   is	  between	   formal	   and	   informal	   informing	   the	   rules	   available	   to	   stakeholders.	   After	   the	  first	  reform	  program	  in	  1986	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  public	  and	  private	  roles	  was	  clear.	  Formal	  development	  was	  dominated	  by	  public	  entities.	  Redistribution	  by	  public	  entities	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was	  justified	  as	  a	  means	  to	  correct	  inequality	  created	  by	  colonialism	  (Nyerere	  1968a).	  Yet,	   the	  majority	  of	  development	  took	  place	  outside	  the	  formal	  power	  structure.	  After	  the	  second	  set	  of	  reforms	  in	  2007	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  public	  and	  private	  was	  not	  as	  clear.	  New	  legislation	  repealed	  the	  direct	  role	  of	  the	  state	  creating	  a	  monitoring	  role	  to	  guide	  private	  sector	  urban	  development.	  The	  NHC	  and	  pension	  funds	  are	  semi-­‐private	  but	  end	  up	  playing	  a	   large	  role	   in	  urban	  development	  because	  of	   the	   limited	  depth	  of	  private	   investment	   and	   lack	   for	   fiscal	   resources	   available	   to	   municipal	   agencies.	  Municipalities	   and	   private	   investors	   move	   between	   formal	   and	   informal	   roles.	   The	  result	   is	   urban	  development	  projects	   on	   a	   larger	   scale	   than	   in	   the	  past	  with	  modular	  qualities.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Major	  Stakeholders	  in	  Urban	  Development	  in	  Tanzania	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institutions	  shaping	  urban	  form	  will	  be	  detailed,	  but	  the	  specific	  private	  actors	  remain	  undefined	  both	  legally	  and	  locally.	  The	  concept	  of	  private	  business	  remains	  an	  elusive	  concept	  with	   a	   community	   of	   business	   people	  whose	   role	   is	   rarely	   fully	   defined.	   Yet,	  reoriented	   public	   institutions	   lack	   the	   necessary	   resources	   to	   implement	   large-­‐scale	  investment	   programs	   to	   create	   universal	   services	   and	   infrastructure	   provision.	   As	   a	  result	   these	   institutions	   compete	  with	   private	   investors	   for	   control	   and	   development	  opportunities	   in	   order	   to	   leverage	   speculative	   increases	   in	   land	   value.	   The	   resulting	  system	   benefits	   existing	   business	   elites	   without	   empowering	   local	   governments	   to	  implement	   programs	   or	   investments	   that	   might	   ensure	   more	   equal	   distribution	   of	  benefits.	   The	   description	   will	   make	   clear	   how	   the	   spurious	   outcomes	   might	   be	  explained	  as	  development	   cascades,	  which	   reinforce	  existing	  power	   relations,	   allow	  a	  power	  grab	  and	  encourage	  investments	  that	  are	  not	  beneficial	  to	  either	  social	  equity	  or	  spatial	  efficiency.	  	  
Colonialism	  to	  Ujamaa:	  Evolving	  patterns	  of	  Urban	  Land	  Use	  Socialism	   underpinned	   early	   postcolonial	   planning	   providing	   an	   ideological	  counterpoint	   to	   colonialism	   and	   a	   state	   centric	   model	   of	   urban	   development.8	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  the	  country’s	  first	  president,	  outlined	  the	  socialist	  ideology,	  known	  as	  Ujamaa,	  in	  the	  1967	  Arusha	  Declaration	  (Nyerere	  1968b).	  The	  resulting	  rhetoric	  was	  optimistic	  about	   overcoming	   colonialism’s	   highly	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   resources	   without	  dismantling	   the	   central	   role	   of	   the	   state.	   Colonial	   authorities	   maintained	   inequality	  through	  a	  set	  restrictions	  on	  the	  migration	  of	  rural	  Africans	  (Lugalla	  1995).	  Using	  the	  1956	   Town	   and	   Country	   Planning	   Ordinance,	   colonial	   town	   planners	   developed	  different	   zones	   for	   various	   racial	   categories	   in	   each	   major	   town	   (Topfer	   2002).	   The	  process	   entailed	   demolition	   of	   so-­‐called	   slum	   housing	   of	   migrant	   African	   workers.	  Colonial	   town	   planning	   justified	   demolitions	   as	   an	   effort	   to	   create	   disease	   free	  environments	   (McHenry	   1976).	   Implicitly	   these	   motivations	   were	   guided	   by	   racist	  beliefs	  that	  led	  to	  segregation	  (Mabogunje	  1990;	  Armstrong	  1987;	  Brennan	  2006).	  High	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  United	  Republic	  of	  Tanzania	  was	  formed	  from	  the	  unification	  of	  Zanzibar	  and	  Tanganyika	  in	  1964.	  Tanganyika	  gained	  independence	  from	  Britain	  in	  1961	  and	  Zanzibar	  in	  1963.	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building	  standards,	   taxes	  and	  policy	  maintained	  racial	  segregation.	  The	  standards	  and	  taxes	   were	   unaffordable	   to	   African	   rural	   migrants.	   For	   instance,	   flush	   toilets	   were	  required	  in	  the	  European	  sections	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  while	  traditional	  building	  materials	  were	   acceptable	   in	   African	   neighborhoods	   (Smiley	   2012).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Europeans	  were	  in	  low-­‐density	  neighborhoods,	  the	  Asians	  in	  medium-­‐density	  and	  the	  Africans	  in	  high-­‐density	  (Alexander	  1983).	  With	  a	  highly	  centralized	  and	  segregated	  system,	  there	  was	   very	   little	   local	   input	   leaving	  many	  Africans	  disenfranchised.	  Ujamaa	  maintained	  colonialism’s	   centralization	   but	   aimed	   to	   undo	   segregation	   by	   focusing	   on	  redistribution	  and	  agricultural	  development.	  
Table	  2:	  Major	  Urban	  Planning	  Legislation:	  1895	  -­‐	  1986	  
Year	   Title	   Major	  Change	  1895	   Crown	  Land	  Ordinance	   Required	  registration	  of	  all	  land	  Unoccupied	  Land	  was	  given	  to	  the	  Crown	  Authorized	  reserved	  lands	  on	  village	  outskirts	  1923	  &	  1928	   Land	  Tenure	  Ordinance	  No	  3	  
Authorized	  99-­‐year	  leases	  for	  granted	  right	  of	  occupancy	  Authorized	  5-­‐year	  CRO	  for	  deemed	  right	  of	  occupancy	  Gave	  power	  over	  unoccupied	  land	  to	  Governor	  Revised	  to	  include	  customary	  land	  1956	  &	  1961	   Town	  &	  Country	  Planning	  Ordinance	   Stipulates	  zoning	  and	  planning	  roles	  Creates	  the	  structure	  of	  large-­‐scale	  urban	  planning	  1962	   NHC	  Act	   Established	  National	  Housing	  Corporation	  1967	   Land	  Acquisition	  Act	   Made	  the	  private	  sale,	  purchase	  and	  rent	  of	  land	  illegal	  Land	  has	  no	  value	  only	  structures	  1969	   Second	  5	  year	  Plan	   Designated	  9	  growth	  pole	  towns	  Resettled	  1,390	  squatters	  for	  industrial	  development	  1971	   Buildings	  Acquisition	  Act	   Nationalized	  buildings	  over	  a	  certain	  value	  
1973	   Rural	  Lands	  Act	   Does	  not	  address	  planning	  and	  utilization	  Made	  customary	  land	  rights	  illegitimate	  Vested	  expropriation	  powers	  in	  the	  President	  Enabled	  the	  declaration	  of	  vague	  specified	  areas	  1981	   Housing	  Policy	   Does	  not	  result	  in	  any	  legislation	  or	  programming	  Encourages	  self-­‐help	  and	  public	  agency	  housing	  provision	  1984	   Rent	  Restriction	  Act	   Limits	  rent's	  ratio	  to	  income	  or	  construction	  cost	  Sources:	  Author’s	  fieldwork,	  Debusman	  and	  Arnold	  1996,	  Shivji	  1998,	  Goran	  2007,	  BoT	  2009	  Parliament	   abolished	   private	   sales	   and	   formal	   land	   valuation	   increasing	   the	   central	  government’s	   urban	   development	   power.	   Party	   officials	   understood	   urban	  development	  as	  a	  necessary	  evil	  to	  agricultural	  production	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  controlled	  but	   not	   encouraged	   (Lugalla	   1995).	   Thus,	   Parliament’s	   reforms	   attempted	   to	   replace	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the	   capitalist	   private	   market	   system	   by	   eliminating	   officially	   recognized	   commercial	  land	  values	  (Nnkya	  1999a).	  During	  German	  and	  British	  colonial	  rule,	  planning	  decisions	  were	  highly	  centralized	  but	  based	  on	  commercial	  valuations.	  For	  instance,	  the	  German	  Crown	  Ordinance	  in	  1895	  and	  the	  British	  Land	  Ordinance	  in	  1923	  gave	  all	   land	  to	  the	  central	   colonial	   authorities	  which	   could	   be	   leased	   by	   individuals	   for	   a	   price	   (Gastorn	  2008)	  (Table	  2).	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  capitalist	  system	  Parliament	  enacted	  the	  1967	  Land	   Acquisition	   Act	   (Briggs	   &	   Mwamfupe	   2000).	   The	   1967	   Act	   maintained	  colonialism’s	  centralized	  control	  by	  nationalizing	  control	  of	  all	   land.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Act	  made	   the	   sale,	   purchase	   and	   rent	   of	   land	   illegal,	  which	   effectively	   eliminated	  leases.	  Then	  the	  1973	  Rural	  Land	  Act	  and	  the	  1975	  Ujamaa	  Village	  Lands	  Act	  gave	  the	  president	  wide	   ranging	   expropriation	  powers	   and	  undermined	   customary	   land	   rights	  (Shivji	  1998).	  These	  Acts	  further	  centralized	  planning	  and	  urban	  development.	  Nyerere	  summed	  up	   the	  approach	   to	  urban	  development	  by	  writing	   “We	  must	  not	   forget	   that	  people	  who	   live	   in	   towns	  can	  possibly	  become	  the	  exploiters	  of	   those	  who	   live	   in	   the	  rural	  areas.”9	  Villagization	  or	   “vijiji	  vya	  ujamaa”	   further	  centralized	  power	  and	  drove	   infrastructure	  investments	  away	  from	  cities.	  Villagization	  relocated	  rural	  and	  urban	  residents	  to	  new	  villages	  centered	  on	  communal	  agriculture	  (Stren	  1981;	  Burton	  2007b).	  Unraveling	  the	  perceived	   fiscal	   urban	   bias	   of	   the	   colonial	   era	   motivated	   villagization	   (URT	   1975).	  Central	  government	  and	  ministry	  investment	  shifted	  towards	  supporting	  these	  villages	  (Hyden	  1980).	  As	   a	   result,	   throughout	   the	  1970’s	   and	  1980’s	   the	   central	   government	  provided	   minimal	   fiscal	   allocations	   to	   urban	   development	   (Armstrong	   1987;	   Burton	  2007b).	  In	  urban	  areas,	  villagization	  sites	  on	  the	  outskirts	  became	  centers	  of	  population	  growth	   (Komu	  2011b).	  The	   focus	  on	  villagization	  undermined	  urban	  management	  by	  starving	   the	   large	   towns	   of	   fiscal	   capacity,	   well-­‐trained	   technocrats	   and	   land	  development	   potential.	   Yet,	   villagization	   did	   not	   stop	   migration	   to	   cities	   putting	  pressure	   on	   overstretched	   local	   governments	   and	   infrastructure	   (Hyden	   1980;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Nyerere,	  Freedom	  and	  Socialism,	  1968,	  pp.	  242-­‐243	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Bryceson	   2006;	   Burton	   2007a).	   Thus,	   villagization	   left	   urban	   local	   governments	  unprepared	  for	  population	  growth	  and	  urban	  management.	  In	   addition,	   the	   1975	   and	   1988	   capital	   relocation	   plans	   to	   Dodoma	   reduced	   existing	  municipalities’	   power	   and	   funneled	   resources	   into	   the	   Dodoma	  Development	   Agency	  (DDA).	  In	  1973,	  Parliament	  chose	  Dodoma	  as	  the	  capital	  relocation	  site	  due	  to	  central	  location,	   transportation	   linkages,	   and	   the	   poverty	   of	   the	   surrounding	   region	   (Hoyle	  1979).	   The	   plan	   for	   Dodoma	   fit	   with	   a	   series	   of	   post-­‐colonial	   new	   city	   plans	   across	  many	   African	   countries.10	  Across	   Africa,	   new	  modernist	   capitals	   included	   large	   green	  belts,	  motorized	  transportation,	  separation	  of	  social	  classes	  and	  groups	  of	  high	  and	  low-­‐rise	  neighborhoods	  (Mabogunje	  1990).	  The	  modernist	  plans	  were	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  Garden	   City	   inspired	   colonial	   town	   plans	   (Bigon	   2013).	   Yet,	   without	   industrial	  development,	  Garden	  City	  ideals	  had	  limited	  applicability	  in	  many	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  cites	   leading	   to	   the	   first	   informal	   unplanned	   settlements	   in	   the	   1950’s	   (Mabogunje	  1990).	   The	   1975	   Plan	   for	   Dodoma	   adhered	   to	   modernization	   ideology	   drawing	  inspiration	   from	   North	   American	   car	   centric	   urban	   planning	   (Siebolds	   &	   Steinberg	  1981).	   Foreign	   consultants	   created	   the	  Dodoma	   Plan	  without	   local	   input	   (Siebolds	  &	  Steinberg	   1981;	   Hoyle	   1979).	   The	   Plan	   did	   not	   provide	   for	   the	   self-­‐help	   incremental	  housing	  that	  defined	  Tanzanian	  urbanization,	  rather	  the	  DDA	  would	  construct	  new	  civil	  servant	  housing	  and	  state-­‐owned	  corporations	  would	  build	  industrial	  estates.	  The	  1975	  Plan	   for	   Dodoma	   was	   revised	   in	   1988	   but	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   fully	   executed.	   That	   is,	  Parliament	  officially	  meets	  in	  Dodoma	  but	  all	  of	  the	  other	  ministries	  and	  bodies	  of	  the	  government	   are	   still	   located	   in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   (Makalle	   et	   al.	   2011).	   Dar	   remains	   the	  cultural	   and	   economic	   capital	   with	   a	   majority	   of	   the	   government	   and	   private	   sector	  functions.	   The	   fiscal	   and	   human	   resources	   drain	   created	   by	   the	   Dodoma	   project	   put	  added	  pressure	  on	  other	  city’s	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  while	  increasing	  DDA’s	  urban	  development	  power.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  These	   cities	   include	   Abuja	   in	   Nigeria,	   Gaborone	   in	   Botswana,	   Lilongwe	   in	   Malawi,	   Nouakchott	   in	  Mauritania,	  and	  Yamassoukro	  in	  Cote	  D’Ivoire.	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Resources	  were	  further	  dispersed	  through	  the	  1969-­‐74	  Second	  Development	  Plan.	  The	  Plan	   empowered	   ministries	   and	   state-­‐owned	   corporations	   with	   urban	   development	  powers	   through	  a	  growth	  pole	  program.	  Under	   the	  program,	  nine	  growth	  pole	   towns	  would	  discourage	  migration	  to	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  spread	  economic	  growth	  throughout	  Tanzania	   (Brennan	   &	   Burton	   2007;	   Sawers	   1989).11	  Colonial	   underinvestment	   in	   the	  rural	   hinterland	   justified	   the	   focus	   outside	   of	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   (Nyerere	   1968a).	   Party	  officials	  considered	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  a	  “parasitic”	  financial	  and	  social	  drain	  so	  they	  wanted	  to	  drive	  urban	  development	  to	  other	  towns	  (Lugalla	  1995).	  Through	  the	  program	  state	  agencies	   would	   distribute	   economic	   development	   to	   predominantly	   rural	   areas	  (Doherty	   1973).	   The	   growth	   pole	   program	   was	   possible	   because	   Parliament	  nationalized	   many	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	   (Hyden	   1980).	   Nationalization	   gave	  Ministries	  urban	  development	  power	  because	  control	  of	  an	  entire	  sector	  was	  vested	  in	  a	  single	  state	  agency,	  which	  then	  made	  industrial	  location	  decisions.	  These	  decisions	  in	  turn	   determined	   the	   land	   use	   in	   urban	   areas.	   New	   states	   across	   Africa	   invested	   in	  growth	   poles	   hoping	   to	   counterweight	   colonialism’s	   large	  magnet	   cities	   (Mabogunje,	  1990,	  p	  131).	  The	  industrial	  base	  left	  by	  the	  program	  provided	  impetus	  for	  population	  growth	  and	  economic	  diversification	  particularly	  in	  the	  secondary	  cities	  of	  Arusha	  and	  Mwanza	  (Lugalla	  1995).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  growth	  pole	  program	  distributed	  urban	  development	   resources	   to	   secondary	   cities.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   reduced	   already	  limited	  resources	   for	  managing	  the	  development	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	   the	  primary	  urban	  area.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  National	  Housing	  Corporation	  (NHC)	  and	  the	  National	  Insurance	  Corporation	  (NIC)	  became	  the	  primary	  developers	  of	  formal	  commercial	  and	  residential	  space.	   Provision	   of	   affordable	   secure	   housing	   for	   all	   citizens	   as	   one	   of	   the	   founding	  pillars	   of	   the	   postcolonial	   government	   (Kironde	   1992).	   In	   1962,	   Parliament	   created	  NHC	  with	   the	  mandate	   to	   fulfill	   the	   promise	   of	   universal	   housing.	   Housing	   provision	  recognized	   the	   rights	   denied	   to	  many	   black	   Tanzanians	   during	   colonialism.	   The	   first	  step	  in	  achieving	  the	  housing	  mandate	  was	  redistribution	  of	  the	  existing	  stock,	  vacant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  These	  towns	  include:	  Tanga,	  Moshi,	  Arusha,	  Mwanza,	  Tabora,	  Dodoma,	  Morogoro,	  Mbeya	  and	  Mtwara.	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land	  and	  old	  agricultural	  estates	  (Brennan	  &	  Burton	  2007).	  Thus,	  a	   large	  share	  of	   the	  NHC’s	   portfolio	   was	   obtained	   through	   the	   1971	   Acquisition	   of	   Buildings	   Act	   (Komu	  2011a).	   The	   Act	   gave	   the	   central	   government	   power	   to	   acquire	   buildings	   that	   were	  either	   of	   high	   value	   or	   did	   not	   serve	   as	   a	   primary	   residence.12	  Although,	   NHC	   only	  actively	  acquired	  assets	  between	  1972	  and	  1984	  the	  policy	  was	  not	  repealed	  until	  1990	  in	  the	  National	  Housing	  Corporation	  Act	  (URT	  1990;	  Hussey	  1997).	  	  The	  persistence	  of	  the	  1971	  Act	  created	  a	  disincentive	  for	  private	  formal	  development	  while	  strengthening	  NHC’s	  position	  as	  the	  primary	  provider	  of	  formal	  housing.	  Between	  1962	  and	  1972,	  the	  NHC	  built	  approximately	  11,000	  units	  and	  acquired	  about	  8,500	  more,	  but	  the	  pace	  of	  development	  dropped	  precipitously	  when	  government	  transfers	  ceased	  in	  1973	  (Komu	  2011a;	   Lugalla	   1995).13	  NHC’s	   portfolio	   accounted	   for	   about	   seven	   percent	   of	   rental	  housing	   stock	   (Komu	   2011a).	   With	   limited	   budget	   allocations,	   the	   idealistic	   housing	  mandate	   was	   not	   met	   through	   the	   state-­‐sponsored	   acquisition	   and	   construction	  programs.	  Yet,	   the	  NHC	  became	  a	  major	  stakeholder	   in	  urban	  development	  with	  well-­‐located	   properties	   and	   land	   parcels	   across	   the	   country.	   Meanwhile,	   NIC	   became	   the	  primary	  developer	  of	   commercial	   space.	  NIC	  provided	   the	   central	   government	  with	   a	  large	  pool	  of	  investment	  capital	  for	  office,	  retail	  and	  hotel	  construction	  throughout	  the	  country.14	  NIC	  constructed	  buildings,	  which	  were	  then	  leased	  by	  individual	  ministries.	  Even	   with	   the	   widespread	   reform	   program,	   private	   owners	   continued	   to	   build	  informally	   partially	   due	   to	   the	   expropriation	   risk	   associated	  with	   formal	   transparent	  urban	  development.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  reduced	  private	   investment	  was	  the	  goal	  of	   the	  Ujamaa’s	  socialist	  reform	  program.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  NHC	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  new	  housing	  demand	  but	  blocked	  other	  formal	  provision	  of	  housing	  (Komu	  2011a).	  Rather	  than	  replacing	  the	  capitalist	  system	  of	  profiteering	  from	  housing	  provision	  the	  centralized	   power	   structure	   pushed	   construction	   into	   opaque	   small-­‐scale	   businesses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  Act	  applied	  to	  all	  properties	  valued	  over	  Tsh	  100,000	  or	  renting	  for	  more	  than	  Tsh	  833	  per	  month.	  	  13	  The	  construction	  total	   includes	  3,400	  units	  built	  as	  part	  of	  a	  slum	  clearance	  program	  that	   included	  a	  sites	   and	   services	   component,	   which	   did	   not	   increase	   the	   housing	   stock	   but	   rather	   replaced	   existing	  informal	  units.	  14	  Interview	  with	  Mary	  Kyomo,	  Planning	  and	  Investment	  Manager	  at	  NIC,	  August	  15,	  2012.	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Informal	  housing	  and	   self-­‐help	   construction	   came	   to	  define	  urban	  housing	   conditions	  during	  the	  Ujamaa	  era	  (Kombe	  1994;	  Lewinson	  1998).	  Lingering	  expropriation	  risk	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  entrenched	  practices	  of	  obscuring	  ownership.	  Property	  owners	  were	   incentivized	   to	   use	   complex	   ownership	   structures	   with	   limited	   documentation.	  These	   alternative	   development	   rules	   avoided	   official	   consent	   or	   compliance	   with	  utopian	   ideals.	   Informal	   development	   allows	   ownership	   transfers	   outside	   the	   public	  regulatory	  framework.	  Informal	  housing	  nearly	  doubled	  over	  the	  socialist	  period	  (Table	  3).	  An	  estimated	  11	  percent	  of	  land	  in	  Tanzania	  fully	  complies	  with	  public	  regulations	  with	   50	   to	   80	   percent	   of	   urban	   residents	   living	   in	   informal	   settlements	   (World	  Bank	  2009;	  Kombe	  2005).	  
Table	  3:	  Share	  of	  informal	  housing	  in	  Tanzania	  
	  	   1967	   1972	   1995	   2002	  
Total	  Mainland	   36	   44	   70	   	  	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam	   	  	   60	   70	   68	  
Mwanza	   	  	   	  	   40	   	  	  
Arusha	   	  	   	  	   70	   	  	  Source:	  UN	  Informal	  Settlements	  and	  Finance	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  2009,	  p.	  	  24-­‐26	  The	  private	  sector’s	  incentives	  to	  informally	  development	  increased	  in	  1972	  when	  the	  Ministry	   of	   Lands15	  and	   District	   Governments16	  accepted	   informal	   development	   and	  agreed	   to	   end	   slum	   demolition.	   In	   the	   1960’s	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Lands	   continued	   the	  colonial	  policy	  of	  demolishing	  slum	  settlements	  deemed	  unsanitary	  and	  illegal	  (Kironde	  1991;	  Brennan	  &	  Burton	  2007).	  Then	  the	  Ministry	  placed	  a	  moratorium	  on	  demolition	  as	   part	   of	   the	   1972	   Sites	   and	   Services	   Program	   (Kironde	   1991;	   Siebolds	  &	   Steinberg	  1982).	   Between	   1973	   and	   1981,	   five	  municipalities	   upgraded	   community	   facilities	   in	  eleven	  existing	  unplanned	  settlements	  (Kulaba	  1989;	  Siebolds	  &	  Steinberg	  1982).	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	   Ministry	   responsible	   for	   land	   administration	   changed	   names	   several	   times	   before	   the	   current	  MLHHSD.	  When	  the	  sites	  and	  services	  program	  was	  active	  it	  was	  named	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Lands,	  Housing	  and	  Urban	  Development	  (MLHUD),	  16 	  Note	   that	   municipal	   governments	   were	   abolished	   during	   the	   period	   so	   higher-­‐level	   district	  governments	  implemented	  urban	  programs.	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program	   provided	   approximately	   20,000	   self-­‐built	   homes	   and	   surveyed	   25,000	   plots	  (Siebolds	  &	   Steinberg	  1982;	  Kironde	  1991;	  Materu	  1986;	  Rakodi	   1991).	   Through	   the	  program,	  the	  District	  Government’s	  role	  shifted	  from	  enforcing	  strict	  formal	  regulatory	  codes	  to	  assisting	  informal	  development.	   	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  increased	  informal	  tenure	  security	   coupled	   with	   formal	   expropriation	   risk	   reduced	   incentives	   to	   privately	  construct	   large-­‐scale	   urban	   projects.	   Small-­‐scale	   informal	   private	   sector	   projects	  dominated	   development	   throughout	   the	   Ujamaa	   era	   yet	   the	   quality	   of	   construction	  materials	  increased.	  For	  instance,	  between	  1978	  and	  2002	  the	  national	  share	  of	  urban	  houses	   with	   concrete	   walls	   nearly	   doubled	   although	   the	   share	   of	   houses	   with	   piped	  water	  and	  latrines	  decreased	  (Table	  4).	  Lack	  of	  financing	  and	  effectively	  strong	  tenure	  rights,	   created	   a	   very	   long-­‐term	   development	   process	  with	  many	   unfinished	   projects	  across	  Tanzanian	  cities	  (Halla	  &	  Mang’waru	  2004).	  	  
Table	  4:	  Urban	  Housing	  Materials	  &	  Services	  in	  Tanzania:	  1978	  &	  2002	  
	  Urban	  Area	   1978	   2002	  
	  	  
Concrete	  Walls	   Metal	  Sheets	   Piped	  Water	   Latrine	   Concrete	  Walls	   Metal	  Sheets	   Piped	  Water	   Latrine	  
Arusha	   31%	   77%	   92%	   97%	   48%	   96%	   99%	   78%	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam	   34%	   86%	   98%	   99%	   88%	   92%	   88%	   83%	  
Mwanza	   29%	   81%	   82%	   91%	   45%	   91%	   83%	   71%	  
Total	  Urban	   26%	   74%	   88%	   96%	   49%	   86%	   83%	   83%	  Source:	  National	  &	  Regional	  Census	  Reports	  1978	  &	  2002	  The	  Rent	  Restriction	  Act	  of	  1984	  provided	  a	   limited	  safety	  net	   for	   formal	  housing	  but	  further	  reduced	  incentives	  for	  private	  formal	  urban	  development.	  The	  Rent	  Restriction	  Act	   set	   rental	   rate	   ceilings	   ranging	   from	   12.5%	   of	   income	   to	   14-­‐18%	   of	   the	   unit’s	  construction	  value	   (Kironde	  1992).	  The	   legislation	   justified	   the	   restrictions	  because	  a	  majority	  of	  urban	  residents	  were	  tenants	  (Table	  5).	  A	  small	  minority	  benefited	  because	  rent	   control	   enforcement	   only	   applied	   to	   formal	   housing.	   Rent	   control	   created	   a	  disincentive	   to	   maintain	   or	   construct	   formal	   housing.	   The	   disincentive	   further	  encouraged	  private	  informal	  development	  while	  eroding	  NHC’s	  potential	  profits	  for	  the	  central	  government.	  Nonetheless,	  rent	  control	  was	  the	  only	  housing	  subsidy	  available.	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Table	  5:	  Tenure	  Structure	  in	  Urban	  Tanzania	  1978	  
Urban	  Area	   Owner	   Tenant	   Other	  
Arusha	   24.5	   71.2	   4.3	  
Dar	  es	  Salaam	   32.5	   65.8	   1.7	  
Mwanza	   39.0	   59.1	   1.9	  
Total	  Urban	   41.0	   56.3	   3.5	  Source:	  National	  Census	  1978	  Table	  16.9,	  p.	  488	  After	  Tanzania’s	  first	  set	  of	  reforms,	  the	  power	  structure	  reflected	  entrenched	  socialist	  bureaucratic	   urbanism	   that	   encouraged	   informal	   development.	   Socialist	   urban	  planning	   maintained	   colonialism’s	   central	   control,	   modernization	   goals	   and	   high	  development	   standards	   (Sawers	  1989).	  There	  was	  a	   clear	  dichotomy	  between	  public	  and	   private	   actors.	   Districts	   financed	   development	   from	   their	   own	   budgets	   without	  consistent	   revenue	   raising	  mechanisms,	  making	   it	   difficult	   to	   achieve	   the	   large-­‐scale	  visions	  of	   socialist	  planning.	  The	  result	  was	   that	  most	  urban	  administration	  program	  came	   to	   depend	   on	   some	   foreign	   donor	   or	   multilateral	   agency	   (Mabogunje	   1990).	  Individual	  ministries	   provided	   employee	  housing	   estates	   and	  often	   constructed	   their	  own	   office	   buildings.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   NHC	   provided	   public	   housing	   and	   the	   NIC	  invested	   in	   infrastructure	  and	  commercial	  real	  estate	  projects.	  These	  actors	  provided	  the	   majority	   of	   formal	   urban	   development	   during	   the	   ujamaa	   period.	   The	   central	  government	  retreated	  from	  service	  provision	  in	  urban	  areas	  rather	  equalizing	  land	  and	  housing	  ownership.	  Socialist	  urban	  development	  instilled	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  public	  formal	  development,	  endowed	  several	  institutions	  with	  power	  and	  reduced	  the	  role	  of	  formal	   private	   development.	   Lack	   of	   confidence	   gave	   rise	   to	   informal	   practices	   to	  compensate	   for	   the	   central	   government’s	   failure	  and	  municipal	   government’s	   limited	  resources.	   The	   private	   sector’s	   role	   was	   informal	   though	   it	   provided	   a	   majority	   of	  urban	   development	   investment.	   The	   resulting	   urban	   development	   led	   to	   sprawling	  cities,	  over	  used	  infrastructure	  and	  very	  limited	  formal	  housing	  supply	  (Hill	  &	  Lindner	  2010;	  Abebe	  2011).	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Urban	  Policy	  Reform:	  Liberalization	  and	  Private	  Market	  Development	  In	   Tanzania’s	   post-­‐socialist	   transition, 17 	  national	   legislators	   reconfigured	   urban	  development	   policy	   providing	   new	   tools	   and	   powerbrokers	   (Table	   6).18	  Policy	   and	  legislative	  rhetoric	  claimed	  the	  right	  combination	  of	  reforms	  would	  encourage	  efficient	  urban	  development	   (URT	  2000a).	  Efficiency	  would	  cater	   to	  a	  variety	  of	   income	   levels	  and	   improve	   overall	   living	   conditions	   (URT	   1999b).	   Implied	   in	   the	   move	   towards	  efficiency	   is	   a	   much	   greater	   role	   for	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   market	   mechanisms.	  Nonetheless,	   similar	   to	   India,	  a	  persistent	  socialist	   rhetoric	  pervades	  reform	  attempts	  complicating	   the	   ongoing	   urban	   transformation	   and	   integration	   with	   the	   global	  urbanism	   (Shatkin	   2014).	   Reforms	   reoriented	   the	   institutional	   mechanisms	   and	  structural	   roles	   of	   urban	   development	   stakeholders	   but	   maintained	   centralized	  government	   control	   over	   many	   aspects	   of	   urban	   development.	   The	   reforms	   reduced	  barriers	   to	   entry	   for	   private	   businesses	   but	   also	   dismantled	   the	   safety	   net	   built	   into	  socialist	  bureaucratic	  urbanism.	  The	  result	  was	  state	  rhetoric	  steeped	  in	  making	  private	  development	   possible,	   formal	   and	   simple	   without	   regard	   to	   affordable	   and	   livable	  conditions	   for	   the	   urban	   majority.	   Yet,	   informal	   development	   rules	   pervade	   formal	  private	  urban	  development	  resulting	  in	  projects	  targeting	  the	  high-­‐income	  sector.	  The	  reform	  process	  created	  some	  competition,	  resembling	  a	  market,	  but	  did	  not	  engender	  transparency	  or	  create	  incentives	  to	  increase	  formal	  development	  on	  a	  large-­‐scale.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  end	  of	  the	  socialist	  era,	  Ujamaa,	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  liberalization	  area,	  Mageuzi,	  is	  understood	  to	  have	  begun	  with	  the	  1986	  IMF	  structural	  adjustment	  program	  when	  Tanzania’s	  per	  capita	  GDP	  had	  eroded	  to	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  in	  the	  world.	  18	  Many	   studies	   documented	   the	   immediate	   impact	   of	   post	   socialist	   liberalization	   in	   reducing	   public	  expenditures	   on	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   in	  urban	   areas,	   but	   is	   not	   the	   focus	  of	   the	   current	   review.	  Good	  examples	  of	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  following	  (Kombe	  1994;	  Shitundu	  2007;	  World	  Bank	  2007).	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Table	  6:	  Urban	  Planning	  Legislation:	  1990	  –	  2012	  
Year	   Title	   Major	  Change	  1990	   NHC	  Act	   NHC	  becomes	  parastatal	  1991	   Banking	  &	  Financial	  Institutional	  Act	   Banks	  privatized	  1991	   Presidential	  Inquiry	  in	  Land	   Land	  Commission	  begins	  the	  discussion	  on	  process	  of	  reform	  
1995	   National	  Land	  Policy	   Radical	  title	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  President	  Authority	  in	  the	  Commissioner	  of	  Lands	  Requires	  village	  certification	  Reinstitutes	  customary	  title	  or	  deemed	  right	  of	  occupancy	  1996	  &	  2009	   The	  Insurance	  Act	   Insurance	  firms	  are	  privatized	  New	  independent	  regulatory	  board	  created	  
1997	   National	  Investment	  Act	   Gives	  coordination	  and	  oversight	  rights	  to	  Tanzania	  Investment	  Center	  Allows	  foreigners	  to	  hold	  land	  through	  JV	  partnerships	  
1999	   Land	  Act	  No.	  4	  &	  5	   Operation	  of	  General	  &	  Village	  Lands	  Establishes	  that	  land	  has	  value	  Requires	  government	  compensation	  for	  land	  seizure	  2000	  &	  2006	   Local	  Government	  Acts	   Reestablishes	  local	  government	  Municipalities	  and	  Cities	  under	  control	  of	  Ministry	  Redevelopment	  plans?	  2000	   Human	  Settlements	  Policy	   Make	  serviced	  land	  available	  Encourage	  private	  sector	  participation	  Plan	  for	  new	  sub-­‐centers	  2002	   Land	  Disputes	  Act	   Establishes	  ward	  or	  district	  land	  tribunals	  Creates	  separate	  land	  court	  
2005	   Miscellaneous	  Act	   NHC	  establishes	  right	  to	  increase	  rents	  and	  buy	  land	  Repeal	  of	  rent	  restriction	  2007	   Land	  Use	  Planning	  Act	   Enables	  authorities	  to	  take	  loan	  defaulters	  to	  court	  Provides	  new	  procedures	  for	  land	  use	  plans	  2007	   Urban	  Planning	  Act	   Requires	  plans	  in	  annexed	  urban	  areas	  2008	   Unit	  Titles	  &	  Mortgage	  Finance	  Act	   Enables	  more	  than	  one	  title	  holder	  to	  land	  parcel	  Increases	  bank	  foreclosure	  rights	  Source:	  Author’s	  interviews,	  fieldwork	  and	  review	  of	  Legislative	  Acts	  Urban	   land	   development	   remains	   centralized	   even	   though	   the	   Land	   Act	   of	   1999	  officially	  gave	  land	  value	  and	  individual	  rights	  to	  title.	  The	  socialist	  legal	  system	  placed	  no	  value	  on	  land	  but	  only	  on	  buildings	  (URT	  1999b).	  The	  1999	  Act	  outlined	  value	  based	  on	   market	   transactions	   as	   well	   as	   guaranteed	   government	   compensation	   for	   any	  appropriation	   based	   on	   those	   values	   (URT	   1999b).	   The	   Office	   of	   the	   President	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maintains	  ownership	  of	  all	  land	  but	  long-­‐term	  leases	  offer	  individual	  land	  tenure.19	  As	  a	  result	   of	   the	   1999	   Act,	   urban	   land	   planning	   is	   controlled	   by	   national	   agencies	   while	  village	  councils	  control	  land	  planning	  in	  rural	  areas.	  The	  resulting	  distribution	  in	  power	  gives	  villagers	  more	  power	  than	  central	  city	  residents.	  Therefore,	  villages	  close	  to	  urban	  areas	  have	  an	  incentive	  remain	  autonomous	  as	  long	  as	  possible.	  The	   2002	   Local	   Government	   Acts	   fiscally	   empowered	   municipalities’	   to	   engage	   in	  formal	   development.	   The	   Acts	   increased	   the	   role	   of	   municipal	   authorities	   in	   urban	  development	  but	  also	   limited	  their	  own	  sources	  of	  revenue.20	  Municipalities	  now	  have	  authority	  to	  plan	  and	  implement	  urban	  development	  projects	  (URT	  2002c;	  URT	  2002b;	  URT	  2006a).	  Planning	  authority	  also	  enables	   local	  authorities	   to	  buy	  and	  sell	   land	   for	  development	   purposes.	   Local	   authorities	   can	   also	   condemn	   buildings	   for	  redevelopment.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  municipalities	   have	   few	   revenue	   raising	   tools.	   For	  many	  ministries	   and	   parastatals	   land	   and	   property	   portfolios	   comprise	   a	  majority	   of	  their	   independent	   financial	   resources	   because	   they	   are	   dependent	   on	   budget	  distributions	  from	  the	  parliament	  for	  liquidity	  (Boex	  &	  Muga	  2009;	  Fjelstad	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Tidemand	  2005).	  Prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  the	  reform	  program	  each	  local	  authority	  could	  set	  their	  own	  fees	  and	  taxes,	  which	  led	  to	  some	  confusion	  and	  complaints	  about	  inefficiency	  (Sarzin	   &	   Raich	   2012).	   The	   Urban	   Authorities	   Rating	   Act	   1999	   allowed	   local	  governments	   to	   assign	   property	   values	   and	   levy	   taxes	   (URT	   2000b).	   The	   legislation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 	  Individual	   leases	   are	   dichotomized	   into	   statutory	   granted	   right	   of	   occupancy	   and	   deemed,	   or	  customary,	  right	  of	  occupancy.	  Granted	  right	  of	  occupancy	  leases	  may	  not	  exceed	  99	  years	  or	  be	  less	  than	  33	  years.	  Meanwhile,	   deemed	   right	  of	   occupancy	  does	  not	   expire,	   but	   is	   governed	  by	  a	   separate	   set	   of	  laws,	  which	  apply	  only	   to	  village	   land.	  Thus,	   the	  differentiation	  between	  customary	  and	  granted	   rights	  does	  not	  apply	  in	  established	  urban	  areas	  because	  all	  land	  is	  classified	  as	  general	  land,	  which	  is	  managed	  by	   the	   statutory	   	   system	   and	   the	   central	   government.	   Yet,	   the	   differentiation	   is	   relevant	   in	   peri-­‐urban	  areas	  where	   village	   land	   is	   rapidly	   being	   converted	   to	   urban	   land	   uses	   by	   often	   speculating	   investors.	  Village	   land	  is	  administered	  by	  the	  village	  council,	  which	   is	   then	  supposed	  to	  offer	  CRO’s	  to	   individuals	  once	   the	   village	   itself	   is	   certified.	   The	   process	   is	   often	   opaque,	   slow	   and	   extremely	   complex	   allowing	  many	  individuals	  to	  grab	  land	  for	  speculation	  and	  large-­‐scale	  development.	  20	  The	  Acts	  refer	  to	  the	  Urban	  Authorities	  Act	  and	  the	  District	  Authorities	  Act,	  which	  together	  define	  the	  local	  government	  role	  throughout	  the	  country.	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claims	   that	   property	   taxes	  will	   enable	  wider	  provision	  of	   infrastructure	   and	   services.	  Yet,	  property	  tax	  collection	  remains	  low	  and	  municipalities	  have	  few	  consistent	  sources	  of	  income	  (Kironde	  2009).	  	  The	  1990	  NHC	  Act	  reoriented	  NHC’s	  role	  from	  a	  low-­‐income	  public	  housing	  provider	  to	  a	  semi-­‐public	  for-­‐profit	  urban	  development	  agency.	  The	  1990	  Act	  set	  new	  requirements	  that	  NHC	  pay	  dividends	  to	  the	  central	  government	  through	  commercially	  viable	  urban	  development	   projects.	   With	   the	   reform,	   the	   central	   government	   expected	   NHC	   to	  overcome	   its	   poor	   performance	   throughout	   the	   1980’s	   and	   become	   financially	  independent.	  Due	  to	  low	  rent	  collection	  rates	  during	  the	  1980’s,	  the	  central	  government	  made	  large	  cash	  transfers	  to	  NHC	  to	  cover	  basic	  operations	  (Komu	  2011a).	  In	  fact,	  over	  the	   decade	   NHC’s	   cash	   flow	   decrease	   creating	   a	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   declining	   revenue	  where	  buildings	  were	  not	  maintained	  or	  new	  stock	  constructed.21	  Restructuring	  NHC	  as	  an	  independent	  parastatal	  shifted	  the	  mandate	  and	  role	  of	  the	  agency.	  NHC	  continued	  to	  struggle	   financially	  until	  2005	  when	  the	  Miscellaneous	  Act	  provided	  greater	  ability	   to	  determine	  market	  rents,	  acquire	  land	  and	  compete	  in	  any	  sector	  of	  the	  housing	  market	  (URT	  2005).	  The	  restructuring	  emboldened	  the	  NHC	  to	  see	  itself	  as	  the	  country’s	  largest	  and	   most	   successful	   private	   real	   estate	   developer	   (NHC	   2010).	   Furthermore,	   official	  statistics	   claim	   the	  national	  housing	  deficit	   is	   close	   to	   three	  million	  units	   (NHC	  2010;	  URT	   2000a).22	  In	   response	   to	   the	   housing	   deficit,	   the	   National	   Human	   Settlements	  Development	   Policy	   of	   2000,	   outlines	   issues	   with	   adequate	   shelter,	   land	   delivery	  system,	  service	  provision	  and	  better	  rural	  housing	  but	  did	  not	  provide	  specific	  actions	  (Urban	   Solutions	   2012).	   An	   update	   to	   the	   1968	   housing	   policy	   remained	   in	   the	  consultant	  phase	  for	  the	  last	  decade.	  Another	   important	   institutional	  shift	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Tanzanian	  Building	  Agency	   (TBA)	   in	  2002.	  While	   the	  TBA	  has	  existed	   in	  various	   forms	  since	  1969	   it	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Interview	  with	  Hamad	  Abdallah,	  Director	  of	  Property	  Management	  at	  NHC,	  June	  26,	  2012.	  22	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  uncover	  the	  underlying	  data	  or	  studies	  that	  led	  to	  the	  calculation.	  It	  might	  be	  a	  political	  move	  by	  NHC	  and	  other	  advocates	   for	   state	   led	  housing	   investment	  by	  claiming	   the	  private	  sector	  had	  failed.	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transformed	   in	   2002	   to	   fill	   the	   some	   of	   voids	   left	   by	   privatization.	   That	   is,	   the	  President’s	  Privatization	  Review	  commission	  designated	  various	  industries	  for	  private	  operation	   including	  ministry	   owned	   real	   estate	   portfolios	   throughout	   the	   late	   1990’s	  and	  early	  2000’s	  (Shitundu	  2007).	  The	  TBA	  was	  established	  to	  manage	  the	  privatization	  process	  of	  individual	  ministry	  assets.	  The	  role	  endowed	  the	  TBA	  with	  considerable	  land	  wealth	  and	  power	  to	  distribute	  well	  located	  assets	  throughout	  Tanzania.	  Furthermore,	  the	  TBA	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  all	  property	  demands	  for	  state	  agencies.	  The	  construction	  mandate	  puts	  TBA	  in	  competition	  with	  NHC.	  In	  sum,	  the	  privatization	  process	  reoriented	  urban	  development	  power	  away	  from	  individual	  ministries	  towards	  private	  investors	  and	  parastatals.	  In	   contrast,	   privatization	   of	   the	   insurance	   industry	   led	   to	   decreasing	   investment	   in	  commercial	  projects.	  When	  the	  insurance	  industry	  was	  privatized	  in	  1996,	  the	  NIC	  was	  the	  only	  insurance	  provider.	  By	  2011,	  there	  were	  26	  commercial	  insurance	  firms	  (TIRA;	  URT	   2011).	   In	   1996,	   the	   NIC	   owned	   many	   of	   the	   largest	   office	   buildings	   across	   the	  country	   as	  well	   as	   several	   large	   housing	   estates.23	  NIC	   began	  divesting	   their	   land	   and	  property	  portfolio	  as	  part	  of	  2010	  effort	  to	  remain	  solvent.24	  As	  of	  2012,	  NIC’s	  portfolio	  included	  only	  its	  own	  office	  spaces	  throughout	  the	  country.	  NIC’s	  trend	  reflects	  a	  trend	  throughout	  the	  insurance	  industry.	  As	  the	  industry	  grew	  the	  share	  of	  total	  investments	  in	  real	  estate	  shrank	  from	  41	  percent	  in	  2003	  to	  23	  percent	  in	  2011	  (Figure	  3).	  The	  lack	  of	  continued	  investment	  in	  urban	  development	  signals	  private	  firms’	  more	  conservative	  risk	   profile	   as	   well	   as	   a	   lower	   degree	   of	   political	   influence.	   The	   lack	   of	   investment	  differs	   from	   the	   Western	   context,	   where	   insurance	   firms	   are	   a	   major	   source	   of	  institutional	  capital	  for	  direct	  and	  indirect	  investment	  in	  large-­‐scale	  real	  estate	  projects.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Interviews	  with:	  Anne	  Mbughuni,	  Finance	  Director	  at	  NIC,	  August	  6,	  2012;	  Mary	  Kyomo,	  Planning	  and	  Investment	  Manager	  at	  NIC,	  August	  15,	  2012.	  24	  NIC	  was	  directed	   to	  give	  preference	   to	  other	  government	  agencies	   in	   the	  sales	  process.	   Initially	   they	  attempted	  to	  sell	  to	  the	  Tanzania	  Building	  Agency,	  but	  the	  deal	  fell	  through	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  capital.	  So	  then,	  they	  have	  sold	  most	  of	  their	  assets	  to	  the	  pensin	  funds.	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Figure	  3:	  Insurance	  Industry	  Investment	  in	  Real	  Estate:	  2003	  -­‐	  2011	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justifications.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Public	   Service	   Pension	   Fund	   built	   an	   18-­‐story	   office	  tower	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   in	   2008	   (URT	   2011b).	   The	   tower	   provides	   positive	   rental	  returns	   because	   it	   is	   fully	   leased	   to	   private	   tenants.	   With	   the	   turn	   towards	   global	  urbanism,	   pension	   funds’	   role	   became	   increasingly	   important	   to	   financing	   politically	  motivated	  and	  large-­‐scale	  modular	  urban	  development	  investments.	  Pension	  funds	  lead	  the	   transition	   to	   global	   urbanism	   by	   providing	   capital	   for	   often	   politically	  motivated	  large-­‐scale	  urban	  development	  projects.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  one	   fund,	   the	  National	  Social	  Security	  Fund	   (NSSF),	   illuminates	   the	  new	  role	  of	  pension	  funds	  in	  the	  post-­‐socialist	  era.	  In	  2010,	  NSSF’s	  direct	  investments	  in	  real	  estate	  accounted	  for	  about	  30	  percent	  of	  total	  investments	  and	  another	  30	  percent	  were	   construction	   loans	   for	   various	   government	   projects.	   Direct	   investment	   in	   real	  estate	   achieved	   small	   returns	   (NSSF	   2009).	   Between	   2003	   and	   2010	   real	   estate	  investments	   provided	   the	   lowest	   returns	   on	   investment	   (Figure	   4).	   Returns	   from	  government	   construction	   loans	   are	   negligible	  with	   high	   default	   rates	   and	   repayment	  periods	   as	   long	   as	   50	   years.27	  In	   contrast,	   government	   securities	   provided	   returns	  ranging	  from	  8	  to	  12	  percent.	  NSSF	  provided	  the	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  City	  Council	  a	  $9	  million	  loan	   for	   the	  Machinga	  Complex,	  which	  has	   five	   stories	  and	  10,000	  stalls	  where	   street	  vendors	   were	   expected	   to	   relocate.28	  The	   Machinga	   Complex	   was	   a	   response	   to	   a	  promise	  made	  by	  President	  Kikwete	  that	  street	  vendors	  would	  be	  given	  a	  formal	  space	  to	   operate.29	  It	   is	   only	   20	   percent	   occupied	   does	   not	   cover	   operating	   costs	  much	   less	  providing	   a	   positive	   return	   for	   loan	   repayment.30	  The	  Machinga	   Complex	   project	  was	  not	   to	   be	   based	   on	   underwriting	   or	   market	   understanding	   but	   rather	   on	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  ibid	  28	  Correspondent.	  “Dar's	  Machinga	  Complex	  to	  open	  before	  October,	  Parliament	  told”.	  The	  Guardian,	  June	  24,	   2010,	   online.	   Joan	   Karaze.	   “Machinga	   Complex	   ready	   for	   business.”	   The	   Citizen,	   August	   21,	   2010,	  online.	  29	  Saumu	  Jumanne.	  “Let's	  Think:	  City	  Fathers:	  Reconsider	  Machinga	  Complex	  usage”.	  The	  Citizen,	  April	  10,	  2011.	  30 Correspondent. “Tanzania: Machinga Complex Board 'Under Fire'”. Tanzania Daily News, August 16, 2013, 
online. Prosper Makene. “Machinga Complex turns White Elephant”. The Guardian, May 13, 2013, online. 
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promises.	  Political	   interference	  with	  projects	   like	  the	  Machinga	  Complex	  makes	  urban	  development	  projects	  risky	  investments	  with	  small	  returns.	  	  
Figure	  4:	  NSSF	  Return	  on	  Investment:	  2003	  –	  2010	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The	  program	  included	  170	  projects	  throughout	  the	  country	  with	  141	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  alone	  (NHC	  2012b).	  31	  A	   few	  private	  businesses	  and	  high-­‐income	  buyers	  gained	  access	  to	  formal	  development	  without	  diminishing	  informal	  practices.	  NHC	  is	  not	  in	  a	  financial	  position	  to	  exercise	  their	  buyback	  option,	  particularly	  since	  property	  values	  increased	  with	   the	   new	   developments.	   Furthermore,	   many	   of	   the	   projects	   stalled,	   site	   designs	  changed	   and	   construction	   quality	   is	   poor.32	  For	   instance,	   the	   collapse	   of	   one	   of	   the	  buildings	  in	  2013	  led	  to	  the	  death	  of	  36	  people	  because	  the	  construction	  was	  faulty	  and	  the	  building	   size	  nearly	   twice	  as	   large	  as	   the	  NHC	  PPP	  agreement.33	  Even	  prior	   to	   the	  collapse,	   there	   were	   30	   pending	   court	   cases	   between	   the	   NHC	   and	   their	   private	  development	   partners. 34 	  The	   outcomes	   decreased	   private	   developer’s	   and	   NHC’s	  willingness	  to	  partner.35	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  PPP	  program	  encouraged	  private	  businesses	  and	  individuals	  to	  invest	  in	  urban	  development.	  Projects	  are	  larger	  than	  any	  development	  in	  Tanzania’s	  history	  reflecting	  global	  urbanism	  contributing	  to	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  central	  city.	  As	  a	  result,	  NHC	  returned	  to	  a	  vertically	  integrated	  development	  model	  where	  they	  hope	   to	   control	   the	   construction	  materials,	  building	  process	  and	   sales.	  Without	  a	   low	  income	   public	   housing	  mandate,	   NHC	   now	   considers	   itself	   a	   competitor	  with	   private	  developers	  of	  high-­‐end	  property.36	  The	  2007	  Land	  Use	  Planning	  and	  Urban	  Planning	  Acts	  broadened	   the	  private	  sector’s	  role	   in	   urban	   development.	   The	   2007	  Acts	   created	   pluralities	   that	   allows	   the	   private	  sector	  to	  leverage	  benefits	  from	  informal	  rules	  within	  formal	  development	  projects.	  The	  Land	   Use	   Planning	   Act	   2007	   set	   mandates	   for	   municipalities	   to	   provide	   universal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  While	  NHC	   first	  entered	   into	   joint	  ventures	   in	  1979,	   the	  early	  ventures	  were	  with	  other	  government	  agencies	  rather	  than	  private	  sector	  owners	  and	  developers	  (interview	  with	  Lussagano).	  32	  Interviews	  on	  June	  27th	  2012	  and	  July	  30th	  2012	  with	  Andrew	  A	  Rugarabamu,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Legal	  Officer	  and	  Lussagana	  Lussagana,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Project	  Manager.	  33	  Karama	  Kenyunko.	  “Dar	  collapsed	  buildings:	  Suspects	  granted	  bail.”	  IPP	  Media,	  April	  17,	  2013,	  online.	  34	  Interview	  with	  Andrew	  A	  Rugarabamu,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Legal	  Officer,	  June	  27th	  and	  30th	  2012.	  35	  Interview	  with	  private	  developer,	  July	  27,	  2012.	  36	  Interview	  with	  Nehemiah	  Mchechu,	  CEO	  at	  NHC,	  June	  26,	  2012	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serviced	   land	   and	   requires	   land	   use	   plans	   in	   every	   district.	   The	   central	   government,	  through	   MLHHSD,	   has	   an	   oversight	   role	   rather	   than	   providing	   direct	   guidance,	  timelines,	  or	  priority	  actions.	  Peppered	  throughout	  the	  legislation	  are	  vague	  references	  to	   encouraging	   individual	   ownership	   and	   housing	   provision	   by	   the	   private	   sector.	  Beyond	   the	   PPP	   program,	   the	   central	   government	   did	   not	   follow	   up	   with	   specific	  programs	  and	  policies	  to	  encourage	  formal	  private	  investment.	  	  The	   Planning	   Acts	   allow	   individual	   owners	   to	   bypass	   local	   planning	   bodies	   when	  developing	   planning	   schemes	   or	   subdividing	   land.	   The	   central	   government	   retains	  control	   while	   allowing	   individual	   developers	   to	   bypass	   slow	   and	   understaffed	   local	  planning	  authorities.	  The	  institutional	  arrangement	  presents	  pluralities	  where	  a	  private	  landowner	  can	  choose	  to	  follow	  the	  rules	  that	  best	  suit	  their	  conditions	  to	  develop	  land	  and	  exert	  their	  influence.	  The	  legislation	  fails	  to	  provide	  clear	  development	  rules,	  yet	  it	  provides	   the	   individual	   bargaining	   power	   by	   requiring	   that	   all	   requests	   receive	   an	  official	   response	   within	   60	   days	   of	   submittal.	   If	   a	   private	   owner	   does	   not	   receive	   a	  response	  they	  can	  then	  proceed	  with	  development.	  The	  time	  limit	   is	  meant	  to	  put	  the	  onus	  on	   the	   local	  planning	  authorities	  and	  MLHHSD	  to	  act	  quickly	   in	  approving	  plans	  and	  speed	  up	  the	  development	  process.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  planning	  authorities	  act	  more	  quickly	  as	  a	  result	  but	  private	  landowners	  have	  greater	  power	  to	  proceed	  with	  development.	  	  The	  2008	  Units	  Title	  Act	  allows	  private	  sector	   to	  develop	   large-­‐scale	  projects	  without	  formal	   financing	  and	  Parliament	   repealed	   the	  Rent	  Restriction	  Act	   in	  2005	   increasing	  private	  sector	  construction	   incentives.	  The	  Unit	  Title	  Act	  allows	  multiple	   titles	  on	  one	  plot	   of	   land	   encouraging	   high-­‐density	   construction	   by	  making	   ownership	   terms	   clear	  and	   easy	   to	   transfer.	   Foreigners	   can	   own	   units	   without	   presidential	   approval	   or	  partnership	  with	  a	  local.	  The	  designation	  of	  multiple	  titles	  remains	  a	  high-­‐income	  tool.37	  Project	  financing	  through	  pre-­‐sales	  becomes	  a	  formal	  means	  of	  development	  financing	  for	  private	  developers.	  Large-­‐scale	  projects	  remain	  all	  cash	  transactions.	  The	  financial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  No	  development	  to	  date	  used	  multiple	   titles	   for	   low-­‐income	  cooperatives	  (interviews	  with	  WAT,	  CCI,	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity)	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sector	   was	   privatized	   in	   1991	   but	   the	   construction	   and	   mortgage	   finance	   market	  remain	   very	   thin.	   The	   number	   of	   banks	   exploded	   with	   40	   new	   institutions	   opening	  between	   1990	   and	   2012	   (Serengeti	   Advisers	   2012).	   Yet,	   only	   five	   banks	   offer	   either	  construction	  and	  mortgage	   loans.	  More	  generally,	   lending	  to	  deposit	  rates	  remain	   low	  at	   around	  40	  percent	   (BOT	  2010).	  These	  banks	  only	  offer	  mortgages	   to	  very	  wealthy	  individuals	   with	   high	   value	   properties,	   interest	   rates	   in	   excess	   of	   20%	   and	   monthly	  income	  requirements	  of	  more	  than	  $2,000.38	  	  Access	  to	  debt	  financing	  from	  local	  banks	  remains	  an	  issue	  for	  developers	  and	  buyers.	  Construction	   financing	   is	   limited	   to	   corporate	   and	   investment	   banking	   so	   that	   the	  beneficiaries	  are	  high-­‐net	  worth	  individuals	  with	  large	  business	  holdings.	  For	  example,	  one	   specialty	   bank	   allocates	   approximately	   25	   percent	   of	   their	   loan	   portfolio,	   or	   $57	  million	   USD	   in	   2013,	   to	   the	   real	   estate	   and	   construction	   sector.	   Yet,	   more	   than	   80	  percent	   of	   their	   clients	   are	   large	   companies	   with	   whom	   they	   do	   other	   business.39	  Developers	  and	  bankers	  reported	  that	  they	  don’t	  need	  construction	  financing	  but	  they	  take	  loans	  for	  20	  to	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  construction	  cost	  to	  avoid	  questions	  about	  project	  cash	  flows	  from	  the	  Tanzanian	  Revenue	  Authority.40	  	  Developers	  have	  other	  assets	  with	  the	  banks	  and	  therefore	  construction	  loans	  are	  a	  bank	  provided	  service	  to	  maintain	  the	  customers	  business.	  The	  majority	  of	  project	  financing	  comes	  from	  pre-­‐sales	  and	  equity	  gained	   through	   other	   businesses.	   The	   financial	   landscape	   limits	   the	   potential	   urban	  development	  investors	  to	  existing	  elites	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Interviews	   with	   the	   following:	   Arun	   Chauhan,	   Senior	   Vice	   President	   at	   Bank	   M,	   Hasnain	   Dinani,	  Relationship	  Officer	  at	  I&M	  Bank,	  Oscar	  Mgaya,	  Chief	  Operating	  Officer	  at	  Tanzania	  Mortgage	  Refinance	  Company	  Ltd,	  Aaron	  Henry	  Mrina,	  Credit	  Analysis	  Officer	  at	  Azania	  Bank,	  Rosemary	  Ihadike,	  Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CBA,	  Jane	  Christopher,	  Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CRDB	  Bank.	  	  39	  Interview	  with	  Arun	  Chauhan,	  Senior	  Vice	  President	  at	  Bank	  M,	  August	  18,	  2012.	  40	  Interviews	   with	   the	   following:	   Arun	   Chauhan,	   Senior	   Vice	   President	   at	   Bank	   M,	   Hasnain	   Dinani,	  Relationship	  Officer	  at	  I&M	  Bank,	  Oscar	  Mgaya,	  Chief	  Operating	  Officer	  at	  Tanzania	  Mortgage	  Refinance	  Company	  Ltd,	  Aaron	  Henry	  Mrina,	  Credit	  Analysis	  Officer	  at	  Azania	  Bank,	  Rosemary	  Ihadike,	  Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CBA,	  Jane	  Christopher,	  Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CRDB	  Bank.	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Private	  development	  is	  dominated	  by	  cash	  transactions,	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  a	  conduit	  for	  laundering	   money.	   Real	   estate	   investment	   offers	   a	   means	   for	   removing,	   hiding	   and	  repatriating	   capital	   for	   the	   investor	   and	   the	   developer.	   Without	   formal	   financing	  mechanisms	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  record	  either	  the	  source	  of	  funds	  or	  the	  sales	  price.	  As	  a	  result,	  development	  becomes	  an	  avenue	  to	  hide	  cash	  from	  authorities.	  Properties	  are	  purchased	  in	  the	  names	  of	  family	  members	  or	  businesses	  that	  are	  not	  easily	  traceable	  to	  an	   individual.	  For	   instance,	   in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  one	  government	  official	  purchased	  20	  units	   in	   a	   building	   using	   different	   names	   for	   each	   unit.41	  The	   purchase	   and	   sale	  processes	  leaves	  room	  for	  capital	  to	  either	  flow	  into	  Tanzania	  or	  out.	  For	  capital	  to	  flow	  in	   developers	   use	   off-­‐shore	   entities	   to	   transfer	   cash.	   Development	   projects	   allow	  repatriation	   of	   capital	   deposited	   outside	   Tanzania.	   The	   property	   is	   bought	  with	   cash	  from	  accounts	  held	  abroad.	  The	  property	  provides	  large	  sums	  of	  cash	  through	  resale	  or	  rental.42	  It	   also	   offers	   the	   opportunity	   to	   extract	   cash	   from	   other	   countries,	   making	  Tanzania	   a	   conduit	   for	   capital	   flight	   from	  other	   countries.	   Buyers	   purchase	   a	   presale	  unit	   then	   sell	   the	   unit,	   often	   before	   it	   is	   completed,	   for	   an	   equal	   or	   lesser	   value,	  depending	  on	   the	  market	  and	   fees	   charged	  by	   the	  developer.	  The	  buyer	  purchases	   in	  cash	  and	  then	  sales	  can	  be	  transacted	  in	  domestic	  or	  off-­‐shore	  accounts.	  The	   reforms	   reoriented	   the	   power	   structure	   to	   reflect	   global	   urbanism	   but	   added	  pressure	  to	  the	  urbanization	  process	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Yet,	  the	  private	  sector	  continues	  to	   operate	   in	   a	   grey	   area	   between	   formal	   and	   informal,	   legal	   and	   illegal,	   public	   and	  private.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  in	  nearly	  thirty	  years	  of	  policy	  and	  institutional	  reforms	  there	  is	  not	  a	  more	  diverse	  and	  dynamic	  private	  sector	  market	  that	  creates	  highest	  and	  best	  use	   real	   estate	   assets	   that	   eventually	   trickle	  down	   to	   the	  poor.	   Partnerships	  between	  public	   and	   private	   are	   opaque.	   New	   development	   is	   targeted	   at	   high-­‐income	   buyers.	  The	   reform	   program	   expects	   the	   private	   sector	   to	   appear	   from	   thin	   air.	   Policies	   and	  programs	   reference	   private	   financing	   and	   engagement	   without	   involving	   business	  owners	   or	   surveying	   potential	   investors’	   interest.	   The	   existing	   network	   of	   private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Interviews	  with	  Lussagana	  Lussagana,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Project	  Manager	  on	  June	  27th	  2012	  and	  July	  30th	  2012.	  	  42	  A	  $10,000	  cap	  on	  cash	  transactions	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  access	  large	  sums	  of	  illicit	  capital	  
	  	   59	  
businesses	   is	   not	   incentivized	   to	   fully	   engage	   in	   the	   formal	   urban	   development.	   As	   a	  result,	   the	   businesses	   that	   do	   participate	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   few	   opportunities	   to	  engage	  in	  the	  formal	  sector	  to	  build	  high-­‐income	  products	  because	  they	  can	  guarantee	  returns	   and	   short-­‐term	   profits.	   Government	   agencies	   are	   in	   direct	   competition	   with	  private	   businesses	   building	   high-­‐end	   properties.	   Reforms	   enabled	   continued	   power	  grabbing	  by	  existing	  elites	  and	  growth	  of	  informal	  remote	  neighborhoods.	  	  
Conclusion	  Tanzanian	   urban	   policy	   transitions	   have	   long	   lasting	   implications	   on	   urban	  development.	   In	   each	   period	   urban	   management	   remained	   elusive,	   yet	   the	   central	  government	   announced	   adjustments	   to	   overcome	   the	   errors	   of	   the	   previous	   period.	  During	  the	  early	  years	  of	  independence	  reforms	  were	  infused	  with	  socialist	  modernist	  ideals	   aimed	   at	   overcoming	   colonialism’s	   underdevelopment	   and	   segregation.	   The	  reforms	  created	  a	  highly	  centralized	  formal	  system	  of	  urban	  development	  with	  control	  over	  various	  aspects	  of	  urban	  development	  vested	  in	  government	  agencies.	  The	  reforms	  spread	   limited	   human	   and	   financial	   resources	   across	   the	   country	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  decrease	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  dominance	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  By	  spreading	  resources	  so	  thinly	  local	  governments	  struggled	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  population	  growth	  and	  demand	  for	   services.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   government	   provision	   informal	   private	   development	  came	   to	   define	   residential	   urban	   development	   while	   commercial	   development	   was	  limited	   to	   small	   areas	   controlled	   by	   central	   government	   agencies.	   Informality	   was	  encouraged	  through	  strong	  tenure	  rights	  and	  several	  policies	  creating	  disincentives	  for	  formal	  development.	  In	   response,	   another	   set	   of	   reforms	   increased	   the	   potential	   for	   formal	   private	   sector	  urban	  development	  and	  decentralized	  government	   influence.	  The	  reforms	  blurred	  the	  line	   between	   informal	   and	   formal	   development	   as	   well	   as	   private	   and	   public	  stakeholders.	   The	   blurriness	   increased	   opportunities	   for	   government	   agencies	   and	  private	  powerbrokers	  to	  engage	  in	  questionable	  development	  projects	  with	  large	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  goal.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  results	  are	   more	   limited	   than	   expected	   because	   formal	   sector	   development	   remains	   small	  relative	  to	  informal	  development	  with	  a	  small	  elite	  group	  of	  business	  men	  engaging	  in	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urban	   development	   projects.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   since	   the	   changes	   took	   effect	  repositioning	   of	   government	   held	   assets,	   redevelopment	   of	   central	   cities	   and	  master	  planning	   in	   peri-­‐urban	   areas	   has	   taken	   place	   on	   a	   larger	   scale	   than	   ever	   before.	   The	  institutional	  reforms	  enabled	  this	  development	  but	  fail	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  equitable	  and	  efficient	  city.	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Chapter	  4:	  Arusha	  
Introduction	  In	  Arusha	  the	  urban	  planning	  reform	  program	  mixed	  with	  existing	  business	  structures	  and	   political	   demands	   to	   influence	   urban	   development	   outcomes.	   The	   outcomes	   in	  Arusha	   do	   not	   provide	   evidence	   of	   universal	  market	   responses	   to	   rents.	   The	   Arusha	  case	   shows	   that	   the	   reform	   program	   created	   plural	   governance	   with	   public	   entities	  seeking	  means	   to	   increase	   cash	   flow	   through	   tourism	   related	   urban	   development.	   It	  also	  created	  a	  network	  of	  private	  business	  structures	  that	  benefitted	  existing	  elites	   to	  engage	   in	  speculative	  development.	   In	   this	  case,	   land	  use	  history	  created	  scarcity	  and	  additional	  pressure	  on	  local	  communities	  to	  resulted	  in	  community	  level	  protests.	  The	  case	  shows	  the	  spread	  of	  similar	  modular	  forms	  and	  that	  under	  some	  circumstances	  it	  leads	  not	  only	  to	  fragility	  but	  community	  engagement	  and	  protest.	  Recent	  urban	  development	  outcomes	  in	  Arusha	  are	  modular	  and	  speculative	  in	  both	  the	  central	   city	   and	   peri-­‐urban	   areas.	   Development	   responds	   to	   an	   external	   demand	   for	  profit	  through	  the	  tourism	  sector.	  Developers	  provide	  a	  full	  set	  of	  services	  that	  isolate	  development	  from	  the	  existing	  city.	  Tourism	  encourages	   investors	  to	  build	  assets	  that	  don’t	   respond	   to	   local	   demands,	   are	   standardized	   and	   self-­‐contained.	   Modularity	   is	  perpetuated	  by	  the	  local	  political	  economy	  that	  encourages	  over-­‐investment	  in	  tourism	  related	   development.	   Due	   to	   a	   plural	   governance	   structure,	   government	   entities	  compete	  for	  investment	  in	  attempts	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  and	  increase	  cash	  flow.	  There	  are	  at	   least	   three	   layers	   of	   contradictory	   planning	   regulations	   between	  national,	   regional	  and	   local.	  The	   result	   is	   a	   regulatory	   stalemate	   that	   creates	  opportunities	   for	   informal	  development.	   Investors	  are	  then	  freed	  to	  pursue	  modular	  developments	  that	  consider	  only	   short-­‐term	   profits.	   Private	   investors	   form	   tourism	   conglomerates	   operating	   in	  regional	  networks	  of	  hotel	  operators.	   In	   turn	   the	   local	  community	   feels	   threatened	  as	  they	  experience	  shrinking	  affordable	  and	  informal	  housing	  options.	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The	   combination	   of	   threats	   to	   political	   legitimacy	   and	   tight	   land	   markets	   leads	   to	  insurgency	   (Holston	   1998;	   Miraftab	   2009).	   Undeveloped	   land	   in	   Arusha	   is	   scarce	  therefore	   informal	   use	   rights	   become	   important	   to	   perceptions	   of	   security.	   When	  modular	   urbanism	  disrupts	   informal	   land	  use	   it	   encourages	   insurgent	   reactions	   from	  local	  communities.	  Protests	  in	  both	  the	  central	  city	  and	  outskirts	  forced	  developers	  to	  make	  small	  concessions	  that	  give	  communities	  access	  to	  infrastructure	  and	  alternative	  land	  uses.	  The	  experience	  in	  Arusha	  suggests	  that	  under	  some	  circumstances	  modular	  urbanism	  can	  lead	  to	  insurgent	  planning.	  The	   following	   chapter	   will	   first	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   Arusha’s	   urban	   form	   and	  economic	   drivers.	   The	   overview	   sets	   the	   context	   for	   an	   in-­‐depth	   examination	   of	  redevelopment	  and	  satellite	  city	  development.	  The	  redevelopment	  case	  study	  examines	  government	   agencies	   attempts	   to	   reposition	   housing	   estates	   as	   retail	   projects	   and	   a	  private	   sector	   driven	   development	   cascade	   in	   hotels.	   Local	   communities	   protest	   the	  repositioning	  attempts	  and	  corrupt	  behavior	  calling	  for	  more	  affordable	  options	  but	  get	  only	   political	   pronouncements	   in	   return.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   satellite	   city	   case	   study	  examines	  the	  development	  of	  Usa	  River.	  Where	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  planning	  stalemate,	  a	  gated	  community	  development	  and	  contentious	  elections	  caused	  local	  communities	  to	  demand	  some	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  modular	  high-­‐end	  residential	  development.	  
Overview	  of	  Arusha’s	  Urban	  Form	  and	  Economic	  Drivers	  The	  southern	  slopes	  of	  Mount	  Meru,	  Africa’s	  second	  highest	  peak,	  define	  Arusha’s	  urban	  form	   (Arusha	   City	   Council	   &	   URT	   2013).	   A	   game	   reserve,	   the	   Arusha	   National	   Park,	  bounds	   the	   city	   to	   the	  North	   (Figure	  5).43	  Urban	  development	   follows	   the	  major	   road	  connecting	  Arusha	  with	  Moshi	  to	  the	  east	  and	  Nairobi	  to	  the	  north.	  Small	  creeks	  provide	  water	   throughout	   area	   but	   do	   not	   create	   major	   impediments	   to	   development	   (IUCN	  2007;	   Ngereza	   2005).	   Informal	   settlements	   are	   dispersed	   throughout	   the	   built	   up	  area.44	  The	  resulting	  urban	  form	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contiguously	  dense	  and	  developed	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Matilda	  Kirenga.	  “Arusha	  National	  Park	  expands	  to	  forest	  area.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  September	  16-­‐22,	  2006,	  p.	  5.	  44	  John	  F	  Masare.	  “Arusha's	  urban	  growth	  nagged	  by	  squalid	  slums.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  July	  22,	  2004,	  p.	  1.	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Tanzania	   stretching	   into	   the	   surrounding	   Meru	   District	   (Coulson	   1982). 45 	  Large	  agricultural	   estates	   or	   plantations	   account	   for	   rapid	   density	   decrease	   on	   the	   eastern	  and	  southern	  edges	  of	  the	  city.	  
Figure	  5:	  Arusha	  Density	  Map	  2002	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculations	  based	  on	  2002	  URT	  Village	  Census	  Statistics	  One	  method	  of	  analyzing	  urban	  form	  measures	  average	  density	  in	  one-­‐kilometer	  bands	  across	  the	  built	  up	  area	  of	  a	  city	  creating	  a	  density	  profile	  (Clark	  1951;	  Bertaud	  2004).	  The	  built	  up	  area	  excludes	   “contiguous	  open	   space	   larger	   than	  4	  hectare,	   agricultural	  land,	   forests,	  bodies	  of	  water	  and	  any	  unused	   land.	   In	  addition,	   land	  used	  by	  airports	  and	  by	  roads	  and	  highways	  not	  adjacent	  to	  urban	  used	  land	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  area	  defined	   as	   built-­‐up	   area.”	   (Bertaud	   2004,	   p.10)	   The	   resulting	   density	   profile	  demonstrates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  classical	  model	  of	  land	  rents	  holds	  in	  a	  given	  city	  (Clark	   1951).	   The	   classical	   model	   predicts	   that	   unrestrained	   private	   land	   markets	  create	   a	   negatively	   sloped	   exponential	   curve	   due	   to	   transportation	   costs	   creating	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Note	  that	  density	  above	  500	  people	  per	  km2	  is	  considered	  urban	  land	  use	  even	  as	  the	  center	  of	  the	  city	  is	  higher	  density	  and	  administratively	  many	  areas	  are	  rural.	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trade-­‐off	   between	   job	   access	   and	   amenities	   (Turok	   2011;	   Gordon	   2008;	   Mills	   &	   Tan	  1980).	  Observations	  from	  around	  the	  world	  provide	  robust	  evidence	  of	  the	  relationship	  (Bertaud	  2004;	  Bertaud	  &	  Malpezzi	  2003;	  Bertaud	  2001).	  Deviations	  from	  a	  negatively	  sloped	  curve	  and	  variation	   in	   the	  rate	  of	  decline	  are	   then	  explained	  by	  policy	  choices	  that	  alter	  the	  set	  of	  available	  trade-­‐offs	  (Bertaud	  &	  Renaud	  1997).	  Given	  the	  long-­‐term	  nature	  of	  investments,	  the	  relationship	  is	  path	  dependent	  and	  difficult	  to	  alter	  (Bertaud	  2004;	  Turok	  2011).	  	  The	  following	  figure	  compares	  Arusha’s	  density	  profile	  at	  two	  points	  in	  time	  (Figure	  6).	  The	   first	   represents	   the	   end	   of	   socialist	   planning	   in	   1988	   when	   the	   area’s	   total	  population	  was	  approximately	  340,000.	  The	  second	  demonstrates	  changes	  after	  more	  than	   10	   years	   of	   active	   privatization	   programs	   and	   encouragement	   of	   private	   sector	  participation	   in	   real	   estate	   markets	   when	   population	   nearly	   doubled	   to	   610,000.46	  Between	   1988	   and	   2002,	   Arusha’s	   core	   continued	   to	   fill	   in	   with	   large	   increases	   in	  density.	   Yet,	   the	   largest	   changes	   in	   population	   occurred	   between	   3	   and	   6	   km,	   just	  outside	  the	  main	  commercial	  area	  of	  the	  city	  (Figure	  6).	  The	  change	  reflects	  urban	  infill	  resulting	  in	  a	  smoothing	  of	  the	  urban	  form	  from	  center	  to	  periphery.	  Nonetheless,	  over	  the	   time	  period	  a	   larger	   share	  of	   the	   total	  population	   shifted	   to	   the	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  1988	  49	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  lived	  more	  than	  8	  km	  from	  the	  city	  center,	  whereas	  by	  2002	  it	  was	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  shift	  towards	  the	  periphery	  confirms	  that	  Arusha	  is	  expanding	  and	  has	  few	  geographic	  constraints	  on	  development.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  NBS	  has	  not	  yet	  released	  geographic	  information	  about	  the	  2012	  Census	  so	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  more	  recent	  profile.	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Figure	  6:	  Density	  Profiles:	  1988	  and	  2002	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quality	   than	   international	   safari	   tourists.	   The	   combination	   of	   international	   and	   local	  tourism	  growth	  increases	  opportunities	  for	  private	  sector	  businesses	  as	  well	  as	  demand	  for	  urban	  development	  projects.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  cash	  crop	  agricultural	  land	  use	  within	  the	  city	  limits	  adds	  land	  market	  pressure	   but	   the	   land	   also	   offers	   large-­‐scale	   urban	   development	   opportunities.	   Pre-­‐existing	  density	   and	  plantation	  agriculture	  kept	   villagization	  out	  of	   the	   area	   (Hillbom	  2011).	  Even	  though	  the	  area’s	  population	  continues	  to	  rapidly	  increase	  there	  are	  large	  plots	   of	   land	   available	   for	   development	   on	   cash	   crop	   plantations	   dating	   to	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	  era	  (URT	  &	  Arusha	  Regional	  Development	  Directorate	  1981).	  	  Plantations	  drive	  up	  the	  land	  rent	  for	  space	  by	  holding	  large	  tracts	  of	  land	  off	  the	  market	  for	  urban	  uses	  creating	  land	  market	  scarcity.	  Due	  to	  land	  scarcity,	  development	  control	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  few	   plantation	   owners.	   During	   Ujamaa,	   ownership	   of	   sisal	   and	   coffee	   plantations	  transferred	  to	  parastatals	  and	  village	  cooperatives	  (Msambichaka	  &	  Bagachwa	  1986).49	  As	   Ujamaa	   ended,	   widespread	   privatization	   of	   parastatals	   offered	   99	   year	   leases	   on	  coffee	  and	  sisal	  plantations	  in	  and	  around	  Arusha	  (Cooksey	  2011a;	  Ponte	  2004;	  Kelsall	  2000).	  The	   estates	  were	  not	   redistributed	   as	   small	   individual	  plots	  because	   the	  main	  goal	  of	  privatization	  was	  to	  bolster	  the	  large-­‐scale	  agricultural	  cash	  crop	  industry	  and	  provide	  a	  source	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  (World	  Bank	  2007;	  World	  Bank	  2004;	  Bigsten	  &	  Danielson	  2001).	  The	   justification	  was	  that	   large	  cash	  crop	  plantations	  would	  provide	  more	  economic	  growth	  and	  salaried	  employment	  than	  small	  individual	  plots.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  privatization	  process	  was	  that	  a	  few	  individuals,	  with	  access	  to	  capital,	  obtained	  large	  plots.50	  A	  few	  individuals	  and	  foreign	  firms	  captured	  most	  of	  estate	  land	  with	  the	  return	  of	   individually	  ownership	   instead	  of	   increased	   local	  participation	  (Ponte	  2004;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Most	   original	   estate	   holders	   were	   allowed	   to	   retain	   50	   acres	   of	   land.	   Although,	   in	   1973,	   all	   non-­‐Tanzanian	   owned	   coffee	   estates	   were	   nationalized	   so	   those	   estate	   owners	   did	   not	   retain	   any	   land.	  (Cooksey	  2011b)	  50	  I	  attempted	  to	  locate	  more	  details	  on	  the	  privatization	  of	  farms	  in	  the	  area	  but	  was	  not	  able	  to	  obtain	  original	  documents	  or	  information	  about	  transactions.	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Cooksey	  2011a;	  Cooksey	  2011b).51	  Plantations	  put	  urban	  development	  control	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  local	  government	  entities	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  residents.52	  
Central	  City	  Redevelopment:	  Creating	  a	  Tourist	  Center	  Arusha’s	   redevelopment	   increased	   rapidly	   between	   2005	   and	   2012	   (Figure	   7).53	  The	  total	  number	  of	  buildings	  with	   five	  or	  more	   stories	   increased	   from	   ten	   to	   fifty	   seven,	  demonstrating	  the	  pace	  of	  redevelopment	  at	  higher	  floor	  to	  area	  ratios.54	  Another	  nine	  buildings	  are	  still	  under	  construction	   implying	  continued	  redevelopment.	   In	  2005	   the	  tallest	  buildings	  included	  four	  seven-­‐story	  buildings.	  By	  2012	  forty-­‐five	  buildings	  were	  seven	  stories	  or	  taller	  of	  which	  nine	  had	  ten	  or	  more	  stories.	  The	  tallest	  building	  is	  an	  office	   tower	   with	   fifteen	   stories.	   While	   development	   is	   spread	   throughout	   the	  redevelopment	   area	   there	   is	   a	   high	   concentration	   close	   to	   the	   central	   market	   and	  recently	   upgraded	   roads	   (Figure	   7).55	  Road	   upgrades	   seem	   to	   be	   correlated	   with	   the	  timing	  of	  many	  redevelopment	  projects.	  56	  More	  specifically,	  twenty-­‐two	  buildings,	  or	  47	  percent,	  of	  the	  new	  buildings	  are	  within	  20	  meters	  of	  the	  upgraded	  roads.	  At	  least	  ten	  of	  these	   buildings	   began	   construction	   after	   the	   road	   upgrades	   were	   completed.	   The	  connection	   between	   infrastructure	   upgrades	   and	   investment	   is	   consistent	   with	   a	  complaint	   reiterated	   time	   and	   again	   by	   private	   sector	   actors	   that	   infrastructure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  In	  some	  cases,	  colonial	  plantations	  owners	  returned	  and	  in	  others	  new	  owners	  purchased	  the	  estates.	  52	  Interview	  with	  Planning	  Officer	  and	  Land	  Surveyor	  in	  Arusha	  Municipal	  Council	  August	  21st	  and	  23rd,	  2012.	  	  53	  Correspondent.	  “Construction	  industry	  takes	  Arusha’s	  economy	  to	  new	  heights.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  August	  23,	  2008,	  pp.	  5–6.	  54	  Arusha	  City	  Council	  records	  do	  not	  include	  information	  on	  building	  permit	  approvals	  or	  documentation	  on	  projection	  completions.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  data	  gap	  I	  took	  field	  notes	  of	  all	  buildings	  with	  5	  or	  more	  stories.	  When	  possible	  I	  inquired	  about	  the	  completion	  date.	  I	  then	  used	  Google	  maps	  to	  compare	  the	  current	  land	  use	  with	  imagery	  from	  2005.	  I	  validated	  field	  notes	  and	  gained	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  the	  scale	  and	  distribution	  of	  redevelopment.	  55	  The	   roads	   were	   paved	   through	   a	   joint	   World	   Bank	   and	   DANIDA	   project	   known	   as	   the	   Tanzania	  Competitive	   Cities	   Project.	   In	   addition	   to	   project	   documents	   the	   Arusha	   City	   Council	   ran	   an	   ad	   in	   the	  Arusha	  Times	  on	  October	  3,	  2009	  summarizing	  the	  road	  improvements.	  56	  Yasinta	  Amos.	  “Arusha	  named	  pilot	  city	  in	  TSCP	  programmes.”	  Daily	  News,	  November	  20,	  2013.	  p.	  2.	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constrained	  their	  capacity	  to	  develop	  real	  estate	  projects.57	  Individual	  private	  investors	  own	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  projects	  close	  to	  the	  upgraded	  roads	  confirming	  the	  correlation	  between	  private	  investment	  and	  infrastructure.	  A	   majority	   of	   new	   buildings	   are	   privately	   owned	   hotels	   and	   office	   buildings.	   Hotels	  account	   for	  52	  percent	  of	   redevelopment.	   In	  2005,	   there	  were	   five	  hotels	  with	  multi-­‐stories	   compared	   to	   thirty-­‐two	   in	  2012.58	  Nearly	  half	  of	   these	  hotels	  are	   concentrated	  around	   the	   central	   market	   and	   the	   upgraded	   roads	   (Figure	   7).	   Office	   and	   retail	  buildings	  account	  for	  44	  percent	  of	  redevelopment	  projects.	  While	  banking	  services	  are	  more	   limited	   than	   in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   both	   local	   and	   international	   banks	  occupy	   six	   of	  these	  buildings.59	  Of	  these	  new	  hotels	  and	  offices	  only	  eight	  are	  joint	  ventures	  or	  owned	  by	   parastatals.	   Furthermore,	   there	   were	   only	   two	   new	   apartment	   buildings,	   or	   4	  percent	   of	   total	   new	   construction	  between	  2005	   and	  2012,	   none	  of	  which	  were	   joint	  ventures.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Interviews	  with	  representatives	  from	  developers	  and	  government	  parastatals	  throughout	  2012.	  58	  I	   confirmed	  with	   Sirili	   Akko,	   Executive	  Officer,	   Tanzania	  Association	   of	   Tour	  Operators	   via	   e-­‐mail	   in	  January	  of	  2014.	  59	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “Bank	  of	  Baroda	  boosts	  Arusha's	  ‘Wall	  Street’”.	  Arusha	  Times,	  August	  18-­‐24,	  2007,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	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Figure	  7:	  Arusha	  CBD	  Redevelopment,	  2005	  and	  2012	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  field	  notes,	  Open	  Street	  Map,	  World	  Bank	  Tanzania	  Strategic	  Cities	  planning	  documents	  Governance	  pluralism:	  government	  led	  redevelopment	  attempts	  Entities	   from	   all	   levels	   of	   the	   government	   compete	   for	   redevelopment	   investment	  creating	   a	   plural	   governance	   regime.	   There	   seems	   to	   be	   widespread	   consensus	   that	  Arusha	  needs	  to	  be	  repositioned	  as	  a	  destination	   for	  both	  tourism	  and	  business	  (URT	  1996;	   Sitts	   2009;	   Arusha	   City	   Council	   &	   URT	   2012;	   URT	   2013e;	   Arusha	   Regional	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Commissioner	   &	   URT	   2010).60	  Yet,	   there	   is	   no	   strategic	   plan	   or	   clear	   guidelines,	   so	  investment	  is	  haphazard,	  speculative	  and	  unregulated.	  Government	  agencies	  engage	  in	  murky	   politically	   motivated	   attempts	   to	   redevelop	   the	   CBD.	   At	   least	   four	   different	  agencies	  pursued	  large	  scale	  modular	  development	  geared	  towards	  tourists	  and	  elites.	  The	  redevelopment	  attempts	  offer	  solutions	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  problems	  facing	  government	  agencies	  but	  do	  not	  address	  underlying	  economic	  and	  land	  market	  issues.	  	  Attempts	   to	   redevelop	   housing	   estates	   demonstrate	   contradictions	   between	   regional	  and	   national	   goals.61	  There	   are	   four	   attempts	   by	   government	   agencies	   to	   create	   large	  retail	   centers	   with	   tourism-­‐oriented	   development	   accounting	   for	   the	   majority	   of	  Arusha’s	  publicly	  owned	  housing	  estates	  (Figure	  8).	  
Figure	  8:	  Housing	  Estates	  in	  Arusha’s	  CBD,	  2012	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork,	  Open	  Street	  Map	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Interview	  with	  Urban	  Planner	  and	  Economic	  Officer	  at	  Arusha	  City	  Council,	  July	  25th,	  2012.	  61	  Correspondent.	   “Arusha	   clashes	  with	   Tanzanian	   government	   over	   land.”	  Arusha	  Times,	   February	   14,	  2012,	  pp.3–5.	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One	  project	  is	  a	  JV	  between	  two	  parastatals,	  the	  Local	  Authorities	  Pensions	  Fund	  (LAPF)	  and	   the	   Arusha	   International	   Conference	   Center	   (AICC).	   The	   project	   site	   is	   AICC	  Kaloleni,	   the	   largest	   housing	   estate	   in	   Arusha	   (Figure	   8).62	  AICC	   owns	   the	   largest	  conference	   facility	   in	  Tanzania	  and	  has	  654	  housing	  units	   throughout	  Arusha.63	  AICC’s	  financial	  position	  varies.	  For	   instance,	  AICC	  often	  spends	  more	   to	  promote	   the	  center	  than	   earnings	   from	   conference	   events	   (AICC	   Annual	   Reports	   2002	   -­‐	   2012).	   Financial	  instability	  led	  AICC	  leaders	  to	  ask	  the	  Arusha	  City	  Council	  (ACC)	  for	  subsidies	  claiming	  that	   the	   city	   businesses	   benefited	   from	   the	   spillover	   from	   AICC	   events.64	  Without	  subsidies,	   AICC	   leaders	   decided	   to	   capitalize	   on	   the	   tourism	   market	   in	   Arusha	   and	  increase	   their	   cash	   flow	   by	   redeveloping	   their	   largest	   housing	   estate.65	  The	   housing	  estate	   required	   renovations	   that	   could	   not	   be	   financed	   through	   current	   cash	   flow.	   In	  2005,	  AICC’s	  first	  redevelopment	  attempt	  failed	  to	  gather	  interest	  from	  any	  investors.66	  In	  2012,	  AICC	  partnered	  with	  LAPF	  to	  redevelop	  7	  acres	  of	  the	  300	  unit	  52	  acre	  AICC	  housing	  estate	  in	  Kaloleni	  as	  a	  “modern”	  retail	  center	  (AICC	  2012).67	  The	  project	  aims	  to	  modernize	   the	   shopping	   experience	   in	   Arusha,	   cater	   to	   tourists	   needs,	   and	   compete	  with	  the	  large	  shopping	  centers	   in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.68	  The	  project	  moved	  ahead	  with	  the	  demolition	  of	  100	  units	  in	  2012.69	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Interview	  with	  Elias	  Baruti,	  Planning	  and	  Investment	  Manager	  at	  LAPF,	  on	  July	  25th	  2012.	  63	  Interview	  with	  Joseph	  John,	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NHC’s	  Arusha	  Regional	  Office,	  August	  21,	  2012	  64	  Correspondent.	  “Council,	  AICC	  concerned	  about	  Arusha’s	  future.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  March	  2-­‐8,	  2002,	  p.	  2.	  	  65	  Correspondent.	  “AICC	  braces	  to	  change	  Arusha’s	  façade.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  November	  5-­‐11,	  2011,	  p.	  3.	  66	  Correspondent.	   “The	   Arusha	   International	   Conference	   Centre	   Is	   Seeking	   Interested	   Investors	   To	  Develop	  A	  Hotel-­‐Casino	  Project.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  November	  26	  –	  December	  2,	  2005.	  67	  Correspondent.	   “Evictions	   to	  make	  way	   for	   shopping	  mall	   in	   Arusha.”	  Arusha	  Times,	   June	   28,	   2011,	  pp.4–6.	  Marc	   Nkwame.	   “Hundreds	   face	   evictions	   from	  municipal	   council	   houses:	   LAPF	   to	   reconstruct	   housing	  estates.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  August	  11-­‐17,	  2007,	  p.	  1.	  Jack	  Mikaili.	  “Arusha	  to	  get	  Sh20bn	  shopping	  mall.”	  Guardian	  on	  Sunday,	  September	  25,	  2011,	  	  68	  Interview	  with	  Elias	  Baruti,	  Planning	  and	  Investment	  Manager	  at	  LAPF,	  on	  July	  25th	  2012.	  69	  Correspondent.	  “AICC	  And	  LAPF	  In	  Arusha	  Estate	  Partnership	  View	  more	  Biz	  News	  AICC	  And	  LAPF	  In	  Arusha	  Estate	  Partnership”.	  Pesa	  Times,	  February,	  15,	  2013.	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The	  next	  largest	  estate	  reflects	  both	  NHC’s	  new	  approach	  to	  redevelopment	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  coordinated	   investment.	  NHC	  recently	  announced	  plans	   to	  redevelop	  many	  of	   their	  commercial	  properties	  in	  Arusha	  as	  master	  developer	  without	  assistance	  from	  private	  sector	   joint	   ventures.	  70	  	   As	   the	   first	   step	   in	   the	   redevelopment	   plan	   NHC	   plans	   to	  demolish	  the	  40	  houses	  at	  the	  Sanawari	  Housing	  Estate	  and	  build	  a	  “modern”	  shopping	  mall	   (Figure	   8).71	  NHC	   began	   relocating	   the	   Sanawari	   tenants	   to	   a	   newly	   constructed	  project,	  Levolosi	  Apartments,	  with	  rental	  rates	  of	  $180	  per	  month	   in	  2012.72	  NHC	  and	  Holtan	   East	   Africa	   Ltd	   constructed	   the	   100	   units	   at	   Levolosi	   with	   an	   asking	   price	   of	  approximately	   $50,000	   per	   unit	   (NHC	   2012a).	   Levolosi	   is	   the	   second	   housing	  construction	  project	   for	  NHC	  in	  Arusha.	  The	   first	  completed	   in	  early	  2012	  was	  the	  48	  unit	  Meru	  Apartments	  with	   asking	   prices	   of	   about	   $110,000.	  With	   the	   three	   projects	  NHC	   will	   add	   a	   mere	   100	   housing	   units	   to	   the	   Arusha	   housing	   market	   and	  approximately	   5,000	   square	   meters	   of	   retail	   space.	   The	   Sanawari	   retail	   project	   will	  compete	  with	  the	  AICC/LAPF	  project	  and	  two	  other	  privately	  owned	  shopping	  centers.	  The	   two	   existing	   retail	   centers	   also	   target	   tourists	   but	   have	   vacant	   spaces	   and	   high	  tenant	   turn	   over.73	  Issues	   at	   these	   centers	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   limited	   demand	   for	  additional	  formal	  retail	  space	  in	  Arusha.	  The	  Sanawari	  retail	  project	  reflects	  NHC’s	  goals	  of	   increasing	   revenue	   and	   aiding	  modernization	   through	  modular	   retail	   development	  rather	  than	  prudent	  responsive	  investment.	  	  Finally,	   two	   other	   retail	   projects	   are	   local	   government	   attempts	   to	   collect	   tourism	  revenue	  and	  claim	  to	  urban	  development	  efficacy.	  The	  ACC	  is	  attempting	  to	  redevelop	  a	  1,000-­‐unit	   housing	   estate	   as	   a	   large	   retail	   anchored	   mixed-­‐use	   project.	   The	   ACC’s	  redevelopment	   plan	   included	   several	   new	   high-­‐rise	   apartments,	   largely	   targeted	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Correspondent.	  “Centre	  of	  Arusha	  set	  for	  property	  renewal.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  June	  24,	  2011,	  p.	  3.	  71	  Interviews	   with:	   Cosmas	   T	   Kimario,	   Director	   of	   Treasury	   and	   Corporate	   Strategy	   at	   NHC,	   March	   7,	  2012;	  Joseph	  John	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NHC	  Arusha,	  July	  24,	  2012;	  Abeid	  Abdalla,	  Director	  at	  Holtan,	  June	  3,	  2012.	  72	  Lusekelo	  Philemon.	  “NHC	  to	  relocate	  its	  tenants	  in	  Arusha	  for	  shopping	  mall	  construction”.	  Guardian	  on	  
Sunday,	  November	  3,	  2012,	  p.	  2.	  73	  Interview	  with	  Ahadi	  Meserki	  at	  Knight	  Frank,	  August	  15th,	  2012.	  
	  	   73	  
high-­‐income	  individuals,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  upscale	  shopping	  center.74	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Arusha	  District	   Council	   (ADC)	   is	   looking	   for	   investors	   in	   a	   two-­‐acre	   site	   in	   the	   Sekei	   area	   of	  Arusha	  about	  one	  kilometer	  from	  the	  main	  Nairobi-­‐Arusha-­‐Moshi	  road	  (Arusha	  District	  Council	   &	   URT	   2012).75	  ADC’s	   plan	   aims	   to	   develop	   a	   retail	   center	  with	   a	   conference	  center,	   restaurants,	   supermarket	   and	   curio	   shops.	   Redevelopment	   announcements	  demonstrate	  ACC’s	  and	  ADC’s	  attempts	  to	  benefit	  from	  tourism.	  	  Without	  sufficient	  own	  source	   revenue,	   ACC	   and	   ADC	   search	   for	   means	   to	   increase	   revenue	   through	  redevelopment.	  That	  is,	  ACC	  and	  ADC	  are	  then	  responsible	  for	  providing	  road	  and	  other	  services	  from	  their	  own	  source	  revenue.	  Yet,	  currently	  neither	  ACC	  nor	  ADC	  financially	  benefit	   from	  tourism	  because	  most	  tourism-­‐related	  fees	  and	  taxes	  are	  paid	  directly	  to	  the	   central	   government.76	  The	   central	   government	   redistributes	   tourism-­‐related	   cash	  flow	   to	  projects	   throughout	   the	   country.	  Tourism	  supports	  ministries	   and	  parastatals	  more	  than	  it	  does	  the	  local	  and	  regional	  government	  in	  Arusha.	  	  In	   addition,	   the	  ACC’s	  Kaloleni	  project	   is	   evidence	  of	  politicians	   capitalizing	  on	  urban	  development	   announcements.	   ACC	   first	   served	   Kaloleni	   residents	   eviction	   notices	   in	  2006	  after	  the	  council	  unanimously	  decided	  to	  redevelop	  the	  area.77	  The	  residents	  sued	  the	   ACC	   for	   unfair	   compensation	   under	   the	   1999	   Land	   Act. 78 	  In	   2010	   the	   ACC	  announced	   the	   Kaloleni	   retail	   development	   and	   evictions	   would	   finally	   proceed.	   The	  announcement	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  rumor	  that	  the	  ACC	  was	  entering	  into	  a	  JV	  with	  a	  Dubai	   based	   equity	   fund	   and	   construction	   firm.79	  	   Rumors	   of	   foreign	   involvement	  prompted	  strong	  resistance	  because	  it	  played	  into	  fears	  that	  prime	  land	  is	  being	  given	  to	  foreigner	  investors	  (Ponte	  2004).	  It	  offered	  opposition	  parties	  and	  local	  residents	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Marc	  Nkwame,	  “Arusha	  Municipality	  to	  evict	  over	  1000	  Kaloleni	  tenants.”	  Daily	  News,	  January	  5,	  2012,	  pp.11–12.	  75	  Interview	  with	  Arusha	  District	  Council,	  July	  25,	  2012.	  76 	  The	   local	   government	   only	   directly	   collects	   a	   guesthouse	   fee,	   which	   is	   only	   paid	   by	   a	   few	  establishments	  that	  don’t	  serve	  breakfast.	  77	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “Mass	  eviction	  faces	  Kaloleni,	  Levolosi	  residents”.	  Arusha	  Times,	  March	  17,	  2007,	  p.	  2.	  78	  Interview	  with	  Bryceson	  L	  Nassari,	  Ward	  Leader	  in	  Kaloleni	  Arusha,	  July	  23,	  2012.	  79	  Zephania	  Ubwani.	  “Kaloleni	  :	  Backyard	  estate	  that	  is	  wetting	  investors’	  appetites”.	  The	  Citizen,	  January	  29,	  2012,	  p.	  2.	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opportunity	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   project	   was	   not	   transparent	   so	   they	   should	   not	   be	  moved.80	  Local	   struggles	   ensued	  with	   opposing	   political	   parties	   using	   the	   investment	  and	   demolition	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   voter	   favor. 81 	  That	   is,	   the	   plans	   were	  announced	  before	  a	  local	  by-­‐election	  for	  Kaloleni	  MP.	  Therefore,	  the	  Chadema	  MP	  from	  Urban	  Arusha	  called	  for	  local	  residents	  to	  resist	  the	  relocation	  plan	  and	  the	  investment	  project.	   The	   Chadema	   councilors	   claimed	   that	   they	   wanted	   to	   see	   the	   buildings	  improved	   but	   with	   options	   for	   tenants	   and	   other	   low-­‐income	   residents.82	  The	   CCM	  mayor	   used	   the	   announcement	   as	   a	   political	   mechanism	   to	   win	   favor	   by	   claiming	  redevelopment	   and	   modernization	   progress	   without	   a	   proposal	   or	   partnership	   for	  redevelopment.83	  The	  mayor	  was	  under	   threat	  because	  Chadema	  claimed	  he	   stole	   the	  election	  leading	  to	  street	  protests	  and	  the	  death	  of	  three	  citizens.84	  The	  redevelopment	  rumors	   arose	   from	   a	   casual	   visit	   by	   Phillips	   International	   from	   Dubai	   without	   any	  commitment	   to	   develop,	   agreement	   on	   scope,	   estimates	   of	   costs	   or	   timeline	   for	  development.85	  The	  investors	  did	  not	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  project.	  	  The	  ACC’s	  Kaloleni	   project	   also	   reveals	   the	   actions	   of	   politicians	   attempting	   to	   prove	  efficacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  threats	  to	  their	  legitimacy.	  In	  March	  2007,	  ACC	  announced	  a	  vague	  redevelopment	  plan	  covering	  almost	  the	  entire	  central	  business	  district	  (Figure	  7).	  The	  CBD	   was	   dilapidated	   partially	   due	   to	   a	   backlog	   of	   infrastructure	   and	   service	  investments	  accumulating	  since	  a	  flurry	  of	  investments	  kicked	  off	  the	  last	  master	  plan	  in	   1986. 86 	  The	   redevelopment	   plan	   required	   four	   or	   more	   stories	   for	   all	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Veronica	  Mehta.	  “Wakazi	  wa	  Kaloleni	  Arusha	  kuhamishwa	  kupisha	  maduka.”	  Habari	  Leo,	  December	  28,	  2013.	  81	  Zephania	  Ubwani.	  “Why	  Grandiose	  Project	  Could	  Hit	  a	  Brick	  Wall”,	  The	  Citizen,	  January	  22,	  2012,	  p.	  2.	  82	  Zephania	  Ubwani.	  “Why	  Grandiose	  Project	  Could	  Hit	  a	  Brick	  Wall”,	  The	  Citizen,	  January	  22,	  2012,	  p.	  2.	  83	  Interview	  with	  Sirili	  Akko,	  Executive	  Officer,	  Tanzania	  Association	  of	  Tour	  Operators,	  August	  25,	  2012.	  84	  Interview	  with	  Emmanuel	  Sulle,	  Researcher	  at	   Institute	   for	  Poverty,	  Land	  and	  Agrarian	  Studies,	  May	  10,	  2014.	  Prosper	  Msoffe.	  “Daraja	  Mbili	  Councilor	  Voted	  Deputy	  Mayor.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  November	  23,	  2013,	  p.	  1.	  	  85	  Interview	  with	  Sirili	  Akko,	  Executive	  Officer,	  Tanzania	  Association	  of	  Tour	  Operators,	  August	  25,	  2012.	  86	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “Google	  Maps	  Distort	  Arusha	  Streets,	  Road	  Names.”	  Daily	  News,	  May	  14,	  2012,	  p.	  4.	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construction	   or	   renovation.87	  ACC	   justified	   the	   high-­‐rise	   requirement	   as	   a	   means	   to	  increase	  density	  in	  a	  land	  scarce	  situation.	  In	  turn,	  increased	  density	  would	  improve	  the	  housing	   and	   land	  markets	   for	   the	  majority	   struggling	  with	   existing	   conditions.88	  	   The	  mayor	  claimed	  in	  the	  announcement	  that	  modern	  cities	  were	  high	  density.89	  Therefore,	  the	  redevelopment	  plan	  would	  create	  the	  conditions	  that	  would	  bring	  Arusha	  into	  the	  present	   to	   compete	   with	   other	   tourist	   based	   cities.	   The	   redevelopment	   plan	   area	  accounts	  for	  85	  percent	  of	  the	  new	  buildings	  with	  five	  or	  more	  stories	  developed	  since	  2005	   (Figure	   7).	   Without	   monitoring	   or	   direct	   government	   incentives,	   the	  redevelopment	  plan’s	  simple	  requirements	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  met.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  2007	   announcement	   of	   a	   redevelopment	   plan	   was	   a	   political	   response	   to	   legitimacy	  threats.	  CCM	   leaders	   in	  Arusha	  were	  under	  pressure	  after	   several	   corruption	   charges	  associated	   with	   land	   grabbing	   and	   development	   decisions.	   The	   CCM	  mayor	   and	   two	  councilors	   were	   forced	   to	   resign	   in	   January	   2007	   due	   to	   their	   involvement	   with	   an	  urban	  development	  scandal.90	  The	  politicians	  were	  accused	  of	   illegally	  giving	  a	  private	  developer	   the	   rights	   to	   develop	   a	   commercial	   complex	   on	   a	   public	   park	   in	   the	  Kilombero	   area. 91 	  Pressure	   was	   also	   building	   from	   widespread	   complaints	   about	  individual	   developers	   obtaining	   building	   permits	   without	   community	   input,	  consideration	  of	  planning	  regulations	  or	  improvements	  in	  infrastructure.92	  The	  charges	  resonated	   with	   voters	   struggling	   to	   access	   affordable	   housing	   and	   land.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Correspondent,	  “Four-­‐storey	  buildings	  order	  causes	  panic”.	  Arusha	  Times,	  June	  2,	  2007,	  pp.4–5.	  	  Repeated	   requests	   to	   the	  ACC	  and	  MLHHSD	   failed	   to	   result	   in	   a	  document	  providing	  additional	  details	  about	  the	  redevelopment	  plan,	  although	  both	  acknowledged	  that	  a	  plan	  existed	  and	  dated	  back	  to	  2002	  (Author’s	  fieldwork	  2012).	  	  	  88	  Interview	  with	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  Arusha	  City	  Council,	  July	  26th	  2012.	  89	  Correspondent.	  “Four-­‐storey	  buildings’	  order	  causes	  panic:	  Councilors	  dismiss	  it	  as	  nonsense.”	  Arusha	  
Times,	  June	  2-­‐	  8,	  2007,	  p.	  4.	  	  90	  Marc	  Nkwame,	   “Arusha	  Mayoral	   seat	  up	   for	  grabs.	   It	  may	   take	  60	  days	   to	   fill	  Laizer’s	   shoes.”	  Arusha	  
Times,	  February	  3-­‐9,	  2007,	  p.	  2.	  91	  Mark	  Nkwame.	  “Kilombero	  plot	  ghost	  still	  haunts	  council.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  February	  2-­‐8	  2008,	  p.	  1.	  Mark	  Nkwame,	  “Kilombero	  plot	  scandal	  backfires	  on	  mayor’s	  job.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  January	  27,	  2007,	  p.	  1.	  92	  Correspondent,	  “Arusha	  city	  wobbling	  without	  key	  planners.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  September	  3-­‐5,	  2005,	  p.	  1.	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redevelopment	  announcement	  gave	  the	  appearance	  that	  CCM	  leaders	  were	  responding	  to	  charges	  of	  corruption	  and	  lack	  of	  action	  on	  urban	  development	  issues.	  Redevelopment	   planning	   is	   not	   driven	   by	   market	   demand	   but	   government	   agencies	  searching	  for	  opportunities	  to	  increase	  cash	  flow	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  growing	  tourism	  sector.	   The	   four	   public	   projects	   establish	   political	   and	   investment	   opportunism.	   The	  AICC/LAPF	  project	  avoids	  local	  political	  issues	  because	  the	  parastatals	  are	  agents	  of	  the	  central	  government,	  but	  both	  hope	  to	   increase	  revenue.	  The	  NHC	  project	  also	  offers	  a	  potential	   avenue	   to	   increase	   cash	   flow	   and	   reduce	  management	   issues.	   The	   ACC	   and	  ADC	   projects	   provide	   the	   same	   hopes	   as	   well	   as	   political	   tools	   to	   prove	   they	   are	  improving	  the	  city.	  Investment	  decisions	  are	  not	  driven	  by	  demand	  or	  highest	  and	  best	  use	  but	  by	  government	  entities	  short-­‐term	  goals	  of	  increasing	  revenue	  and	  appearing	  to	  be	   facilitating	   the	   modernization	   of	   Tanzania’s	   cities.	   These	   retail	   projects	   reveal	  abstract	  and	  opportunistic	  attempts	  to	  redevelop	  Arusha	  for	  tourists.	  The	  disarray	  and	  competition	   amongst	   government	   regulatory	   agencies	   leads	   to	   fewer	   public	   private	  partnerships	  or	  informal	  coalitions	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  Hotel	  Development	  Cascade:	  Private	  Sector	  Redevelopment	  In	  central	  Arusha,	  private	  sector	  investment	  in	  residential	  projects	  is	  extremely	  limited.	  Meanwhile,	   hotels	   and	   commercial	   investments	   propel	   redevelopment	   in	   central	  Arusha.	   Much	   like	   the	   attempts	   by	   government	   agencies,	   private	   sector	   driven	  redevelopment	  projects	  focus	  on	  capturing	  benefits	  from	  the	  increasing	  flow	  of	  tourists.	  Since	   2005,	   the	   private	   sector	   invested	   in	   redeveloping	   forty-­‐six	   properties	   as	   hotels	  and	   commercial	   buildings.	   These	   projects	   respond	   to	   Arusha’s	   growing	   tourism	  industry	   benefitting	   existing	   business	   elites.	   Over	   the	   same	   period	   two	   parastatal	  projects	   provided	   eighty	   new	   middle-­‐income	   units	   and	   two	   private	   high-­‐end	   luxury	  projects	  provide	  another	  forty	  units.	  Therefore,	  recent	  redevelopment	  added	  pressure	  to	  the	  housing	  market	  by	  converting	  former	  residential	  plots	  to	  commercial	  use	  without	  increasing	  supply	  elsewhere.93	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Interview	  with	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  Arusha	  City	  Council,	  June	  26th,	  2012.	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Recent	  hotel	  construction	  reveals	  a	  development	  cascade	  where	  local	  investors	  convert	  properties	   to	   hotels	   without	   respect	   for	   market	   demand.	   Developers’	   decisions	   are	  based	  on	  construction	  starts	  and	  personal	  perceptions	  of	  growth.	  One	  way	  of	  measuring	  the	   development	   cascade	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   supply	   of	   hotel	   accommodations	   in	   the	  area.94	  There	  are	  ninety-­‐six	  hotels	  in	  the	  area,	  with	  more	  than	  2,000	  hotel	  rooms	  (Table	  7).	   Hotel	   construction	   is	   not	   justified	   by	   demand	   for	   hotels	   because	   occupancy	   is	  already	  low	  across	  Tanzania.95	  Between	  2009	  and	  2013,	  national	  hotel	  occupancy	  never	  rose	  above	  40	  percent.96	  Although,	   the	  Arusha	  submarket	  may	  have	  higher	  occupancy	  rates,	   several	   hotel	   owners	   indicated	   it	   was	   not	   high	   enough	   to	   justify	   more	  construction	   and	  was	   in	   line	  with	   national	   trends.97	  Yet,	  more	   than	   80	   percent,	   or	   80	  hotels,	   opened	   after	   1999.	   Furthermore,	   more	   than	   70	   percent	   of	   the	   hotels	   are	   in	  central	  Arusha.	  These	  hotels	   range	   from	  high-­‐end	   full-­‐service	  establishments	  catering	  to	  safari	  tourists	  to	  budget	  options	  for	  local	  business	  travelers.	  Establishing	  ownership	  was	   often	   difficult	   but	   many	   of	   the	   hotels	   in	   the	   city	   center	   were	   reportedly	   locally	  owned.98	  Arusha	   has	   no	   internationally	   branded	   hotels.	   Instead,	   hotels	   are	   one-­‐off	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  The	   official	   data	   shows	   unrealistically	   large	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   hotel	   accommodations	   and	  occupancy	   rates,	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	   surmise	   growth.	   In	   order	   to	   overcome	   the	   shortcoming,	   I	  conducted	  field	  observations	  to	  estimate	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  market.	  Sirili	  Akko,	  the	  executive	  officer	  of	   the	   Tanzania	   Association	   of	   Tour	   Operators,	   graciously	   provided	   background	   information,	   current	  research	  and	  promotional	  materials	  on	  the	  accommodation	  sector	  in	  Arusha.	  I	  also	  made	  note	  of	  all	  the	  hotels	   that	   I	   could	  discern	  while	  conducting	   fieldwork	   in	   the	  central	  urban	  area	  as	  well	  as	  Usa	  River.	   I	  followed	   up	  with	   Internet	   research	   on	   each	   hotel	   to	   determine	   their	  marketing	   approach	   and	   further	  details	   about	   size	   and	  ownership.	   I	  was	  also	  able	   to	  detect	   additional	  hotel	   sites,	  which	  allowed	  me	   to	  gauge	  the	  accuracy	  of	  fieldwork	  with	  official	  government	  statistics.	  95	  Interview	  with	  Lamada	  Investment,	  May	  10,	  2012.	  96	  The	   National	   Bureau	   of	   Statistics	   conducts	   a	   monthly	   survey	   of	   150	   hotels	   to	   estimate	   national	  occupancy.	   The	   sample	   includes	   all	   hotels	   with	   more	   than	   30	   beds	   and	   a	   sample	   of	   smaller	   hotels.	  (http://www.nbs.go.tz/hotel_statistics)	  	  97	  Interview	  with	  Lamada	  Investment,	  May	  10,	  2012.	  98	  I	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  that	  foreigners	  have	  ownership	  stake	  in	  11	  hotels,	  or	  15	  percent,	  of	  the	  hotels	  in	  the	   city	   center.	   Corespondence	   with	   Sirili	   Akko,	   Executive	   Officer,	   Tanzania	   Association	   of	   Tour	  Operators,	  has	  been	  critical	  to	  establishing	  these	  connections.	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investments	   by	   foreign	   individuals	   in	   partnership	   with	   local	   business	   elites.	   Local	  business	  elites	  lead	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  investment	  in	  hotel	  development	  in	  central	  Arusha.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  hotels	  in	  the	  peri-­‐urban	  hotels	  tend	  to	  cater	  solely	  to	  safari	  tourists	  and	  are	  more	  often	  majority	  owned	  by	  foreigners.	  For	  instance,	  58	  percent	  of	  the	  peri-­‐urban	  hotels	  are	  foreign	  owned.	  
Table	  7:	  Hotels	  in	  Arusha	  
Location	   Hotels	   Rooms	   Foreign	  Owned	  	  	   #	   %	   #	   %	   #	   %	  Central	  City	   72	   75%	   	  1,734	  	   77%	   11	   44%	  Peri-­‐Urban	   24	   25%	   	  510	  	   23%	   14	   56%	  Total	   96	   	  	   	  2,244	  	   	  	   25	   	  	  Source:	  Author’s	  field	  notes,	  Trip	  Advisor	  and	  Individual	  Websites	  Hotel	   construction	   in	   the	   central	   city	   reflects	   a	   local	   private	   sector	   creating	   tourism	  conglomerates	  competing	  to	  capture	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  of	   tourism	  without	  regard	  to	  the	   property	   market	   as	   a	   whole.	   The	   ownership	   and	   management	   structure	   of	   nine	  hotels	   unveils	   the	   nature	   of	   private	   investment	   in	   Arusha	   (Figure	   9).99	  Private	   sector	  redevelopment	   is	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   tourism	   industry	  with	   transparent	  ownership	  structures.	  The	  Impala	  Hotel	  Group	  owns	  four	  hotels	  and	  no	  other	  property	  assets.100	  A	  well-­‐known	   local	   businessman,	   Melo	   Mrema,	   owns	   all	   businesses	   within	   the	   Impala	  Group.	  The	  business	  started	  with	  Impala	  Shuttle	  Services	  between	  Moshi	  and	  Arusha	  in	  the	   early	   1980’s.	   Then	   the	   business	   expanded	   to	   Classic	   Tours	   &	   Safaris	   and	   the	  construction	   of	   the	   Impala	   Hotel	   in	   1988.	   Impala	   uses	   the	   tour	   company	   to	   ensure	  bookings	  in	  the	  hotels	  spread	  throughout	  the	  Arusha	  region.	  The	  Impala	  Group	  is	  linked	  to	   the	   network	   via	   the	   Great	   Lakes	   Management	   Company	   providing	   a	   variety	   of	  hospitality	  services	  at	  hotels	  throughout	  Arusha.	  	  The	   Palace	   Hotel	   reveals	   another	   investor	   creating	   a	   tourism	   conglomerate	   with	   a	  wider	  regional	  influence.	  NHC	  entered	  into	  a	  JV	  with	  Prestigious	  Hotels	  Group	  in	  2006	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Interviews	  with	  hotel	  owners	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  for	  their	  personal	  safety.	  100	  Interview	  with	  Joas	  Tibaijuka	  Managing	  Director	  at	  JT	  Architects,	  on	  March	  12th	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to	  develop	  the	  Palace	  Hotel	  managed	  by	  Great	  Lakes	  Management	  Company.	  The	  Palace	  Hotel	   construction	   started	   in	   2008	   opened	   in	   2011.101	  Prestigious	   Hotels	   Group	   is	  wholly	   owned	   by	   Hans	   Macha	   and	   includes	   properties	   in	   both	   Arusha	   and	   Dar	   es	  Salaam.102	  The	  management	  company	  is	  wholly	  owned	  by	  Icon	  Hotel	  Group	  Africa.	  Icon	  demonstrates	  the	  emergence	  of	  East	  African	  networks	  of	  business	  owners	  with	  hotels	  in	   five	   countries	   and	   headquarters	   in	   Nairobi.	   These	   entities	   demonstrate	   the	  increasingly	   regional	   nature	   of	   tourism	   investors	   who	   share	   expertise	   and	   capital	  across	  networks	  in	  several	  countries.	  The	   ownership	   structure	   of	   the	   Mount	   Meru	   hotel	   brings	   out	   the	   potential	   gains	  through	  management	  fees	  hiding	  financial	  issues	  with	  hotel	  operations	  in	  Arusha.	  Icon	  and	  Blue	  Jewel	  Company	  Limited	  jointly	  own	  Hodi	  Hotel	  Management	  Company,	  which	  in	   turn	  owns	  the	  Mount	  Meru	  Hotel.	  The	  Government	  of	  Tanzania	  built	   the	  200	  room	  Mount	   Meru	   hotel	   in	   1977.103	  In	   2004,	   Blue	   Jewel	   Company	   gained	   control	   of	   Mount	  Meru	   Hotel	   via	   the	   Presidential	   Parastatal	   Sector	   reform	   after	   a	   Mauritian	   hotel	  operator	   returned	   the	   asset	   that	  was	  part	   of	   a	   larger	  portfolio	  of	   hotels.104	  Blue	   Jewel	  Company’s	  owner,	  Mr.	  Wado,	  had	  a	  successful	  gem	  trading	  business	  providing	  him	  with	  the	   capital	   to	  make	   the	   initial	   investment	   in	  Mount	  Meru	  Hotel.	   In	   order	   to	   fund	   the	  redevelopment	   he	   partnered	   with	   Icon	   and	   USAID’s	   Southern	   African	   Enterprise	  Development	  Fund	  (SAEDF).105	  SAEDF	  provided	  an	   initial	  $9	  million	   investment	   in	  the	  project	  as	  well	  as	  financing	  hotel	  operations.	  SAEDF	  collapsed	  in	  2013	  partially	  due	  $1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Adam	  Ihucha.	  “Local	  News:	  a	  new	  ultra	  modern	  hotel	  opens	  its	  doors	  next	  month	  in	  Arusha.”	  Arusha	  
Times,	  June	  11-­‐17,	  2011,	  p.	  3.	  102	  Correspondent.	   “Opening	   of	   new	   Palace	   Hotel	   ushers	   tourist	   high	   season.”	   Arusha	   Times,	   June	   18,	  2011,	  p.	  3.	  103	  Happy	   Lazaro.	   “Multi	   million	   dollars	   invested	   to	   elevate	   Mount	   Meru	   Hotel	   status.”	   Arusha	   Times,	  October	  31st,	  2009,	  p.	  3.	  104Elisha	  Mayallah.	  “Mount	  Meru	  Hotel	  ‘escapes’	  Privatization	  Noose.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  January	  10-­‐16,	  2004,	  p.	  3.	  105	  Happy	   Lazaro.	   “Multi	   million	   dollars	   invested	   to	   elevate	   Mount	   Meru	   Hotel	   status.”	   Arusha	   Times,	  October	  31st,	  2009,	  p.	  3.	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million	  provided	  to	  Hodi	  Hotel	  Management	  for	  operating	  costs.106	  The	  insolvency	  of	  the	  Mount	  Meru	  Hotel	  exposes	  the	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  a	  consistent	  cash	  flow	  even	  for	  Arusha’s	  most	  prominent	  and	  high-­‐end	  hotel	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  to	  personally	  gain	  from	  management	  fees	  regardless	  of	  hotel	  performance.	  	  The	  ownership	  and	  management	  of	   these	  hotels	  demonstrate	  business	  elites	   creating	  regional	   networks	   to	   capture	   increased	   in	   tourism.	   Private	   investors	   like	   those	  displayed	  in	  the	  network	  of	  hotel	  ownership	  make	  project	  decisions	  based	  on	  available	  financing	  instead	  of	  direction	  from	  the	  city	  government,	  a	  tourism	  plan	  for	  the	  city,	  or	  clear	   statistics	   on	   hotel	   demand.107	  Hotel	   performance	   indicates	   that	   the	   market	   is	  overbuilt	  and	  that	  new	  hotels	  are	  unlikely	  to	  reach	  profitable	  occupancy	  rates.	  	  Private	  sector	   urban	   redevelopment	   in	   Arusha	   benefits	   a	   few	   individuals	   that	   operate	   in	  isolation	  of	  other	  investors.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Barry	  Meier	  and	  Ron	  Nixon.	   “Promising	  African	  Development	  Fund	  Collapses.”	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  30,	  2013,	  p.	  B1.	  107	  Interview	  with	  Emmanuel	  Kirenga,	  Economic	  Development	  Officer	   at	  Arusha	  City	  Council,	   June	  26th	  2012	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Figure	  9:	  Hotel	  Ownership	  &	  Management	  Structure	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increasing	  prices	  voters	  are	  looking	  to	  the	  local	  government	  to	  provide	  more	  serviced	  plots	  and	  affordable	  housing	  units.	  The	  needs	  and	  demands	  of	  local	  residents	  are	  shut	  out	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  quickly	  capitalize	  on	  tourism	  growth.	  	  
Peri-­‐urban	  Development:	  Rising	  Conflict	  Since	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	   era,	   excellent	   climate	   conditions	   and	   agricultural	   opportunities	  drew	  people	  to	  the	  villages	  surrounding	  Arusha’s	  city	  center	  leading	  to	  a	  long	  history	  of	  conflict	   and	   political	   awareness	   about	   access	   to	   land	   (Coulson	   1982).	   The	   colonial	  conflicts	   culminated	   in	   the	   1951	   Meru	   Land	   Case,	   where	   local	   residents	   lost	   their	  wrongful	   eviction	   case	   before	   the	   UN	   but	   the	   incident	   politically	   mobilized	   the	   local	  community	  (Mesaki	  2013).	  The	  contentious	  history	  resulted	  in	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  of	   land	   ownership	   excluding	   the	   majority	   from	   the	   benefits	   of	   development	   therein	  creating	   the	   conditions	   for	   conflict.	  The	   impetus	   to	   convert	  plantations	   to	   tourist	   and	  residential	   developments	   stems	   from	   the	   volatile	   cash	   flow	   of	   traditional	   plantation	  agriculture	   (Hillbom	  2011).	  The	   type	  of	  cash	  crops	  produced	  has	  varied	  shifting	   from	  sisal	  to	  coffee	  to	  horticulture	  (Cooksey	  2011b).	   	  For	  instance,	  between	  1990	  and	  2008	  coffee	  exports	  from	  Arusha	  declined	  nearly	  300	  percent	  (Tanzania	  Coffee	  Board	  2012).	  In	   contrast,	   between	   1998	   and	   2011	   horticultural	   exports	   increased	   400	   percent	  (Cooksey	  2011b;	  TAHA	  2012).110	  The	  decline	  in	  coffee	  exports	  led	  to	  a	  50	  percent	  loss	  in	  total	  hectares	  farmed	  in	  the	  Arusha	  region	  (Tanzania	  Coffee	  Board	  2012).	  Commodity	  price	   volatility	   led	   to	   a	   range	   of	   land	   uses	   on	   plantations	   from	   productive	   farms,	   to	  tourist	   resorts,	   to	   residential	   developments,	   to	   fallow	   land,	   to	   informal	   settlements	  (URT	   &	   Ardhi	   University	   2009).	   The	   conversion	   to	   other	   uses	   creates	   tension	   and	  ambiguity	   between	   the	   few	   that	   control	   land	   parcels	   and	   the	   majority	   looking	   for	  affordable	  land	  to	  develop.	  	  The	  Usa	  River	  Area	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  conflicts	  and	  contradictions	  arising	  from	   plantation	   land	   use	   conversion	   in	   Arusha.	   Usa	   River	   is	   located	   in	   the	   Eastern	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  The	   growth	   can	   be	   partially	   attributed	   to	   Dutch	   and	   Tanzanian	   governmental	   support	   for	   the	  subsector,	   which	   began	   in	   1999.	   The	   decline	   in	   exports	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   and	  declining	  demand	  from	  the	  EU	  zone.	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suburbs	   of	   Arusha	   between	   Mount	   Kilimanjaro	   and	   Mount	   Meru.	   Since	   its	  establishment	   as	   a	   German	   colonial	   outpost,	   Usa	   River	   has	   served	   as	   the	   central	  business	  district	  of	  the	  Meru.	  Usa’s	  central	  role	  creates	  a	  social	  and	  economic	  influence	  across	  several	  wards	  (Glenk	  et	  al.	  2007).111	  Usa	  River	  has	  many	  large	  businesses,	  several	  universities,	  a	  handful	  of	  cash	  crop	  plantations	  and	  a	   few	  tourist	  hotels	   (URT	  &	  Ardhi	  University	   2009).	   Usa	   has	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   amenities	   and	   a	   solid	   economic	   base	  attracting	  investors	  from	  outside	  the	  immediate	  market.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Kilimanjaro	  airport	  provides	  direct	  access	  to	  international	  markets.	  These	  endowments	  encourage	  investment	   targeted	   at	   buyers	   from	   abroad	   and	   local	   elites.	   The	   economic	  infrastructure	   attracted	   population	   growth.	   Between	   1978	   and	   2012,	   the	   area’s	  population	   nearly	   tripled.	   The	   5	   percent	   annualized	   growth	   rate	   exceeds	   both	   the	  regional	  and	  the	  district	  growth	  rates	  (NBS	  1978a;	  NBS	  1988;	  NBS	  2002).	  	  Rapid	  population	  growth	   led	   to	  an	   increase	   in	  density	  and	  demand	   for	   infrastructure,	  housing	   and	  municipal	   services.	   An	   increasingly	   dense	   core	   area	  mimics	   the	   trend	   in	  Arusha’s	  urban	   transition.	  Much	  of	   the	  central	  area’s	  density	  exceeds	  600	   inhabitants	  per	  km2,	  which	   reflects	   the	  need	   for	   services	  appropriate	   to	  urban	  conditions.112	  With	  more	   than	   65,000	   inhabitants	   the	   area	   now	   has	   a	   population	   approaching	  municipal	  status	   in	   its	   own	   right.113	  Between	   1988	   and	   2012,	   the	   areas	   surrounding	   the	   main	  trunk	  road	  became	  denser,	  while	  density	  in	  the	  more	  distant	  locations	  remained	  stable	  (Figure	   10).	   The	   dispersion	   of	   density	   demonstrates	   the	   peri-­‐urban	   transition	   along	  trunk	  infrastructure	  in	  Arusha’s	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.	  Residential	  development	  spreads	  out	  from	   the	  main	   roads	  as	   land	  becomes	  scare	  and	  expensive	  close	   to	   the	   roads	   (URT	  &	  Ardhi	  University	  2009).	  Usa	  River	  is	  developing	  as	  a	  satellite	  city	  without	  government	  investment	  or	  planning	  but	  due	  to	  location	  and	  infrastructure	  endowments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Meru	  District,	  which	  was	  carved	  out	  of	  Arumeru	  district	   in	  2009	  and	   includes	  69	  villages	   (Nkwame	  2009).	  112	  The	  definition	  of	  urban	  areas	  is	  debatable	  but	  in	  the	  analysis	  I	  will	  use	  500	  inhabitants	  per	  km2	  as	  the	  threshold,	  which	  was	  derived	  from	  a	  global	  study	  of	  land	  use	  11/10/14	  9:20	  AM.	  113	  According	   to	   the	  Urban	  Planning	  Act	   of	   2007	   a	  municipality	   is	   defined	   as	   an	   area	  with	   a	  minimum	  population	  of	  100,000	  and	  less	  than	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  employment	  base	  in	  agriculture.	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Figure	  10:	  Density	  Trends	  Across	  Larger	  Peri-­‐Urban	  Region	  
	  
Source:	  URT	  Census	  1988,	  2002,	  2012	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculation	  Planning	  Stalemate:	  A	  Power	  Struggle	  Between	  Government	  Agencies	  Three	   levels	  of	  planning	  by	   local,	  district	  and	  national	  governments	  are	  contradictory	  resulting	   in	   ambiguous	   and	   ineffective	   planning	   guidance.	   Village	   governments	   block	  planning	   by	   refusing	   to	   become	   part	   of	   the	   large	   town	  which	   creates	   ambiguity.	   The	  local	  planning	  response	   is	   limited	  by	  perverse	  political	   incentives	   to	  maintain	  control	  through	   delaying	   incorporation	   as	   a	   larger	   administrative	   area.	   For	   instance,	   the	  Usa	  River	  Ward	   received	   township114	  status	   in	  2009,	  while	   the	   surrounding	  wards	   remain	  rural.115	  The	   designation	  was	   a	   downgrade	   from	   the	  municipal	   status	  Usa	   received	   in	  2002.	  Village	  powerbrokers	  avoided	  municipal	  designation	  by	  failing	  to	  produce	  master	  plans.116	  In	   2004,	   the	   MLHHSD	   interfered	   and	   insisted	   on	   a	   status	   change.	   Township	  status	   took	   land	  use	  planning	   control	   away	   from	  village	  powerbrokers	   and	  gave	   it	   to	  district	  authorities.	  According	  to	  the	  2007	  Urban	  Planning	  Act,	  township	  councils	  have	  planning	   authority	   to	   determine	   a	   detailed	   planning	   scheme	   and	   zoning	   regulations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  A	   township	   has	   at	   least	   10,000	   people,	   a	   health	   center,	   secondary	   school,	   20	   licensed	   retail	   shops,	  primary	  court	  and	  is	  ward	  or	  division	  headquarters	  (Urban	  Planning	  Act	  2007,	  p.	  58)	  115	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “AAGM:	  Plans	  for	  New	  Usa-­‐River	  Township	  Underway”	  Arusha	  Times,	  July	  1,	  2009,	  p.	  2.	  	  116	  Mustafa	  Leu.	  “Council	  approves	  plan	  to	  create	  two	  more	  municipalities.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  June	  15,	  2002,	  p.	   2.	   In	   addition	   to	   interviews	  with	   Emmanuel	   Segeja,	   Land	   Officer,	   Meru	   District	   and	   Shautu	   Chuma,	  Head	  Town	  Planner,	  Meru	  District,	  August	  23,	  2012.	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(URT	   2007).	   The	   power	   shift	   occurs	   because	   a	   town	   council	   is	   largely	   comprised	   of	  appointed	  members	  with	  leadership	  elected	  from	  within	  the	  district	  council.	  In	  contrast,	  all	  members	   of	   a	   village	   council	   are	   frown	   from	   the	   local	   population	  with	   leadership	  elected	   by	   consent	   of	   the	   whole	   village	   assembly.	   The	   town	   council	   arrangement	  provides	   more	   control	   for	   district	   and	   central	   government	   bodies	   than	   the	   village	  council.	   Furthermore,	   according	   to	   the	   1999	   Land	   Act	   the	   status	   change	   categorizes	  undeveloped	   land	  as	  general	   land.	   In	   turn,	   general	   land	   falls	  under	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	  the	  president	  and	   the	  MLHHSD.	  Thus,	   the	   central	   government	   can	  plan	  and	   trade	   the	  land	  without	  consulting	  the	  local	  planners	  or	  township	  council	  (URT	  1999b).	  In	   Usa	   River	   land	   use	   development	   and	   planning	   is	   outside	   the	   control	   of	   local	  administrators	   reducing	   the	   incentive	   to	  complete	  and	   implement	   land	  use	  plans.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  2007	  Urban	  Planning	  Act	  the	  township	  designation	  requires	  an	  update	  to	  the	  1997	  planning	  scheme	  for	  Usa	  River.	  MLHHSD	  financed	  the	  planning	  process	  but	  surrounding	  villages	  refused	  to	  participate.	  The	  resulting	  plan	  covers	  only	  a	  small	   portion	   of	   the	   economic	   area	   of	   Usa	   River.	   The	   recommendations	   of	   the	   plan	  remain	   unfunded	   without	   local	   government	   support.	   Without	   incentives	   for	   local	  government	   strategic	   planning	   fails,	   land	   use	   justification	   remains	   ambiguous	   and	  planning	  reaches	  a	  stalemate	  (Nnkya	  1999a).	  The	   planning	   stalemate	   at	   the	   village	   level,	   translates	   to	   the	   district	   level	   where	  approving	   a	   strategic	   plan	   and	   coordinating	   priorities	   results	   in	   contradicting	   and	  unrealistic	   plans.	   A	   new	   district	   strategic	   plan	   aimed	   to	   restrict	   urban	   sprawl	   and	  improve	   housing	   conditions	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   satellite	   towns	   (URT	   &	  Ministry	  of	  Regional	  Administration	  and	  Local	  Government	  2011).	  Therefore,	   the	  new	  strategic	   plan	   included	   converting	   agricultural	   plantations	   to	   planned	   housing	  developments	  to	  accommodate	  local	  growth	  through	  public	  private	  partnerships	  (URT	  &	  Ministry	  of	  Regional	  Administration	  and	  Local	  Government	  2011).	  To	  date	   the	  plan	  has	   not	   received	   district	   council	   approval,	   even	   though	   it	   has	   been	   submitted	   three	  
	  	   86	  
times.117	  Each	  time	  the	  plan	  goes	  for	  approval	  a	  different	  council	  member	  carves	  out	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  from	  the	  plan	  because	  it	  was	  included	  in	  their	  area	  of	  representation	  and	  they	  wanted	   to	  maintain	  control.118	  The	  result	   is	  a	   strategic	  plan	   that	  bears	   little	   local	  relevance,	  has	  limited	  jurisdiction	  and	  does	  not	  provide	  realistic	  guidance	  on	  improving	  the	   district.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   keeps	   significant	   portions	   of	   the	   district	   in	   an	  ambiguous	   state	   that	   allows	   the	   perception	   of	   more	   local	   control	   while	   maintaining	  status	  quo	  for	  local	  powerbrokers.	  	  An	   ambitious	   project	   by	   the	   NHC	   reveals	   a	   third	   layer	   of	   governance	   creating	   more	  ambiguity	   and	   further	   diluting	   the	   local	   planning	   jurisdiction.	   NHC	   plans	   to	   build	   a	  satellite	   city	   in	   Usa	   River	   on	   a	   300	   acre	   agricultural	   plantation	   acquired	   from	  Hortanzania	   Limited,	   a	   horticultural	   exporter.119	  NHC	   acquired	   the	   site	   in	   2011	   for	  $36,000	  per	  acre	   in	  a	  private	  market	  transaction.120	  NHC	  intends	  to	  build	  600	  housing	  units	  and	  a	  retail	  center	  in	  two	  phases	  (Figure	  11).	  The	  justification	  for	  the	  satellite	  city	  is	  to	  ease	  the	  traffic	  congestion	  in	  Arusha	  CBD	  and	  support	  the	  tourism	  industry.121	  The	  land	  cost	  alone	  guarantees	  that	  the	  final	  product	  will	  not	  be	  low	  cost	  or	  targeted	  at	  the	  local	   population.	   Neither	   the	   local	   council	   nor	   the	   district	   council	   had	   input	   on	   the	  project’s	   location	   or	   scope.122	  The	   satellite	   city	   plan	  was	   not	   included	   in	   the	   new	  Usa	  River	  plan	  or	  the	  District	  Strategic	  plan.	  Although	  it	   fits	  within	  the	  district’s	  vision	  for	  creating	  satellite	  cities	  on	  plantations,	  the	  plan	  lacked	  any	  coordination	  with	  the	  district.	  The	   project	   is	   competition	   for	   the	   district’s	   own	   plans	   for	   a	   satellite	   city	   (URT	   &	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  Interviews	  with	  Emmanuel	  Segeja,	  Land	  Officer,	  Meru	  District	  and	  Shautu	  Chuma,	  Head	  Town	  Planner,	  Meru	  District,	  August	  23,	  2012.	  118	  Interviews	  with	  Emmanuel	  Segeja,	  Land	  Officer,	  Meru	  District	  and	  Shautu	  Chuma,	  Head	  Town	  Planner,	  Meru	  District,	  August	  23,	  2012.	  119	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “NHC	  Set	  to	  Establish	  Two	  Satellite	  Towns	  in	  Arusha.”	  Daily	  News,	  February	  21,	  2013.	  120	  Interview	  with	  Joseph	  John,	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NHC’s	  Arusha	  Regional	  Office,	  August	  21,	  2012.	  	  121	  Interview	   with:	   Cosmas	   T	   Kimario,	   Director	   of	   Treasury	   and	   Corporate	   Strategy	   at	   NHC,	   March	   7,	  2012;	  Joseph	  John,	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NHC’s	  Arusha	  Regional	  Office,	  August	  21,	  2012	  122	  Interviews	  with	  Emmanuel	  Segeja,	  Land	  Officer,	  Meru	  District	  and	  Shautu	  Chuma,	  Head	  Town	  Planner,	  Meru	  District,	  August	  23,	  2012.	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Ministry	   of	   Regional	   Administration	   and	   Local	   Government	   2011).	   The	   project	  demonstrates	  the	  lack	  of	  local	  control	  over	  development	  creating	  a	  planning	  stalemate.	  	  
Figure	  11:	  Usa	  River	  Satellite	  City	  Plan	  2013	  
	  
Source:	  http://www.nhctz.com/images/NHC	  REAL	  ESTATE	  INVESTORS	  FORUM	  
	  Gated	  Communities:	  A	  Private	  Sector	  Response	  One	   landowner	   repositioned	   a	   former	   sisal	   plantation	   as	   the	   Kilimanjaro	   Golf	   and	  Wildlife	  Estate	  (Kiligolf),	  a	  high-­‐income	  community	  centered	  on	  a	  golf	  course.	  Kiligolf	  is	  the	  largest	  private	  residential	  project	   in	  the	  Arusha	  area.	  Kiligolf	  sits	  within	  the	  3,085	  acre	  Dolly	  Estate	  that	  was	  established	  as	  a	  sisal	  plantation	  in	  1950,	  nationalized	  in	  1967	  and	  then	  sold	  to	  an	  investor	  in	  1997.123	  Kiligolf	  is	  a	  full-­‐service	  gated	  community	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  The	  well-­‐known	  Trappe	  family	  bought	  Dolly	  Estate.	  The	  family	   is	  of	  German	  decent,	  but	  has	  been	  in	  the	  area	  since	  the	  1900’s	  managing	  a	  hunting	  and	  safari	  company.	  Dolly	  Estate	  was	  established	  in	  1950,	  then	   partially	   nationalized	   as	   part	   of	   the	   Jamhuri	   Sisal	   Company	   in	   1967,	   and	   then	   fully	   privatized	   in	  1996	  (Sabea	  2001).	  The	  family	  does	  not	  use	  the	  estate	  as	  a	  working	  farm,	  claiming	  that	  it	  was	  too	  eroded.	  They	  established	   the	  private	  Nduruma	  Polo	  Club,	  which	  contains	  a	   restaurant	  providing	  a	   few	   jobs	   for	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developed	   in	  multiple	   phases	   on	   a	   1,050-­‐acre	   site	   enclosed	   by	   an	   electric	   fence	  with	  security	   gates	   ().	   Project	   development	   began	   in	   2000	   as	   the	   vision	   of	   two	   Dutch	  investors.124	  The	  project	  was	   formally	   registered	  as	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  Development	  Ltd	  with	  TIC	  in	  2008.	  Approximately	  400	  1-­‐acre	  plots	  were	  designated	  for	  the	  development	  of	  individual	  homes,	  with	  a	  network	  of	  access	  roads	  running	  throughout	  the	  site	  as	  well	  as	  connecting	  it	  to	  the	  main	  Arusha-­‐Moshi	  road.	  The	  remaining	  600	  acres	  include	  an	  18-­‐hole	  golf	  course,	  two	  hotels	  and	  an	  airplane	  landing	  strip.	  A	  “villa”	  rental	  company	  also	  allows	   owners	   to	   rent	   their	   homes	   on	   a	   short-­‐term	   basis	   for	   tourists.	   The	   area’s	  desirability	  as	  a	  tourism	  corridor	  for	  wealthy	  expats	  and	  locals	  justifies	  the	  developer’s	  project.	  
Figure	  12:	  Kiligolf	  Site	  Plan:	  Phase	  I	  –	  III	  
Source:	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  &	  Wildlife	  Estates	  Brochure,	  2012	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  local	   residents.	   In	   2008,	   a	   50-­‐acre	   commercial	   vegetable	   seed	   farm,	   Afrisem,	   was	   established	   on	   the	  southern	  end	  of	  the	  estate.	  The	  farm	  is	  a	  partnership	  between	  Rijk	  Zwaan	  and	  East	  West	  Seed	  Co.	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  hybrid	  seeds	  to	  local	  farmers.	  124	  Interview	  with	   Zummi	   Cardodo,	   General	  Manager,	   Kilimanjaro	   Golf	   Development	   Limited,	  May,	   20,	  2012	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The	  realization	  of	  the	  full	  Kiligolf	  plan	  proceeds	  as	  residential	  plots	  continue	  to	  sell	  and	  construction	  projects	  take	  shape.	  	  Approximately	  100	  plots	  in	  Phase	  I	  and	  II	  were	  first	  marketed	  for	  sale	  in	  2009.	  As	  of	  November	  2013,	  90	  percent	  of	  Phase	  I	  and	  III	  are	  sold	  out,	   Phase	   II	   is	   entirely	   sold	   out	   and	   Phase	   IV	   sales	   have	   begun.	   The	   golf	   course	   is	  complete	   along	  with	   the	   clubhouse	   and	   twenty	  homes.	   The	  purchasers	   of	   these	  plots	  were	  approximately	  60	  percent	  local	  and	  40	  percent	  foreign.125	  The	  plots	  cost	  between	  $65,000	   and	   $75,000	  with	   full	   construction	   ranging	   between	   $100,000	   and	   $500,000	  for	  one	  of	  twelve	  designs.	  Plot	  prices	  are	  about	  200	  percent	  higher	  than	  those	  reported	  by	  residents	  outside	  the	  development,	  partially	  reflecting	  the	  benefits	  of	  infrastructure	  and	   services.126	  The	  project	  does	  not	   arrange	   financing	   through	   strategic	  partnerships	  with	  banks	  but	  payments	  can	  be	  made	  in	  three	  installments.	  The	  project	  owners	  do	  not	  inquire	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  buyer’s	  cash	  payments.	  	  
Buyers	   can	   modify	   the	   designs	   with	   approval	   from	   project	   management	   and	   total	  square	   footage	  cannot	  exceed	  40	  percent	  of	   the	  plot.	  The	  maximum	  square	   footage	   is	  300	  m2	   on	   a	   single	   plot	   and	   less	   than	  700	  m2	   on	   a	   double	   plot.	   All	   designs	   include	   a	  swimming	  pool	   and	   staff	   quarters.	   Individuals	   are	   prohibited	   from	  having	  more	   than	  two	   domestic	   staff	   and	   running	   businesses	   from	   their	   homes.	   The	   site	   restrictions	  contrast	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  built	  environment	  surrounding	  Kiligolf.	  The	  separation	  between	   work	   and	   home	   ensures	   that	   the	   community	   is	   separated	   from	   its	  surroundings.	   The	   Kiligolf	   covenants	   also	   restrict	   landscaping	   to	   a	   list	   of	   approved	  indigenous	   plants.	   Landscaping	   restrictions	   prohibit	   small	   farm	   plots	   ensuring	   the	  exclusion	  of	  most	  local	  residents.	  Kiligolf	  provides	  security,	  water,	  solid	  waste	  removal,	  electricity,	  and	  roads	  maintenance.	  The	  services	  will	  be	  maintained	  through	  an	  annual	  usage	  fee	  as	  well	  as	  a	  $1,500	  family	  golf	  membership	  (Kiligolf	  Homeowners’	  covenants).	  The	   level	   of	   service	   provision	   increases	   costs	   for	   both	   the	   Kiligolf	   developers	   and	  buyers	  guaranteeing	  that	  only	  wealthy	  buyers	  can	  afford	  the	  lifestyle.	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Interview	  with	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  Development	  Limited,	  May,	  20,	  2012.	  126	  Interview	  with	  VEO	  and	  villagers	  in	  Kitufe	  Village,	  Arumeru	  District,	  August	  20,	  2012.	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Figure	  13:	  Kiligolf	  Golf	  Course	  
	  
Source:	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  and	  Wildlife	  Estates	  Brochure	  
Figure	  14:	  Villas	  at	  Kiligolf	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  and	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  and	  Wildlife	  Estates	  Brochure	  A	   growing	   repositioning	   trend	   demonstrates	   that	   local	   demand	   drivers	   do	   not	   effect	  project	   decisions.	   Instead,	   project	   developers	   capitalize	   on	   increased	   land	   values	   and	  the	   area’s	   desirability	   as	   a	   vacation	   and	   retirement	   destination.	   	   The	   only	   large-­‐scale	  residential	   developments	   that	   are	   financially	   sustainable	   are	   structured	   for	   an	   elite	  consumer	  from	  outside	  the	  immediate	   land	  and	  housing	  market.	  That	   is,	  since	  Kiligolf	  began	  three	  other	  former	  agricultural	  estates	  began	  conversion	  to	  high-­‐end	  residential	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development	  with	  full	  amenities.127	  Similar	  to	  Kiligolf,	  these	  projects	  target	  high-­‐income	  buyers	   instead	   of	   local	   villagers.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   housing	   product	   on	   the	   formal	  market	   is	   not	   targeted	   at	   local	   individuals.	   Thus	   in	   peri-­‐urban	   Arusha,	   as	   urban	  development	   is	   formalized	   the	   land	  and	  housing	  market	  becomes	  more	  exclusive	  and	  expensive.	  	  Insurgent	  planning:	  a	  community	  response	  to	  satellite	  development	  In	  April	  2012,	   the	   local	   community	   responded	   to	  growing	  concerns	  about	   the	  Kiligolf	  project	  by	  invading	  the	  estate.	  The	  response	  is	  similar	  to	  insurgent	  planning	  responses	  documented	   in	   South	   Africa	   where	   citizens	   took	   planning	   into	   their	   own	   hands	  (Miraftab	   2005).	   Between	  200	   and	  300	   villagers	   tore	   down	  part	   of	   the	   estate’s	   fence	  and	  allowed	  their	  livestock	  to	  begin	  grazing	  (Figure	  15).	  The	  situation	  did	  not	  escalate	  further	   but	   private	   security	   guards	   were	   on	   hand	   to	   assist	   local	   police.128	  Villagers	  claimed	  grievances	  ranging	  from	  water	  resources	  to	  grazing	  land.	  The	  villagers	  believed	  that	   Kiligolf	   was	   a	   tourist	   hotel	   development	   owned	   by	   foreigners.129	  The	   villagers	  expected	  to	  gain	  no	  benefit	   from	  the	  project	  beyond	  a	  few	  low	  wage	  jobs	  cleaning	  the	  hotel.130	  The	  villagers	  understood	   that	   there	  was	  more	  at	  stake	  and	   that	   they	  stood	   to	  lose	   a	   great	   deal	   from	   the	   development.	   The	   incident	   highlights	   the	   complexity	   of	  satellite	   city	   development	   where	   the	   dense	   majority	   of	   residents	   are	   cut	   out	   of	   the	  process.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  The	  other	  projects	   include	   the	  100	  acre	  Manyatta,	  150	  acre	  Rivergardens,	  200	  acre	  Lake	  Duluti	  Eco	  Estates.	  128	  Correspondent.	  “Horticultural	   investors	  under	  renewed	  pressure	  to	   leave	  Meru.”	  Guardian	  Tanzania,	  June	  3,	  2012,	  pp.	  2–3.	  Marc	  Nkwame.	  “Farm	  invasions	  continue	  to	  hit	  Meru.	  “	  Tanzania	  Daily	  News,	  April	  28,	  2012,	  pp.2–5.	  129	  Interview	  with	  VEO	  and	  villagers,	  Kitefu	  Village,	  Arumeru,	  August	  20,	  2012.	  130	  Interview	  with	  VEO	  and	  villagers,	  Kitefu	  Village,	  Arumeru,	  August	  20,	  2012.	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Figure	  15:	  Villager	  Invasion	  at	  Kiligolf	  
	  
Source:	  Filbert	  Rweyemamu,	  Arusha	  Times,	  May	  5th,	  2012	  
Figure	  16:	  Private	  Security	  Guards	  during	  the	  Villager	  Invasion	  at	  Kiligolf	  
	  
Source:	  http://securitytalkafrica.blogspot.com/2012/04/arusha-­‐unrest.html	  Water	   scarcity	   is	   a	   delicate	   issue	   that	   the	  Kiligolf	   project	   destabilized.	  Most	   villagers’	  water	  source	  comes	  from	  a	  series	  of	  rain	  and	  glacial	  fed	  rivers,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  springs	  dried	   up	   by	   2008.131	  As	   of	   2010,	  water	   from	  public	   dams,	   rainwater	   harvesting	   tanks	  and	  gravity	   fed	  pumps	  were	  not	  working	  (URT	  &	  Ministry	  of	  Regional	  Administration	  and	   Local	   Government	   2010).	   In	   2009,	   the	   severity	   of	   water	   shortage	   caused	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Edward	  Selasini.	  “20	  springs	  dry	  up	  in	  Usa	  River	  village.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  March	  1,	  2008l,	  p.3.	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Pangani	  Basin	  Water	  Authority	  to	  declare	  that	  there	  were	  more	  water	  allocations	  than	  total	  water	   supply	   in	   the	  area	   (IUCN	  &	  Pangani	  Basin	  Water	  Board	  2009).	  The	  Board	  claimed	  they	  would	  no	   longer	  allocate	  new	  water	  usage.	  Yet,	  Kiligolf	  managed	  to	  drill	  several	  new	  boreholes.	  If	  Kiligolf	  draws	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  water	  as	  the	  average	  golf	  course	   it	  will	  equal	  about	  a	   fifth	  of	   the	  entire	  Meru	  District’s	  current	  capacity	  (URT	  &	  Ministry	   of	   Regional	   Administration	   and	   Local	   Government	   2010).	   Kiligolf’s	   water	  usage	  makes	  the	  surrounding	  area	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  water	  shortages.	  Several	  farmers	  on	  the	  Southern	  side	  of	  Kiligolf	  reported	  decreased	  water	  supply	  and	  struggling	  crops	  since	   the	   boreholes	   were	   drilled.132	  In	   destabilizing	   the	   water	   situation,	   Kiligolf	   gave	  villagers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  demand	  water	  concessions.	  	  Villagers	  also	  lost	  access	  to	  informal	  land	  use	  through	  the	  development	  of	  Kiligolf.	  That	  is,	   the	  Dolly	  Estate	  had	   long	  been	  used	   for	  grazing	  animals,	  grass	  harvesting	  and	  as	  a	  path	   between	   villages.	   As	   the	   Kiligolf	   project	   took	   shape	   access	  was	   denied	   to	   these	  informal	  uses	  which	  local	  villagers	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  livelihood.	  In	  addition,	  many	   villagers	   built	   houses	   on	   empty	  plantations	   (URT	  &	  Ardhi	  University	   2009).	  As	  formal	  high-­‐end	  residential	  projects	  expand	  the	  opportunity	  for	  informal	  encroachment	  on	   large	   estates	   declines,	   putting	   pressure	   on	   the	   informal	   housing	  market	   and	   local	  survival	  tactics.	  Therefore,	  the	  development	  of	  Kiligolf	  doesn’t	  respond	  to	  local	  demand	  for	  housing	  and	  serviced	   land	  even	   if	   it	   increases	   the	  housing	   supply.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  project	   is	   perceived	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   traditional	   informal	  means	   of	   development	   in	   Usa	  River.	  	  The	  local	  community’s	  violent	  reaction	  to	  Kiligolf	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  property.	  That	  is,	  the	  project	  accounts	  for	  a	  large	  share	  of	  vacant	  land	  that	  is	  close	  to	  the	  dense	  residential	  areas	  in	  central	  Usa	  River.	   In	  fact,	   it	  accounts	  for	  2	  percent	  of	  overall	  land	  use	  in	  the	  Usa	  River	  area	  (Figure	  17).	  Kiligolf’s	  land	  area	  is	  nearly	  equal	  to	  the	  total	  land	  used	  for	  dense	  unplanned	  settlements.	  Furthermore,	  majority	  of	  the	  land	  is	  under	  agricultural	  cultivation,	  including	  large	  commercial	  cash	  crop	  estates	  and	  small	  local	   farms.	  That	   is,	   commercial	  agriculture	  accounts	   for	  about	   twice	  as	  much	   land	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Interviews	  with	  VEO	  and	  Villagers,	  Kitefu	  Village,	  Arumeru,	  August	  20,	  2012.	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local,	   22	   percent	   versus	   13	   percent,	   of	   total	   land	   use.	   The	   difference	   between	   uses	  explains	  why	  local	  communities	  are	  feeling	  threatened	  by	  both	  commercial	  agriculture	  and	  residential	  development.	  Hotels	  account	  for	  only	  1	  percent	  of	  total	  land	  use,	  which	  is	   surprising	   because	   interviews	   and	   local	   media	   coverage	   highlighted	   the	   growing	  pressure	  from	  land	  conversion	  for	  the	  tourism	  sector	  (interview	  2012).	  These	  land	  uses	  reveal	   why	   local	   communities	   feel	   alienated	   but	   also	   the	   potential	   for	   profit	   from	  investment	  in	  the	  relatively	  dense	  area.	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Figure	  17:	  Usa	  River	  Land	  Use	  
	  





%	  of	  Total	  
Residential	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Dense	  unplanned	   	  4,168,763	  	   	  4.17	  	   6%	   3%	  Moderate	  unplanned	   	  29,675,603	  	   	  29.68	  	   43%	   20%	  Sparse	  unplanned	   	  32,149,358	  	   	  32.15	  	   46%	   22%	  Dense	  planned	   	  721,552	  	   	  0.72	  	   1%	   0%	  
Kiligolf	   	  3,046,954	  	   	  3.05	  	   4%	   2%	  
Total	   	  69,762,230	  	   	  69.76	  	   100%	   47%	  Commercial	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Agriculture	   	  46,377,282	  	   	  46.38	  	   66%	   31%	  Vacant/Unused	   	  19,990,955	  	   	  19.99	  	   28%	   13%	  Warehouses/Retail	   	  2,664,718	  	   	  2.66	  	   3%	   2%	  Hotels	   	  1,503,404	  	   	  1.50	  	   2%	   1%	  
Total	   	  70,536,359	  	   	  70.54	  	   100%	   47%	  Other	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Government	   	  1,016,642	  	   	  1.01	  	   4%	   0%	  School	   	  795,270	  	   	  0.80	  	   10%	   1%	  National	  Park	   	  6,492,038	  	   	  6.49	  	   78%	   4%	  
Total	   	  8,303,950	  	   	  8.30	  	   100%	   6%	  Total	   	  148,602,539	  	   	  148.60	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  The	   villagers	   used	   their	   uprising	   as	   a	   collective	   action	   bargaining	   tool.	   The	   uprising	  enabled	  villagers	  to	  partially	  overcome	  the	  planning	  stalemate	  within	  the	  government	  and	  gain	  some	  benefits	   from	  private	   investment.	  Since	   the	   invasion,	  Kiligolf	   created	  a	  “community	  development	  program”	  which	  meets	  some	  of	   the	  villagers’	  demands.	  The	  villagers	   claimed	   that	   Kiligolf	   developers	   promised	  water	   infrastructure	   but	   failed	   to	  deliver.	   Legally	   Kiligolf	   is	   not	   responsible	   for	   water	   provision	   to	   the	   surrounding	  villages.	   By	   providing	   water	   infrastructure	   solely	   to	   the	   project	   the	   developers	  overcame	   the	   local	   planning	   and	   service	   stalemate,	   but	   also	   reduced	   the	   pressure	   on	  local	  officials	  to	  provide	  services	  throughout	  the	  area.	  Kiligolf	  negotiated	  with	  the	  four	  villages	   and	   will	   provide	   both	   water	   and	   electricity.133	  To	   date	   two	   villages	   received	  pipes	   and	   one	   a	   filling	   station	   (Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  &	  Wildlife	   Estate	   2013).	   Kiligolf	   also	  created	  a	  “grass	  bank”	  within	  Dolly	  Estate	  where	  locals	  receive	  permits	  to	  cut	  grass	  for	  their	  livestock	  within	  the	  grounds.	  In	  addition,	  Kiligolf	  built	  two	  primary	  schools	  for	  the	  villages	  and	  will	  also	  sponsor	  students	  to	  go	  to	  secondary	  and	  vocational	  schools,	  using	  5	  percent	  of	  the	  annual	  fees	  from	  Kiligolf	  residents	  (Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  &	  Wildlife	  Estate	  2013).	   These	   actions	   indicate	   that	   the	   developers	   are	  working	  with	   the	   local	   villages	  and	   that	   negotiations	   are	   ongoing.	  While	   the	  project	   continues	   as	   originally	   designed	  for	  high-­‐income	  outsiders,	  Kiligolf	  expanded	  their	  role	  to	  include	  service	  provider	  to	  the	  surrounding	   villages.	   The	   current	   concessions	   are	   not	   large	   enough	   to	   overcome	   the	  long-­‐term	   land	   use	   and	   environmental	   issues	   facing	   the	   area,	   but	   the	   negotiations	  expand	   some	   of	   the	   investment	   benefits	   to	   the	   community	   and	   higher	   density	   living	  (Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  &	  Wildlife	  Estate	  2013).	  The	  Kiligolf	  incident	  was	  part	  of	  a	  string	  of	  invasions	  by	  local	  villagers	  in	  response	  to	  a	  contentious	   by-­‐election	   in	   Arumeru	   East	   that	   played	   into	   grievances	   about	   land	  shortage,	   water	   scarcity	   and	   changes	   in	   informal	   use	   rules.134 	  Estate	   conversions	  became	   a	   political	   opportunity	   to	   make	   incendiary	   claims	   about	   land	   redistribution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Interview	  with	  Kilimanjaro	  Golf	  Development	  Limited,	  May,	  20,	  2012.	  134	  Correspondent.	  “Police	  Probe	  Meru	  Farms	  Invasion.”	  Daily	  News,	  May	  1,	  2012,	  p.	  4.	  Correspondent.	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without	   intending	   to	   follow	   through.135	  The	   by-­‐election	   was	   contentious	   because	   the	  main	  opposition	  party	  to	  the	  ruling	  CCM	  party,	  Chadema,	  had	  a	  good	  chance	  of	  winning	  but	  needed	  to	  turn	  out	  voters.	  Chadema	  developed	  a	  stronghold	  in	  the	  Arusha	  Region	  in	  the	   national	   2010	   elections	   when	   members	   of	   parliament	   (MP)	   were	   elected	   from	  Arusha	  Urban,	  Moshi	   Urban	   and	  Hai.	   So	   then,	  when	   the	   sitting	  MP	   for	   Arumeru	   East	  passed	   away	   it	   offered	   Chadema	   an	   opportunity	   to	   further	   solidify	   and	   consolidate	  power.	   Chadema	   gained	   popularity	   locally	   and	   nationally	   by	   focusing	   on	   revealing	  corruption	  within	  CCM	  and	  questioning	   large-­‐scale	   land	  deals	  and	   foreign	   investment	  therein	  (Chadema	  2010).	  Land	  use	  conversion	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  for	  many	  Chadema	  candidates	  who	   argue	   for	  more	   transparent	   and	   locally	   driven	   planning	  mechanisms	  (Reith	   2011;	   Chadema	   2010).	   Within	   this	   context,	   both	   the	   CCM	   and	   Chadema	  candidates	   for	   the	   Arumeru	   seat	   reportedly	   told	   voters	   they	  would	   be	   redistributing	  foreign	   owned	   land	   to	   landless	   villagers.136	  These	   claims	   are	   not	   based	   on	   policy	   or	  general	   legal	   sentiment.	   These	   claims	   are	   an	   attempt	   to	   engage	   local	   communities	  though	  the	  pressures	  associated	  with	  land	  scarcity	  and	  lack	  of	  affordable	  housing.	  The	   tension	   leads	   to	   conflicts	   between	   the	   local	   population,	   business	  owners	   and	   the	  government	   often	   associated	  with	   rising	   political	   opposition	  parties	   (Cooksey	   2011b;	  Larsson	   2001).	   Arusha	   is	   the	   national	   stronghold	   of	   the	   main	   opposition	   party	   in	  Tanzania,	  Chadema.	  The	  Arusha	  Region	  is	  known	  for	  having	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  land	  conflicts	   in	   Tanzania	   often	   correlated	   with	   rising	   opposition	   party	   influence.137	  	   Yet,	  reliable	  statistics	  documenting	  the	  change	  are	  not	  available.	   In	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Correspondent.	  “Tanzania	  govt	  signs	  off	  huge	  tracts	  of	  land	  to	  foreign	  investors	  in	  secret	  deals”,	  East	  
African,	  May	  14,	  2012,	  p.	  5.	  136	  From	   interview	   with	   VEO	   and	   villagers,	   Kitefu	   Village,	   Arumeru,	   August	   20,	   2012.	   Just	   as	   the	  campaigns	   kick-­‐started	   in	   the	   Constituency	   early	   March,	   CHADEMA's	   Deputy	   Secretary	   General,	   Zitto	  Kabwe	  declared	   that	   the	   land	   issue	   in	  Arumeru	  would	  be	  given	  priority.	  During	   the	   election	   campaign	  former	   President	   Benjamin	   Mkapa,	   campaigning	   for	   the	   CCM	   candidate,	   acknowledged	   government	  awareness	   of	   land	   problems	   in	   the	   district	   (Godson	  Majola,	   “Arumeru,	   Arusha	   land	   invasions	   threaten	  commercial	  farming.“	  The	  East	  African,	  May	  12,	  2012.)	  137	  Interviews	  with	  land	  officers	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Arusha	  and	  Mwanza	  all	  repeated	  that	  conflict	  was	  more	  common	  around	  Arusha	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  country.	  
	  	   98	  
gap	   in	  official	   information,	  a	  review	  of	  newspaper	  archives138	  demonstrated	   that	  since	  2002	  there	  have	  been,	  on	  average,	  two	  large-­‐scale	  and	  prolonged	  conflicts	  per	  year	  in	  the	  Meru	  District.	  The	  reported	  conflicts	  involved	  local	  community	  disputes	  with	  large-­‐scale	   investments	  or	  estates.	  The	  highest	  numbers	  were	  in	  2009	  and	  2012,	  coinciding	  with	   political	   campaigning	   for	   the	   national	   presidential	   election	   in	   the	   former	   and	   a	  local	  by	  election	  in	  the	  latter.	  	  Kiligolf	   developers	   claimed	   that	   the	   entire	   incident	   was	   politically	   motivated.139	  	   The	  body	  representing	  the	  horticultural	  industry	  feared	  that	  the	  wrong	  message	  was	  being	  sent	   that	   failed	   to	   “enable”	  markets	   and	  would	   lower	   exports	   from	   the	   area.140	  While	  these	   points	   of	   view	   ignore	   grievances	   about	   the	   project,	   they	   demonstrate	   that	   land	  invasions	   are	   a	   political	   deflection	   tool.	   Villagers’	   justification	   was	   that	   they	   were	  collecting	  campaign	  promises	  of	  land	  redistribution.141	  The	  villagers’	  insurgent	  response	  was	  directed	  at	  Kiligolf,	  not	  the	  local	  authorities.	  The	  local	  authorities	  are	  legally	  bound	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  villagers’	  grievances.	  The	  stalemate	  created	  by	  local	  powerbrokers	  is	  more	  to	  blame	  for	  planning	  and	  service	   failures	   than	  the	  private	   investors.	  Politicians	  successfully	  shifted	  responsibility	   to	   the	  private	  sector	   investors.	  The	   incident	  reveals	  that	   development	   in	   Usa	   River	   has	   become	   an	   electoral	   mechanism	   for	   political	  candidates	  more	  than	  an	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  land	  and	  housing	  scarcity	  issues.	  
Conclusion	  Arusha	   reveals	   modular	   urbanism	   influenced	   by	   competition	   between	   plural	  governance	   regimes.	   In	   both	   the	   central	   city	   and	   peri-­‐urban	   areas	   three	   levels	   of	  government	  entities	  are	  competing	  to	  complete	  development	  that	  captures	  the	  benefits	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  I	  reviewed	  the	  Arusha	  Times,	  the	  Guardian,	  and	  the	  Citizen	  newspapers	  over	  the	  period	  searching	  for	  references	   to	   conflicts.	   Although,	   the	   approach	   does	   not	   capture	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   local	   boundary	  disputes	  it	  gives	  me	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  violent	  and	  large-­‐scale	  conflicts	  in	  the	  area.	  139	  Interview	  with	   Zummi	   Cardoso,	   General	   Manager,	   Kilimanjaro	   Golf	   Development	   Limited,	   May,	   20,	  2012.	  140	  Happy	  Lazaro,	  2012.	  “Meru	  land	  crisis	  takes	  deadly	  turn.”	  Arusha	  Times,	  May	  5,	  2012,	  pp.1–2.	  141	  Correspondent.	  “Horticultural	  investors	  under	  renewed	  	  pressure	  to	  leave	  Meru.”	  Guardian	  on	  Sunday,	  June	  3,	  2012,	  p.	  2.	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of	  tourism.	  Enabling	  market	  reforms	  encourage	  entrepreneurialism	  among	  government	  agencies	   as	   well	   as	   political	   threats	   from	   a	   new	   opposition	   party	   influences	   the	  competition.	  The	  confluence	  of	  competing	  interests	   led	  to	  a	  planning	  stalemate.	  These	  attempts	  confirm	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  urban	  development	  vision	  and	  reveal	  a	  competition	  for	  investment	  between	  parastatals	  and	  local	  entities.	  In	   this	   context,	   private	   sector	   investors	   steer	   investment	   towards	   tourism	   oriented	  assets	   rather	   than	   accommodating	   local	   demand.	   In	   the	   central	   city,	   developers	   form	  tourism	  conglomerates	  that	  provide	  all	  types	  of	  tourism	  related	  services	  including	  hotel	  booking.	   In	   peri-­‐urban	   areas,	   developers	   convert	   agricultural	   plantations	   to	   high-­‐end	  residential	   communities	   with	   full	   services	   and	   standardized	   design.	   By	   focusing	   on	  attracting	   tourists	   and	  high-­‐income	  buyers	   the	  new	  developments	   are	  detached	   from	  the	   local	   context.	   The	   detachment	   encourages	   overbuilding	   as	   investors	   respond	   to	  perceptions	  of	  tourism	  growth	  and	  past	  experience	  rather	  than	  actual	  demand.	  Arusha’s	   recent	   urban	   development	   demonstrates	   that	   local	   demand	   drivers	   do	   not	  influence	   project	   decisions	   and	   instead	   investors	   capitalize	   on	   increased	   land	   values	  and	  the	  area’s	  desirability	  as	  a	  tourism	  destination.	  Capitalizing	  on	  land	  value	  results	  in	  modular	  urbanism	  structured	   for	   an	  elite	   consumer	   from	  outside	   the	   immediate	   land	  and	   housing	   market.	   As	   these	   redevelopment	   projects	   expand	   the	   opportunity	   for	  informal	  encroachment	  declines.	  Reduced	  encroachment	  puts	  pressure	  on	  the	  informal	  housing	  market	  and	  local	  survival	  tactics	  in	  both	  the	  central	  city	  and	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.	  Given	   the	   land	  use	  history	  and	   the	  structure	  of	  business	   in	  Arusha	   the	   tactics	  used	   in	  developing	  these	  projects	  leads	  to	  local	  protest	  and	  demands	  for	  more	  transparency.	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Chapter	  5:	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  
Introduction	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  private	  sector	  development	  is	   increasing	  inequality	  and	   fragility	   but	   without	   an	   organized	   protest	   from	   the	   community.	   The	   outcomes	   are	  explained	   by	   plural	   governance	   structures	   and	   networked	   elite	   business	   structures	  capturing	   resources,	   similar	   to	   the	   findings	   in	   Arusha.	   Also	   like	   Arusha,	   the	   underlying	  issues	   of	   creating	   coordinated	   land	   use	   planning	   or	   providing	   infrastructure	   remain	  constraints	  on	  urban	  development	  that	  are	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  enabling	  markets	  theory.	  Unlike	   Arusha,	   the	   underlying	   land	  market	   is	   not	   as	   constrained	   as	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   so	  although	  access	  to	  the	  city	  is	  becoming	  more	  unequal	  there	  are	  other	  opportunities	  for	  the	  poor	   majority	   to	   find	   accommodation	   and	   continued	   informal	   livelihoods	   on	   the	   city’s	  outskirts	  without	   reason	   to	   organize	   a	   protest.	   The	   case	   study	   reinforces	   the	   findings	   in	  Arusha	   that	   private	   market	   reforms	   have	   done	   little	   to	   improve	   the	   urban	   form	   or	  opportunities	  for	  the	  urban	  majority	  to	  date	  in	  Tanzania.	  Dar	   es	   Salaam’s	   skyline	   is	   dotted	   with	   cranes	   and	   high-­‐rises	   signaling	   new	   large-­‐scale	  development.	  New	  developments	  are	  modular	  because	  they	  are	  out	  of	  scale	  with	  existing	  fabric,	  targeted	  at	  high-­‐income	  buyers,	  isolated	  from	  informal	  settlements,	  fully	  serviced	  by	  developers	   and	   unrelated	   to	   local	   demand.	   Modular	   urbanism	   results	   from	   existing	  powerbrokers	   searching	   for	   reliable	  profits	   from	  real	   estate,	   informal	  development	   rules	  and	  plural	  governance	  regimes.	  Informal	  development	  is	  pervasive	  with	  established	  rules	  that	   thwart	   reform	   because	   existing	   owners	   benefit	   from	   the	   status	   quo.	   The	   power	  structure	   is	   unaltered	   by	   new	   urban	   development.	   Modular	   development	   provides	   local	  elites	  and	  politicians	  with	   the	  appearance	  of	  developing	   the	   future	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  as	  a	  modern	  center	  of	  investment,	  while	  making	  short-­‐term	  personal	  gains.	  	  	  In	  the	  central	  city,	  high	  land	  values	  and	  unmet	  demand	  for	  all	  types	  of	  property	  motivate	  a	  competition	   between	   various	   central	   government	   agencies.	   Competition	   between	   central	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government	   agencies	   and	   parastatals	   is	   unrelated	   to	   demands	   for	   space	   resulting	   in	   a	  plural	  governance	  regime.	  Meanwhile,	  private	  sector	  investors	  use	  real	  estate	  as	  means	  to	  illegally	   move	   cash	   in	   and	   out	   of	   the	   country,	   which	   further	   detaches	   investment	   from	  demand.	   Power	   delineated	   in	   the	   city	   center	   between	   formal	   development	   with	  government	  agencies	  and	  informal	  development	  by	  private	  sector.	  The	   peripheries	   offer	   ample	   land	   for	   development	   but	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   are	  limited.	  As	   the	  city	  continues	   to	  spread	   towards	   the	  villages	  on	   the	  peripheries	   there	  are	  large	  areas	  of	  undeveloped	  land	  available	  for	  urban	  land	  use	  conversion.	  The	  land	  is	  often	  unserviced	   and	   difficult	   to	   reach	   via	   the	   existing	   road	   network.	   As	   land	   is	   developed	  without	  a	  plan	  some	  communities	  make	  cooperative	  decisions	  to	  input	  roads	  but	  in	  general	  most	  areas	  are	  defined	  by	  limited	  services	  and	  infrastructure.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  lower	  land	  values	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  assemble	  large	  plots	  of	  land	  for	  satellite	  city	  development.	  As	  a	  result,	  central	  government	  agencies	  can	  project	  power	  and	  capacity	  by	  accumulating	  land	  and	   making	   large	   scale	   planning	   announcements.	   These	   pronouncements	   engender	  speculation	   in	   the	   land	   market	   without	   development.	   Land	   prices	   increase	   without	  commensurate	   increases	   in	   housing	   or	   other	   buildings.	   The	   speculative	   spike	   in	   prices	  crowds	  out	  residents	  looking	  for	  affordable	  housing	  and	  investment	  solutions.	  The	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  urban	  form	  and	  property	  market	  trends.	   Then	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   redevelopment	   of	   Upanga	   as	   an	   example	   of	   modular	  redevelopment	  because	   it	  references	  experiences	   in	  other	  cities	  and	  responds	  to	  political	  demands	   more	   than	   it	   does	   to	   local	   space	   requirements.	   The	   Upanga	   neighborhood	  redevelopment	   resulted	   in	   a	   series	   of	   high-­‐rise	   residential	   developments	   positioning	   a	  network	   of	   business	   elites	   to	   leverage	   informal	   tactics	   and	   capture	   the	   benefits	   of	  Government	  and	  development	   inefficiencies.	  Finally,	   I	  will	   examine	   the	  development	  of	  a	  satellite	   city	   in	   Kigamboni,	   which	   uncovers	   another	   attempt	   at	   modular	   urbanism.	   In	  contrast	   to	   the	  central	  city,	   two	   large-­‐scale	  central	  government	   initiatives	   failed	  to	  create	  significant	  urban	  development	  outcomes.	  Instead,	  the	  initiatives	  created	  direct	  competition	  with	   private	   sector	   development.	   The	   Kigamboni	   experience	   reveals	   political	  announcements	   by	   central	   agencies	   creating	   confusion	   because	   they	   are	   partial	   and	  contradictory.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  announcements	  encouraged	  price	   speculation	  based	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on	  potential	  compensation	  and	  future	  infrastructure	  improvements.	  Finally,	   in	  Kigamboni	  private	   sector	   investors	   do	   not	   have	   access	   to	   informal	   practices	   used	   by	   elite	   business	  networks	  in	  the	  central	  city	  resulting	  in	  limited	  success.	  	  
Overview	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  Urban	  Form	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  urban	  form	  is	  restricted	  by	  a	  creek	  system	  and	  natural	  harbor.	  The	  Indian	  Ocean	   bounds	   the	   city	   to	   the	   east	   (Figure	   18).	   A	   natural	   harbor	   stretches	   about	   10	  kilometers	  inland	  along	  the	  Kizinga	  and	  Mzinga	  creeks	  (Kebede	  &	  Nicholls	  2011).	  Most	  of	  the	   urban	   development	   adheres	   to	   a	   fingerlike	   structure	   along	   the	   four	   major	   roads	  dividing	   the	   city	   (Halla	   &	  Mang’waru	   2004;	   Kombe	   2005;	   Hill	   &	   Lindner	   2010).	   Formal	  planning	  and	  development	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  population	  growth,	  so	  the	  current	  urban	  form	  depends	  on	  an	  infrastructure	  system	  designed	  for	  a	  much	  smaller	  city	  (Lugoe	  2008;	  Meshack	  2004;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2009;	  Kyessi	  2008).	  Backlogs	   in	   infrastructure	  and	  services	  range	  from	  roads	  to	  title	  provision	  (Lugoe	  2007;	  Parsa	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Municipal	  investment	  improved	  major	   roads	   but	   provided	   limited	   investment	   in	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   roads	  (UN-­‐HABITAT	  2009).	  The	  road	  network	  is	  largely	  the	  same	  as	  the	  original	  colonial	  system	  (Kombe	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Pervasive	  road	  congestion	  contrasts	  with	  the	  reality	  that	  less	  than	  half	  of	  Dar’s	  nearly	  1,800	  km2	  footprint	  is	  built	  up	  (Halla	  &	  Mang’waru	  2004).	   
Figure	  18:	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  Urban	  Structure	  
Source:	  (Ortiz	  2011)	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Between	  1988	  and	  2002,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  population	  more	  than	  doubled	  from	  1.3	  million	  to	  2.7	   million	   and	   shifted	   towards	   the	   outskirts.142	  In	   1988	   approximately	   a	   third	   of	   the	  population	  lived	  more	  than	  eight	  kilometers	  from	  the	  city	  center	  but	  by	  2002	  it	  was	  nearly	  60	  percent.	  By	  2002	  the	  highest	  density	  was	  5	  kilometers	  from	  the	  city	  center	  (Figure	  19).	  The	   share	   of	   Dar’s	   total	   population	   that	   lived	   in	   within	   three	   kilometers	   of	   the	   center	  shrank	  from	  14	  percent	  to	  7	  percent,	  resulting	  in	  a	  nearly	  20	  percent	  drop	  in	  density.	  The	  drop	  in	  density	  reflects	  limited	  residential	  redevelopment	  over	  the	  period	  consistent	  with	  reports	  about	  dilapidated	  conditions	  (UN-­‐HABITAT	  &	  Cities	  Alliance	  2010).	  	  
Figure	  19:	  Density	  Profiles:	  1988	  and	  2002	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cost	   implications	   of	   providing	   full	   services	   over	   a	   large	   area	   further	   prohibit	   any	  major	  changes	  (Ortiz	  2011).	  The	  resulting	  collaged	  urban	  form	  has	  pockets	  of	  high	  density	  where	  land	   is	   made	   accessible	   via	   roads	   and	   bridges	   with	   a	   mix	   of	   planned	   and	   unplanned	  neighborhoods	  (Abebe	  2011).	  	  Current	   land	   uses	   created	   a	   low-­‐density	   property	   market	   that	   is	   largely	   segmented	   by	  use.143	  The	   CBD	   contains	   headquarters	   for	   all	   seventeen	   central	   government	   ministries	  (Knight	  Frank	  2013).	  The	  central	   city	   functions	  as	  Tanzania’s	  administrative	   capital	  with	  office	  complexes	  defining	  a	   large	  share	  of	   land	  use.	  The	  central	  government	  has	  been	  the	  city’s	  largest	  office	  tenant	  but	  the	  business	  and	  financial	  services	  sector	  now	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  property	  market.144	  One	  indicator	  of	  Dar’s	  role	  as	  a	  financial	  center	  is	  that	  all	  53	  banking	  institutions	  operating	  in	  Tanzania	  have	  their	  headquarters	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  with	  only	  eight	  banks	  maintaining	  upcountry	  branches	  (URT	  2010b).	  The	  port	  creates	  demand	  for	  warehouses	  on	  the	  southern	  side	  of	  the	  city.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  is	  a	  strategic	  import	  export	  hub	  because	  it	  is	  the	  largest	  and	  deepest	  natural	  port	  on	  the	  East	  Coast	  of	  Africa	  (Morisset	  2013)	   The	   port	   services	   the	   land	   locked	   countries	   of	   Burundi,	  Malawi,	   Rwanda,	   Uganda,	  and	  Zambia	   (Shkaratan	  2012).	  A	  majority	  of	   the	   industrial	  developments	  are	  also	  on	   the	  southern	  side	  of	  the	  city.	  Factories	  produce	  goods	  ranging	  from	  textiles,	  to	  food	  processing,	  to	   light	  manufacturing,	   to	   cement	   (URT	  2004).	  The	   industries	  are	  mostly	   small-­‐scale	  and	  privately	   owned	   but	   in	   total	   account	   for	   40	   percent	   of	  manufacturing	   in	   Tanzania	   (URT	  2004;	  UN-­‐HABITAT	  2009).	  	  Overview	  of	  Dar’s	  property	  investment	  growth	  Dar	  is	  Tanzania’s	  capital	  of	  business	  and	  financial	  services,	  making	  it	  the	  most	  robust	  and	  diverse	   economy	   in	   the	   country.	   At	   independence	   Dar	   accounted	   for	   more	   than	   half	   of	  Tanzania’s	   GDP	   but	   has	   decreased	   to	   approximately	   seventeen	   percent	   (NBS	   2012b).	  Although	  Dar’s	  economic	  dominance	  decreased	  since	  independence,	  it	  remains	  the	  largest	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  My	   understanding	   of	   the	   property	  market	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	  was	   informed	   by	   an	   interview	  with	   Ahaad	  Meskiri,	  Managing	  Director	  at	  Knight	  Frank	  Tanzania	  on	  March	  25th	  2012.	  
144 Abduel Elinaza. “Dar es Salaam on record high demand for office space.” Daily News, February 14th, 2011. p. 5. 
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employment	  and	  economic	  driver	  in	  the	  country	  (Lugalla	  1995).	  For	  instance	  in	  2012,	  Dar	  es	   Salaam’s	   economy	   accounted	   for	   more	   than	   a	   third	   of	   total	   formal	   employees	   in	  Tanzania	   and	   more	   than	   a	   quarter	   of	   private	   employees	   (URT	   2013c).	   A	   majority	   of	  Tanzania’s	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   also	   remains	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam.	   Between	   1999	   and	  2008	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	   total	  FDI	   in	  Tanzania	  (Figure	  20).	   FDI	   in	   Dar	   is	   nearly	   six	   times	   larger	   than	   the	   nest	   largest	   recipients,	   Arusha	   and	  Mwanza.	   FDI	   allows	  developers	   and	  government	   entities	   to	   scale	  up	   investment	  projects	  more	  than	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  Tanzania	  (URT	  2013e).	  
Figure	  20:	  Share	  of	  FDI	  by	  Region	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approximately	   $730	   million	   annually.	   Investments	   peaked	   in	   2010	   well	   after	   the	   global	  financial	  crisis	  began	  in	  2007.	  The	  trend	  in	  property	  investment	  demonstrates	  that	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	   property	   market	   and	   Tanzania’s	   economy	   are	   isolated	   from	   world	   market	  fluctuations	  (Morisset	  2013).	  	  
Figure	  21:	  Formal	  Investment	  in	  Real	  Estate	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trends	  imply	  that	  property	  investment	  is	  linked	  to	  macroeconomic	  indicators	  in	  Tanzania	  but	  not	  to	  global	  trends	  in	  real	  estate	  investment.	  
Figure	  22:	  Total	  Investment	  by	  Local	  and	  Foreign	  Investors	  	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  Calculations	  based	  on	  TIC	  Investment	  Database	  2012	  (see	  footnote	  5)	  
Figure	  23:	  Share	  of	  Total	  Investment	  in	  Residential	  and	  Office	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between	   2006	   and	   2012.	   The	   increasing	   trend	   reinforces	   that	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   is	   isolated	  from	  global	  fluctuations	  in	  property	  investment.	  Expenditures	  demonstrate	  rapid	  increases	  in	   property	   market	   investment.	   The	   vast	   majority	   of	   construction	   takes	   place	   in	   Dar	   es	  Salaam	  with	   small	   expenditures	   in	   Arusha	   and	  Mwanza.	   The	   following	   case	   studies	   will	  begin	  to	  unpack	  what	  is	  driving	  the	  increase	  in	  investment	  and	  who	  is	  benefitting	  from	  the	  outcomes.	  
Figure	  24:	  Total	  Construction	  Expenditures	  by	  Urban	  Area	  	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculation	  based	  on	  CRB	  database	  2012	  (see	  footnote	  5	  for	  more	  detail)	  
































Arusha	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  Mwanza	  
	  	   109	  
an	   affluent	   Asian	   suburb	   through	   a	   land	   pooling	   program	   in	   late	   1950’s	   (Brennan	   et	   al.	  2007).	  When	  redevelopment	  started	  in	  1999	  there	  were	  only	  two	  buildings	  with	  more	  than	  seven	  stories	  (MLHHSD	  &	  Ilala	  Municipality	  2009).	  By	  2012	  there	  were	  47	  buildings	  with	  more	  than	  six	  stories.	  Of	  these	  41	  were	  residential	  buildings	  and	  6	  were	  offices	  (Table	  8	  &	  Figure	  27).147	  Of	  the	  residential	  buildings,	  seven	  buildings	  have	  retail	  space	  on	  the	  ground	  floors.	   The	   new	   development	   added	   almost	   3,000	   largely	   3-­‐bedroom	   units	   to	   Upanga’s	  housing	   stock.	   Density	   in	   the	   neighborhood	   could	   triple	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   new	  construction. 148 	  The	   development	   timeline	   demonstrates	   a	   boom	   in	   residential	  development	   (Table	   8).	   Between	   1999	   and	   2009	   thirteen	   projects	   delivered.	   Then	   after	  2009,	   investment	   increased	   rapidly	   with	   a	   total	   of	   28	   projects	   completed	   or	   nearing	  completion.	  Fifty	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  projects,	  or	  21	  buildings,	  are	  joint	  ventures	  (JV)	  with	  a	  government	  agency.	  Of	  these,	  17	  are	  JVs	  with	  the	  NHC.	  The	  number	  of	  JVs	  indicates	  NHC’s	  influence	  over	  the	  redevelopment	  process.149	  By	  2012,	  JVs	  account	  for	  fewer	  of	  the	  projects	  as	  private	  individuals	  undertake	  investments	  without	  state	  support.	  The	  expected	  increase	  in	  stock	  accounts	  for	  a	  doubling	  of	  the	  middle	  and	  high	  end	  housing	  stock	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  (Knight	   Frank	   2013).	   The	   increase	   in	   population	   and	   residential	   development	   is	  unprecedented	   in	   a	   formal	   neighborhood	   in	   Dar	   where	   the	   land	   use	   patterns	   remained	  static	  since	  colonial	  times	  (Brennan	  et	  al.	  2007).	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  Note	  that	  these	  estimates	  were	  accurate	  as	  of	  September	  1,	  2012,	  when	  I	  completed	  fieldwork.	  I	  gathered	  the	  data	  through	  site	  visits	  and	  conversations	  with	  property	  managers	  in	  each	  building.	  148	  The	  estimate	  uses	  the	  2002	  Upanga	  average	  household	  size	  of	  5.6	  members	  and	  an	  occupancy	  rate	  of	  85%,	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  total	  population	  increase	  of	  14,000	  residents	  to	  approximately	  86	  people	  per	  hectare.	  	  149	  The	  other	  state	  agencies	  include	  Tanzania	  Building	  Association	  and	  the	  Tanga	  Bohra	  Education	  Society.	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Table	  8:	  Residential	  Project	  Pipeline	  in	  Upanga,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania	  
Year	   Projects	   JV	   Estimated	  Units	  1999	   1	   1	   	  30	  	  2000	   2	   0	   	  156	  	  2002	   1	   1	   	  48	  	  2005	   7	   4	   	  444	  	  2006	   1	   1	   	  90	  	  2009	   1	   1	   	  72	  	  2011	   4	   4	   	  186	  	  2012	   9	   2	   	  834	  	  2013	   10	   4	   	  670	  	  2014	   5	   3	   	  438	  	  
Total	   41	   21	   	  2,968	  	  Source:	  NHC	  list	  of	  Joint	  Ventures,	  author’s	  interviews	  and	  site	  visits	  
Figure	  25:	  Upanga	  “Skyline”	  2012	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  June	  2012	  Construction	  expenditures	  in	  Upanga	  increased	  from	  less	  than	  $1	  million	  in	  2006	  to	  more	  than	   $20	   million	   in	   2011	   (Table	   9).	   Over	   the	   same	   time	   period	   in	   Dar,	   expenditures	  increased	  14	  times,	  with	  the	  share	  of	  investment	  in	  Upanga	  varying	  annually.	  Construction	  expenditures	   include	   “networked	   premium	   infrastructure”	   such	   as	   generators,	   power	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sources,	  water,	  septic	  tanks	  and	  telecommunications.150	  In	  contrast,	  many	  roadways	  remain	  unpaved	  without	   expectations	   of	   resurfacing	   (Figure	  26).151	  The	   increase	   in	   expenditures	  demonstrates	  the	  growing	  economic	  importance	  of	  urban	  redevelopment	  in	  Upanga.152	  
Table	  9:	  Residential	  and	  Mixed	  Use	  Construction	  Contracts,	  USD	  
Year	   Upanga	   Dar	  es	  Salaam	  
Upanga	  %	  
of	  Dar	  2006	   	  $844,401	  	   	  $10,812,938	  	   7.8%	  2007	   	  $450,667	  	   	  $30,136,023	  	   1.5%	  2008	   	  $2,846,251	  	   	  $47,855,057	  	   5.9%	  2009	   	  $16,079,447	  	   	  $113,963,865	  	   14.1%	  2010	   	  $11,206,435	  	   	  $126,028,789	  	   8.9%	  2011	   	  $20,670,571	  	   	  $151,861,585	  	   13.6%	  Source:	  Contractor’s	  Review	  Board	  project	  database,	  Author’s	  calculations	  
Figure	  26:	  Road	  condition	  on	  Mindu	  Street	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  in	  March	  2012	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  150	  Site	   visits	   confirmed	   that	   all	   buildings	   included	   full	   services	   that	  were	   often	   provided	  by	   the	   developer	  outside	  of	  city	  service	  providers.	  151	  Interview	  with	  developers	  and	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHSSD.	  152	  Finnigan	  Wa	  Simbeye.	  “Investments	  Lift	  Construction	  Sector”.	  Daily	  News,	  December	  9,	  2009,	  p.	  2.	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Role	  of	  State	  Agencies	  in	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  Upanga	  The	  redevelopment	  of	  Upanga	  reveals	  a	  plural	  governance	  regime	  comprised	  of	  two	  layers	  of	   competing	   redevelopment	   guidelines.	   The	   two	   layers	   include	  MLHHSD’s	   projection	   of	  national	   power	   and	   parastatals’	   leveraging	   private	   land	   ownership.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  MLHHSD	   attempts	   to	   project	   power	   through	   redevelopment	   plans.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  parastatals	  engage	   in	  speculative	   JVs	  with	  private	  developers.	  MLHHSD	  owns	  few	  parcels	  so	  their	  regulatory	  goals	  do	  not	  align	  with	  the	  land	  rich	  parastatals	  attempting	  to	  increase	  cash	   flow	   and	   leverage	   land	   value.	   Redevelopment	   outcomes	   are	   thus	   based	   on	   the	  financial	  and	  political	  position	  of	  an	   individual	  agency	   instead	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  public	  plan	   or	   local	   demand.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   plural	   governance	   regime	   lacking	   in	   clarity,	  incentivizing	  speculative	  development	  and	  creating	  an	  informal	  land	  use	  plan.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  clarity	  is	  also	  an	  advantage	  for	  real	  estate	  investors.	  MLHHSD	   created	   one	   layer	   of	   governance	   reflected	   in	   a	   2004	   redevelopment	   plan	   for	  Upanga.	  The	  plan	  suggested	  minimum	  height	  requirements	  on	  blocks	  of	  parcels	  throughout	  Upanga	  (Figure	  27).	  The	  plan	  justifies	  minimum	  height	  requirements	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  address	  land	  use	  inefficiencies	  indicated	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  low-­‐density	  CBD.153	  The	  plans’	  simplicity	  and	  small	  geographic	  coverage	  is	  also	  a	  response	  to	  the	  previous	  citywide	  planning	  failures	  (Armstrong	   1987).154	  The	   citywide	   plans	   depended	   on	   large-­‐scale	   investment	   in	   building	  construction,	  services	  and	  infrastructure	  (Halla	  &	  Mang’waru	  2004;	  Briggs	  &	  Yeboah	  2001;	  Ndezi	  2007;	  Nnkya	  1999b).	  MLHHSD	  and	  the	  three	  municipal	  governments	  that	  comprise	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  were	  expected	  to	  make	  these	  investments.	  Yet,	  large-­‐scale	  investment	  never	  materialized.	   The	   smaller	   redevelopment	   plan	   provided	   few	   promises	   of	   improved	  infrastructure	  or	  additional	  spending	  by	  municipal	  or	  national	  authorities	  (MLHHSD	  &	  Ilala	  Municipality	  2009).	  In	  the	  redevelopment	  plan,	  MLHHSD	  and	  the	  Municipality	  of	  Ilala	  only	  had	   to	   maintain	   open	   spaces,	   provide	   building	   permits	   and	   ensure	   that	   construction	  projects	  complied	  with	  the	  broad	  guidelines.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHHSD,	  on	  July	  15th	  2012.	  154	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHHSD,	  on	  July	  15th	  2012.	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Figure	  27:	  Upanga	  Planned	  vs	  Actual	  Redevelopment,	  2013	  
	  Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork,	  MLHHSD	  Redevelopment	  Plan	  2004,	  Open	  Street	  Map	  In	  reality,	  the	  redevelopment	  plan	  is	  more	  of	  a	  rhetorical	  device	  than	  a	  planning	  tool.	  The	  redevelopment	   plan	   depends	   on	   the	   municipality’s	   motivation	   and	   capacity	   to	   monitor	  construction	  projects.	  Yet,	  MLHHSD’s	  overrides	  the	  municipality’s	  planning	  power	  creating	  a	  disincentive	  to	  monitor	  compliance	  with	  the	  redevelopment	  plan.	  For	   instance	   in	  1999,	  the	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   City	   Council	   produced	   a	   new	   master	   plan	   known	   as	   the	   Sustainable	  Urban	   Development	   Plan	   1999–2010,	   which	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   MLHHSD	   (Bersaglio	   &	  Kepe	  2013).	  In	  place	  of	  the	  City	  Council	  plan	  MLHHSD	  announced	  that	  they	  would	  produce	  the	  master	  plan.	  The	  new	  MLHHSD	  plan	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  approved	  and	  as	  a	  result	  the	  most	  recent	   official	  master	   plan	   dates	   back	   to	   1979	  when	   the	   city	   had	   about	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	  population	   it	   has	   today	   (URT	   2013b).	   Officially	   the	   planning	   process	   endows	   the	  municipalities	   with	   planning	   capabilities	   without	   ensuring	   decision-­‐making	   or	  implementation	  capacity.	  Municipal	  officials	  do	  not	  monitor	  development	   therefore	  often	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developers	  report	  one	  plan	  to	  MLHHSD	  and	  then	  develop	  something	  different.155	  Without	  a	  strong	   municipality,	   MLHHSD	   can	   make	   sweeping	   plans	   and	   pronouncements	   about	  improvements	   in	   Upanga.	   These	   pronouncements	   provide	   evidence	   to	   parliament	   and	  voters	   that	   MLHHSD	   is	   overcoming	   corruption	   and	   improving	   urban	   management.	  MLHHSD’s	  makes	  claims	  about	  plans	  to	  prosecute	  project	  owners	  that	  do	  not	  follow	  zoning	  plans	   or	   obtain	   proper	   permits,	   but	   to	   date	   there	   is	   limited	   follow	   through.156	  Although,	  MLHHSD’s	   legally	   possesses	   planning	   jurisdiction	   in	   practice	   MLHHSD’s	   role	   remains	   a	  grey	  area	  full	  of	  rhetoric	  about	  improvement	  and	  efficiency	  while	  minimizing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  municipality.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   redevelopment	   plan	   offered	   MLHSSD	   a	   means	   to	   claim	   they	   are	  supporting	   the	   private	   sector	   and	   encouraging	   redevelopment	   of	   the	   deteriorating	   city	  center	  in	  the	  face	  of	  criticism	  from	  many	  fronts.	  A	  speech	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Mizengo	  Pinda	  at	   a	   ceremony	  marking	   the	   start	   of	   construction	   of	   the	   twenty	   five	   story	   Uhuru	  Heights	  residential	  building	  sheds	  light	  on	  how	  central	  government	  actors	  use	  the	  rhetorical	  tool	  of	  enabling	   private	   sector	   developers	   (URT	   2008).	   In	   the	   speech	   he	   lays	   out	   the	   role	   of	  redevelopment	  as	  follows:	  
“Private	   Sector	   contribution	   to	   the	   investment	   in	   High-­‐Storey	   Buildings	  
construction	  is	  crucial	  and	  of	  big	  value	  in	  improving	  the	  environment	  of	  our	  Cities	  
and	   the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	   twenty	   five	   storey	  building	   like	   this,	  not	  only	  will	  
reduce	  the	  problem	  of	  residential	  and	  business	  houses	  upon	  its	  completion,	  but	  also	  
will	   increase	   employment	   opportunities	   during	   its	   construction	   and	   even	   after	   it	  
has	  been	  completed.	  (URT	  2008)”	  He	   then	   claims	   private	   sector	   investment	   is	   nurtured	   by	   MLHSSD	   and	   other	   central	  government	  policies.	  Meanwhile,	  other	   issues	   in	   the	  construction	  sector,	  such	  as	  building	  collapses,	   are	   due	   to	   negligence	   by	   regulatory	   boards	   and	   other	   construction	   industry	  professionals.	   The	   speech	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   central	   government	   actors	   use	  redevelopment	  to	  claim	  legitimacy	  and	  support	  for	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  redevelopment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  Interview	  with	  Mathayo	  Mwakagamba,	  Prinicpal	  Architect	  at	  Mwaka	  Arch	  Consult,	  May	  7th	  2012.	  156	  Sylivester	  Ernest.	  “Tibaijuka	  Issues	  Yet	  Another	  Threat”.	  The	  Citizen,	  September	  8,	  2011.	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plan	  gives	  MLHHSSD	  an	  opportunity	  to	  reinterpret	  a	  global	  concept	  of	  redevelopment	  for	  local	   use	   without	   having	   to	   make	   financial	   commitments.	   Yet,	   the	   plan	   lacks	   a	   local	  economic	   justification,	   description	   of	   local	   government	   responsibilities,	   or	   infrastructure	  upgrades.	  Redevelopment	  offers	  a	  political	  opportunity	   to	  give	   the	  appearance	  of	   change	  and	  a	  dynamic	  private	  sector	  partnership.	  Parastatals	   create	   a	   second	   governance	   layer	   because	   they	   are	   independent	   of	  MLHHSD	  and	  the	  municipalities.	  Parastatals	  have	  planning	  control	  over	  their	  plots	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  issue	  building	  permits.	  In	  Upanga,	  parastatals	  became	  land	  rich	  through	  privatization	  and	  the	  1999	  Land	  Act	  because	  they	  could	  use	  land	  for	  commercial	  development.	  	  As	  one	  of	  Dar’s	   first	   neighborhoods,	   land	   parcels	   and	   buildings	   in	   Upanga	   were	   clearly	   identified	  during	  the	  colonial	  period	  (Brennan	  &	  Burton	  2007).	  During	  Ujamaa,	  much	  of	  the	  property	  in	   Upanga	   was	   nationalized	   vesting	   control	   in	   central	   government	   agencies.	   Parastatals	  gained	   control	   of	   30	   percent	   of	   the	   properties	   in	   Upanga	   (MLHHSD	  &	   Ilala	  Municipality	  2009).	   Through	   the	   Building	   Acquisition	   Act	   the	   NHC	   acquired	   a	   large	   number	   of	  properties	   (Komu	   2011a).	   Through	   privatization,	   NHC	   maintained	   ownership	   of	   their	  nationalized	   apartment	   and	   office	   buildings	   as	   well	   as	   a	   few	   undeveloped	   land	   parcels	  (Kironde	   1992;	   Hussey	   1997;	   Komu	   2011a).	   NHC’s	   Upanga	   properties	   account	   for	   38	  percent	   of	   the	   NHC’s	   national	   revenue	   and	   5,000	   tenants.157	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Tanzania	  Building	  Agency	  (TBA)	  was	  endowed	  with	  control	  of	  single-­‐family	  homes	  occupied	  by	  civil	  servants.158	  TBA	  thus	  had	  a	  large	  portfolio	  of	  small	  plots	  making	  them	  a	  significant	  player	  in	  the	   property	  market.	  Other	   parastatals	   gained	   control	   of	   individual	   plots	   throughout	   the	  neighborhood.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   increase	   cash	   flow	   parastatals	   leveraged	   high	   value	  properties	   to	   reposition	   rapidly	   deteriorating	   buildings	   in	   Upanga.	   The	   NHC	   and	   TBA	  lacked	   consistent	   and	   significant	   sources	   of	   income	   due	   to	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   include	  building	   deterioration,	   below	   market	   rents	   and	   difficult	   to	   evict	   renters	   many	   years	   in	  arrears	  (Komu	  2011a).159	  Privatization	  provided	  the	  option	  to	  leverage	  land	  value	  through	  JVs	   to	   redevelop	   dilapidated	   low-­‐rise	   buildings	   as	   modern	   cash	   flowing	   high-­‐rises.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  157	  Interview	  with	  Ben	  Kilimba,	  Upanga	  Regional	  Manager	  at	  NHC,	  on	  March	  3rd	  2012.	  158	  Interview	  with	  Elias	  Tamiro,	  Director	  of	  Real	  Estate	  at	  TBA,	  August	  15,	  2012.	  159	  Interview	  with	  Hamad	  Abdallah,	  Director	  of	  Property	  Management	  at	  NHC,	  on	  June	  26th	  2012.	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Redevelopment	  also	  offered	  a	  means	   to	  remove	   tenants	  paying	  below	  market	   rents	  or	   in	  many	   cases	   no	   rent	   at	   all.160	  JV	   redevelopment	   provided	   an	   opportunity	   to	   offload	   the	  management	   issues	   with	   current	   buildings,	   increase	   cash	   flow,	   and	   establish	   financial	  independence	   from	   the	   central	   government.	  NHC	   and	  TBA	  pursued	   JV’s	  with	   developers	  who	   would	   present	   deals	   based	   on	   tenders	   for	   redevelopment.161	  In	   all	   instances	   the	  developer	  financed	  the	  construction	  costs.	  	  Development	  of	  the	  Palm	  Residency	  epitomizes	  the	  governance	  issues	  resulting	  from	  plural	  governance	  regimes	  in	  Upanga.	  TBA	  entered	  into	  a	  JV	  with	  Royal	  Orchard	  Inn	  in	  2006.	  The	  JV	  concerned	  the	  redevelopment	  of	  two	  plots	  adjacent	  to	  Ukulu,	  the	  president’s	  residence.	  TBA	   granted	   a	   building	   permit	   without	   consulting	   the	   municipality	   or	   MLHHSD.	   The	  resulting	  building	  has	  two	  18	  story	  towers	  with	  108	  residential	  units,	  a	  pool,	  a	  gym	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  small	  shops	  on	  the	  ground	  floor.	  When	  construction	  topped	  out	  in	  2011,	  it	  raised	  questions	   about	   security	   and	   the	   development	   process.	   The	   Ilala	  Municipality	   ordered	   a	  halt	   on	   construction.	   Construction	   was	   delayed	   as	   the	   press	   and	   public	   expressed	   their	  outrage,	   but	   then	   the	   building	   was	   completed,	   residents	   moved	   in	   and	   sales	   continued.	  Eventually	  the	  Municipality	  sued	  the	  former	  director	  of	  TBA	  for	  issuing	  the	  building	  permit.	  
162	  The	   Municipality	   claimed	   that	   the	   Palm	   Residency	   violated	   the	   2007	   Urban	   Planning	  Act’s	   requirement	   that	   a	   change	   of	   use	  must	   obtain	   approval	   from	   the	  Municipality	   and	  MLHHSD.	  The	   case	  was	  decided	   in	   favor	   of	   the	  Municipality	  with	   the	   judge	   ordering	   the	  removal	  of	   twelve	  stories.	  163	  The	  efficacy	  of	   the	  demolition	  ruling	  remains	  unclear	  due	   to	  complexities	   in	   the	  sales	  process.164	  Royal	  Orchard	   Inn	  Ltd	  sold	  85	  percent	  of	   the	  units.165	  The	  sales	   took	  place	  before	   the	  building	  was	  complete	  guaranteeing	  profits.	  Yet,	   the	  TBA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  Interview	  with	  Hamad	  Abdallah,	  Director	  of	  Property	  Management	  at	  NHC,	  on	  June	  26th	  2012.	  161	  Interviews	  with:	  Elias	  Tamiro,	  Director	  of	  Real	  Estate	  at	  TBA,	  August	  15,	  2012;	  Hamad	  Abdallah,	  Director	  of	  Property	  Management	  at	  NHC,	  on	  June	  26th	  2012.	  162	  Faustine	  Kapama.	  “TBA	  Officials	  in	  Court	  Over	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  Building”.	  Daily	  News,	  July	  18,	  2013,	  p.	  2.	  163	  Bernard	  James.	  “Tall	  Building	  a	  Threat	  to	  Ikulu”.	  The	  Citizen,	  August	  7,	  2011,	  p.	  1.	  164	  The	  details	  of	  the	  project	  confirmed	  with	  a	  property	  manager	  and	  representative	  for	  the	  private	  developer	  who	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  for	  personal	  safety	  reasons.	  165	  ibid	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was	   not	   party	   to	   these	   sales	   because	   title	   was	   registered	   with	   the	   MLHHSD.166 	  The	  reporting	  process	  gave	  the	  developer	  the	  chance	  to	  collect	  revenue	  without	  distributions	  to	  the	   TBA.	   The	   developer	   therefore	   claimed	   that	   the	   building	   is	   legal	   and	  will	   bot	   be	   torn	  down.	   The	   developer	   had	   cover	   from	   the	   illegal	   construction	   permits	   and	   an	   opaque	  business	   structure.	   The	   project	   demonstrates	   the	   competition	   between	   various	   state	  agencies,	  the	  use	  of	  informal	  practices	  by	  private	  developers	  and	  the	  power	  of	  elites.	  	  
Figure	  28:	  Palm	  Residency	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  March	  2012	  Current	   redevelopment	  affirms	   that	   there	   is	  no	  overarching	  vision	   for	   the	  neighborhood.	  Instead	  redevelopment	  reflects	  a	  complex	  structure	  of	  governing	  agencies	  with	  competing	  sources	   of	   financing	   and	   regulation.	   Various	   government	   agencies	   dominate	   the	   land	  market	   creating	   regulatory	   plurality	   and	   power	   struggles	   (Nnkya	   1999a).	   NHC,	   TBA,	   the	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municipality	  and	  MLHSSD	  are	  competing	  for	  control	  over	  the	  future	  of	  the	  city.	  The	  result	  is	  institutional	  competition	  in	  property	  markets	  instead	  of	  private	  sector	  driven	  development.	  Redevelopment	   in	   Upanga	   demonstrates	   an	   unregulated	   race	   to	   finish	   modular	   urban	  forms	   that	   provide	   short-­‐term	   profit	  maximization	   for	   a	   few	   elites	   without	   reference	   to	  local	   needs	   and	   rules.	   Many	   of	   the	   new	   projects	   are	   on	   unpaved	   roads	   and	   in	   close	  proximity	   to	   one	   another	   so	   that	   the	   airflow	   in	   the	   neighborhood	   is	   limited.	   Community	  services	  and	  retail	  are	  lacking	  from	  parking	  provision,	  to	  green	  space,	  to	  grocery	  stores,	  to	  water	  and	  electrical	  system	  upgrading.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  each	  of	  the	  buildings	  provides	  its	  own	  services	  and	  infrastructure	  much	  like	  an	  informal	  development.	  Modular	  urbanism	  led	  to	  haphazard	  development	  without	  reference	  to	  local	  needs.	  Networked	  webs:	  Private	  Sector	  Redevelopment	  Private	  sector	  projects	  leverage	  the	  regulatory	  plurality	  created	  by	  government	  agencies	  to	  maximize	  profits.	  Private	  sector	  developers	  are	  sophisticated,	  collusive,	  and	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  network	  of	  business	  elites.	  These	  developers	  continue	  informal	  practices	  including	  changing	  building	  designs,	  building	  on	  untitled	  land,	  ignoring	  construction	  standards,	  using	  informal	  contractors,	  selling	  unregistered	  units	  and	  misreporting	  sales	  prices.	  These	  tactics	  are	  made	  possible	  by	  ambiguous	  governance	  and	  limited	  incentives	  to	  enforce	  regulations.	  For	   instance,	   municipal	   officials	   do	   not	   enforce	   of	   floor	   to	   area	   ratios,	   setbacks,	   road	  reserves,	   or	   open	   spaces.167	  Several	   families	   with	   businesses	   associated	   with	   the	   port	  redeveloped	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  parastatal	  plots	  in	  Upanga.	  These	  families	  set	  up	  individual	  holding	   companies	   for	   each	   building	   obscuring	   their	   direct	   involvement.168	  As	   a	   result,	  business	  elites	  captured	  the	  benefits	  of	   joint	  ventures	  by	  retaining	  most	  of	   the	  profit	  and	  building	  larger	  buildings	  than	  agreed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Interview	  with	  lawyer	  for	  Estim	  Construction,	  June	  8,	  2012.	  	  168	  Interviews	  on	   June	  27th	   2012	   and	   July	   30th	   2012	  with	  Andrew	  A	  Rugarabamu,	  NHC	   Joint	  Venture	   Legal	  Officer	  and	  Lussagana	  Lussagana,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Project	  Manager.	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The	   redevelopment	  projects	   are	   largely	   financed	   through	  a	   combination	  of	  pre-­‐sales	   and	  access	   to	   capital	   from	   other	   business	   ventures.169	  The	   largest	   commercial	   real	   estate	  lenders	   indicated	   that	   their	  clients	  rarely	  placed	  debt	  on	  projects	  but	   in	  some	  cases	   took	  out	  a	  loan	  to	  reduce	  government	  investigations	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  project	  financing.170	  Loans	  did	  not	  exceed	  20	  percent	  of	  project	  costs	  and	  lenders	  used	  the	  customers	  other	  assets	  as	  collateral.	  In	  other	  words,	  banks	  did	  not	  underwrite	  the	  value	  of	  the	  land	  parcel.	  Pre-­‐sales	  provided	   the	  majority	   of	   construction	   financing.	   Pre-­‐sales	   reduces	   developers’	   financing	  and	  sell	  out	  risks.	  Pre-­‐sales	  create	  informal	  space	  for	  developers	  to	  gauge	  project	  interest	  without	  registering	  sales	  with	  government	  entities	  and	  avoid	  the	  formal	  banking	  system.171	  Sales	  managers	  claimed	  that	  many	  buildings	  had	  secondary	  markets	  in	  pre-­‐sales	  where	  an	  individual	   unit	   would	   trade	   two	   or	   three	   times	   before	   the	   project	   completed	  with	   large	  price	   increases	   on	   each	   sale.172	  The	   pre-­‐sales	   are	   all	   cash	   transactions	   with	   few	   of	   the	  owners	  expecting	   to	   live	   in	   the	  unit.	  These	  buildings	  reflect	   investment	  opportunities	   for	  wealthy	   individuals.	   Anecdotal	   evidence	   indicated	   that	   the	   cash	   for	   purchase	   came	   from	  dubious	  sources.173	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  169	  I	  conducted	   interviews	  with	   fifteen	   local	  developers	  between	  February	  and	  August	  2012	  whose	  names	  I	  keep	   anonymous	   for	   their	   own	   safety.	   I	   also	   conducted	   interviews	   with	   twelve	   property	   managers	   who	  confirmed	  management	  practices	  but	  whose	  names	  I	  will	  also	  keep	  anonymous	  for	  their	  safety.	  170 	  Interviews	   with	   the	   following:	   Arun	   Chauhan,	   Senior	   Vice	   President	   at	   Bank	   M,	   Hasnain	   Dinani,	  Relationship	   Officer	   at	   I&M	   Bank,	   Oscar	   Mgaya,	   Chief	   Operating	   Officer	   at	   Tanzania	   Mortgage	   Refinance	  Company	   Ltd,	   Aaron	  Henry	  Mrina,	   Credit	   Analysis	   Officer	   at	   Azania	   Bank,	   Rosemary	   Ihadike,	   Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CBA,	  Jane	  Christopher,	  Relationship	  Manager	  at	  CRDB	  Bank.	  171	  Interviews	  with	  developers	  and	  property	  managers.	  172	  I	  found	  evidence	  in	  the	  sales	  database	  of	  incomplete	  units	  for	  sale	  at	  prices	  above	  initial	  asking	  prices	  but	  the	   observations	  were	   not	   large	   enough	   to	   confirm	   the	   average	   increase	   in	   prices	   or	   the	   degree	   to	  which	  trading	   occurred.	   The	   original	   observations	   about	   secondary	  market	   trading	   came	   from	   an	   interview	  with	  Murtaza	  Adamjee,	  CEO	  of	  Global	  Land	  Solutions,	  March	  16,	  2012.	  	  173	  I	  conducted	   interviews	  with	   fifteen	   local	  developers	  between	  February	  and	  August	  2012	  whose	  names	  I	  keep	  anonymous	   for	   their	  own	  safety	  but	  all	  mentioned	   that	   there	  was	  a	   link	  between	   their	  developments	  and	  “funny	  money”	  that	  buyers	  used	  to	  purchase.	  Only	  five	  of	  the	  developers	  were	  willing	  to	  admit	  that	  their	  own	  sources	  of	  capital	  might	  also	  include	  funny	  money.	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Private	   development	   companies	   in	   Upanga	   are	   spider	  webs	   of	   entities	  with	  multi-­‐sector	  functions	   across	   several	   countries.	   The	   web	   of	   entities	   seamlessly	   moves	   cash	   between	  businesses	   within	   Tanzania	   and	   abroad.	   The	   movement	   is	   undetected	   by	   government	  authorities	   because	   the	   companies	   are	   effectively	   multinational	   corporations	   shifting	  profits	  within	  holding	  companies.	  For	  instance,	  the	  logistics	  arm	  of	  the	  business	  will	  import	  and	  then	  sell	  construction	  materials	  to	  the	  developer	  at	  either	  under	  or	  over	  priced	  costs,	  depending	  on	  the	  direction	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  move	  capital	  (Boyce	  &	  Ndikumana	  2012).	  The	  opaque	  structure	  also	  gives	  access	  to	  buyers’	  capital	  that	  may	  be	  outside	  Tanzania	  without	  appearing	   on	   local	   records.	   For	   instance,	   one	   developer	   reported	   that	   he	   used	   a	   bank	  account	  in	  New	  Jersey	  to	  take	  deposits	  for	  project	  sales	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  which	  allowed	  the	  full	  price	  and	  the	  individual	  to	  remain	  obscured.174	  Then	  the	  individual	  has	  a	  clean	  source	  of	  capital,	   which	   can	   be	   locally	   accessed	   through	   rental	   streams	   or	   sales	   value	   without	  question.	   The	   company	   structure	   creates	   the	   appearance	   of	   local	   investment	   and	  compliance	  with	   formal	   rules	   but	   allows	   companies	   to	   engage	   in	   informal	   practices	   and	  capture	  benefits.	  The	  development	  of	  Zahra	  Towers	  provides	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  private	  project	  development.	  The	  project	  is	  a	  1999	  joint	  venture	  between	  Sarah	  Investment	  Limited	  and	  the	  NHC	  (Figure	  29).	   Per	   the	   standard	   PPP	   agreement,	   NHC	   provided	   the	   land	   and	   the	   developer	   would	  manage	   construction	   and	   sales.	   The	   resulting	   10-­‐story	   project,	   Zahra	   Towers,	   has	   two	  floors	  of	  retail	  and	  54	  apartments.	  The	  buy	  back	  period	  for	  NHC	  expired	  in	  2010	  thus	  the	  building	   and	   underlying	   land	   is	   75%	   owned	   by	   Sarah	   Investment	   Ltd,	   which	   is	   in	   turn	  owned	  by	  Zahra	  Development.	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  Interview	  conducted	  on	  April	  20th	  2012	  with	  developer	  whose	  name	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  for	  personal	  safety.	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Figure	  29:	  Zahra	  Towers	  ownership	  network
	  Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork,	  Bank	  M	  Annual	  reports,	  project	  websites
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  The	   development	   company,	   Zahra	   Development,	   is	   part	   of	   a	   networked	   structure	   of	  other	  real	  estate	  assets	  and	  businesses	  across	  several	  sectors.	  Most	  of	  the	  15	  assets	  are	  high-­‐rises	  built	  in	  the	  last	  10	  years.	  The	  portfolio	  is	  geographically	  concentrated	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  but	  diversified	  across	  all	  subsectors	  of	  the	  real	  estate	  markets.	  The	  portfolio	  is	   tied	   together	   through	  holding	   companies	   that	   insulates	   and	  obscures	  owners.	  Note	  that	  the	  ownership	  structure	  includes	  PPPs	  with	  NHC	  and	  TBA.	  The	  holding	  companies	  engage	   in	   businesses	   ranging	   from	   safari	   tours,	   to	   construction	  materials,	   to	   textiles	  manufacturing,	   to	   car	   imports.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Africarrier	   Group	   holds	   Zahra	  Development.	   Africarrier	   began	   as	   an	   automobile	   import	   export	   company	   in	   1976.175	  Through	   Africarrier,	   Zahra	   Developers	   has	   access	   to	   financing	   through	   Bank	   M.	  Between	  2007	  and	  2013,	  commercial	  real	  estate	  accounted	  for	  25	  percent	  of	  Bank	  M’s	  lending	   compared	   to	   5	   percent	   of	   CRDB	   and	   NMB’s	   loan	   portfolios. 176 	  Bank	   M’s	  construction	   lending	   is	   twice	  the	  size	  of	  either	  CRDB’s	  or	  NMB’s.	  Bank	  M	  underwrites	  property	   development	   on	   a	   much	   largest	   scale	   than	   other	   major	   banks	   because	   its	  shareholders,	  like	  Africarrier,	  directly	  engage	  in	  property	  development.177	  The	  structure	  includes	   a	   construction	   company,	   Africonstruction,	   which	   keeps	   all	   flows	   of	   capital	  during	  the	  construction	  process	  within	  the	  Africarrier	  Group.	   In	  addition,	   through	  the	  Group	  4	  holding	  entity	  they	  have	  access	  to	  management,	  construction,	  engineering	  and	  architectural	   skills	   in	   India	   and	   Dubai.	   Opus	   and	   Trendmark	   Property	   engage	   in	  activities	   ranging	   from	  master	   developer	   to	   road	   construction.	   Modular	   projects	   are	  transferred	   from	   other	   contexts	   via	   these	   master	   developers. 178 	  The	   names	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Interview	   conducted	   on	   April	   20th	   2012	   with	   developer	   whose	   name	   will	   remain	   anonymous	   for	  personal	  safety.	  176	  The	  data	  relies	  on	  annual	  reports	   from	  each	  bank	  where	   they	  account	   for	   loans	   to	  construction	  and	  real	  estate.	  177	  Mike	   Mande	   and	   Wilfred	   Edwin.	   “Tanzania:	   Dar	   Seeks	   Auditor	   Over	   BOT	   Towers	   Scam.”	   The	   East	  
African,	  March	  31st,	  2008,	  pp.29–31.	  178	  I	   asked	   questions	   about	   architects	   in	   all	   developer	   interviews	   but	   for	   their	   own	   safety	   I	   will	   not	  mention	  their	  names	  here.	  I	  confirmed	  the	  process	  with	  several	  local	  architects	  and	  engineers	  including	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architectural	  style	  reference	  development	  in	  Mumbai	  and	  Dubai	  resulting	  in	  residential	  towers	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   that	   appear	   out	   of	   place.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   complex	  structure	   demonstrates	   private	   development	   expertise	   but	   on	   the	   other	   that	   the	  redevelopment	  projects	   are	  neither	  developing	   local	   capacity	   nor	   responding	   to	   local	  demands.	  Zahra	   Developers	   demonstrates	   an	   investment	   circuit	   between	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   South	   Asia,	   where	   trading	   through	   the	   port	   provides	   business	  connections	  and	  access	  to	  capital.179	  The	  connection	  to	   international	   flows	  of	  capital	   is	  uniquely	  tied	  to	  port	  businesses	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  instead	  of	  improved	  financial	  markets.	  These	  projects	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  property	  market	  could	  be	  a	  means	  to	  clean	  “funny	  money”,	  yet	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  the	  market	  share	  of	  projects	  engaging	  in	  cleaning	  money.	   Interviews	  confirmed	  the	  steps	   in	  the	  process	  (Unger	  et	  al.	  2010;	  OECD	  2008;	  GIABA	   2008;	   Financial	   Crimes	   Enforcement	   Network	   2006).	   Through	   the	   Group	   4	  holdings	   entity	   Zahra	   has	   access	   to	   capital	   flows	   in	  Dubai	   and	   India.	   Access	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	   easily	   transfer	   funds	   in	   and	   out	   of	   Tanzania.	   Cash	   flow	   stays	   undetected	  within	  the	  web	  of	  companies.	  The	  developer	  mentioned	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  where	  buyers	  get	  their	  cash	  but	  they	  do	  have	  bank	  accounts	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Middle	  East	  which	  allow	  the	  buyers	  to	  subvert	   the	  Tanzanian	  banking	  system.	  They	  approximated	  that	  a	  large	  share	  of	  buyers	  illegally	  obtained	  their	  funds.	  Investors	  operate	  outside	  the	  formal	  banking	  system,	  because	  ownership	  doesn’t	  require	  proof	  of	  wealth.	  	  	  Zahra	   Developers’	   structure	   reveals	   a	   sophisticated	   business	   with	   redevelopment	  capacity	   limiting	   competition.	  The	   interlocking	   structure	  of	   the	   companies	   that	   relate	  back	  to	  the	  Zahra	  Towers	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  small	  group	  of	  local	  elites	   controls	   the	   urban	   development	   process.	   It	   is	   difficult	   for	   new	   development	  companies	   to	   break	   into	   the	   market	   because	   so	   much	   of	   the	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  the	   following	   interviews:	   Philip	   Makota,	   Principal	   at	   UNDI	   Engineering	   Consultants,	   August	   7th	   2012;	  Salim	  Zagar,	  Chairman	  at	  Moladi	  Tanzania,	  June	  7th	  2012.	  179	  I	  conducted	  interviews	  with	  fifteen	  local	  developers	  between	  February	  and	  August	  2012	  whose	  names	  I	  keep	  anonymous	  for	  their	  own	  safety.	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information	   is	   controlled	   by	   a	   few	   networked	   businesses.	   The	   lack	   of	   competition	  reinforces	   opaque	   transactions	   and	   encourages	   informal	   practices.	   The	   structure	   of	  private	  real	  estate	  entities	  leads	  to	  short	  term	  profit	  goals	  over	  long	  term	  planning	  and	  investment	   goals	   that	   underpin	   the	   enabling	   markets	   theory	   as	   well	   as	   most	   urban	  planning	  programs.	  	  Redevelopment	  provided	  a	  glut	  of	  housing	  catering	   to	  high-­‐income	  residents,	  without	  associated	  benefits	   for	  other	   income	  groups.	  The	  dilapidated	  state	  and	   low	  density	  of	  many	  buildings	  offered	  many	  opportunities	  for	  redevelopment	  to	  investors	  with	  access	  to	   cash,	   information	   about	   properties,	   and	   construction	   materials.	   As	   early	   projects	  successfully	  sold	  out	  more	  investors	  searched	  for	  projects	  in	  the	  neighborhood.	  Private	  developers	   capture	   redevelopment	   benefits	   by	   leveraging	   cash	   flow	   from	   other	  businesses.	  Buyers	  and	  renters	  never	  directly	  deal	  with	  the	  landlord.	  They	  rent	  through	  management	  companies.	  The	  building	  developer	  often	  directly	  owns	   the	  management	  companies.	   That	   is,	   one	   of	   the	   major	   financial	   incentives	   for	   developers	   is	   that	   they	  collect	  fees	  for	  management	  services,	  but	  do	  not	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  ownership.	  The	  current	  system	   offers	   an	   opportunity	   to	   launder	  money	   obtained	   illegally	   by	   underreporting	  sales	   prices,	   over	   reporting	   construction	   costs.	   Investment	   in	   real	   estate	   offers	   an	  intermediary	  step	  in	  the	  capital	  flight	  process.	  Redevelopment	  decreasing	  affordability:	  community	  effects	  Over	   the	   last	   decade	   housing	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   became	   increasingly	   unaffordable.	  Between	  2001	  and	  2010,	  rents	  across	  Tanzania	  increased	  9	  percent	  compared	  to	  a	  270	  percent	   increase	   for	  middle-­‐income	   residents	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   (Bank	   of	   Tanzania	   &	  URT	  2011).	  The	   increase	   in	   rents	   compares	   to	  an	   increase	   in	   consumer	  prices	  of	  214	  percent.	  Thus	  rents	  rose	  faster	  than	  other	  consumer	  goods	  over	  the	  last	  decade.180	  The	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  Emmanuel	  Onyango.	  “Dar’s	  rent	  nightmare.”	  This	  Day,	  March	  3,	  2013,	  pp.16–18.	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increase	   in	  rents	   is	   important	   in	  Upanga	  where	  completed	  projects	  are	  on	  average	  80	  percent	  occupied	  by	  renters.181	  	  In	  Upanga,	  sales	  prices	  and	  rental	  rates	  increased	  over	  the	  last	  decade.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2002,	  a	  3	  bedroom	  unit	  advertised	  sales	  price	  ranged	  from	  $13,000	  to	  $60,000.182	  By	  2012,	   sales	   prices	   range	   from	   $250,000	   to	   $300,000	   for	   an	   average	   quality	   new	   3	  bedroom	   unit.	   The	   price	   increase	   is	   striking	   given	   that	   in	   2007	   the	   average	  monthly	  income	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  was	  $174	  (URT	  2009).	  Property	  owners	  passed	  on	  the	  price	  increase	   to	   renters	   as	   rental	   rates	   increased	  more	   rapidly	   than	   sales	  prices.	  Between	  2000	   and	   2012	   average	   rent	   increased	   from	   $600	   per	   month	   to	   $1,800	   per	   month	  (Figure	  30).	  Rental	  rates	  peaked	  at	  $2,000	  per	  month	  in	  2008.	  The	  peak	  correlates	  with	  the	  completion	  of	  many	  construction	  projects.	  The	  falling	  rental	  rates	  indicate	  that	  high-­‐end	   units	   are	   over	   supplied.	   Rents	   in	   Upanga	   grew	   faster	   than	   the	   Peninsula,	   the	  wealthiest	   neighborhood	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   and	   the	   City	   Center,	   a	   middle	   class	  neighborhood	   (Figure	   31).	   The	   rental	   growth	   index	   in	   Upanga	   was	   well	   above	   the	  Peninsula,	  while	  the	  city	  center	  rental	  growth	  was	  generally	  lower	  but	  began	  catching	  up	  with	  Upanga.	  These	  trends	  indicate	  that	  the	  upgraded	  housing	  market	  in	  Upanga	  is	  only	  available	  to	  the	  wealthiest	  residents	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  Interviews	  with	  property	  sales	  teams	  including:	  Saleh	  Ally	  on	  March	  3rd	  2012;	  Sultani	  Mehta	  on	  March	  15th	  2012;	  Alibaba	  Singh	  on	  April	  24th2012,	  Sulieman	  Dualeh	  on	  April	  27th	  2012;	  Sulieman	  Adamjee	  on	  May	  2nd	  2012.	  182	  I	  gathered	  data	  for	  the	  following	  analysis	  from	  a	  free	  weekly	  newspaper,	  Advertising	  Dar,	  which	  began	  listing	  properties	  for	  rent	  and	  sale	  in	  1999.	  The	  listings	  provide	  detail	  on	  size,	  amenities,	  neighborhood,	  and	  price.	  Advertising	  Dar	  does	  not	  charge	  to	  include	  listings	  which	  are	  now	  in	  print	  and	  on-­‐line.	  
	  	   126	  
Figure	  30:	  Average	  Rental	  Rate	  in	  three	  Dar	  Neighbourhoods,	  USD	  2001	  
	  
	  Source:	  Author’s	  own	  calculations	  from	  Advertising	  Dar	  postings	  
Figure	  31:	  Rental	  Rate	  Index,	  2002	  =	  1.00	  
	  
	  Source:	  Author’s	  own	  calculations	  from	  Advertising	  Dar	  postings	  Government	  agencies	  and	  the	  NHC	  shed	  their	  mandate	  to	  improve	  living	  conditions	  and	  opportunities	  through	  redevelopment.	  High-­‐end	  housing	  that	  is	  unaffordable	  to	  nearly	  all	  Tanzanians	  is	  problematic	  because	  it	  does	  not	  leave	  resources	  to	  respond	  to	  low	  and	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middle-­‐income	   demand.	   According	   to	   local	   real	   estate	   experts,	   the	   upper	   income	  residential	  market	  was	  saturated	  in	  2005	  (Knight	  Frank	  2005).	  Thus,	  new	  units	  in	  the	  central	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  do	  little	  to	  improve	  housing	  affordability	  or	  land	  use	  efficiency	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  	  
Satellite	  Cities	  in	  Kigamboni:	  Urban	  Transition	  	  The	  Kigamboni	  Area	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  experience	  with	  modular	  satellite	  city	   development	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam.	   Kigamboni	   includes	   five	   wards	   in	   the	   Temeke	  Municipality	  on	  the	  southern	  side	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  Until	  recently	  Kigamboni	  resembled	  a	  rural	  village	  with	  urbanites	  moving	  there	  only	  to	  work	  at	  an	  oil	  refinery	  (Mramba	  &	  Joseph	  2012).	  The	  area’s	  slow	  development	  was	  due	  to	  infrastructure	  constraints	  that	  made	  the	  area	  accessible	  only	  via	  ferry	  from	  the	  congested	  heart	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  or	  a	  long	  route	  around	  the	  Mgogoni	  Creek.183	  The	  area’s	  population	  steadily	  increased	  from	  24,000	  in	  1978	  to	  nearly	  140,000	  in	  2012	  without	  intense	  land	  pressure	  (NBS	  2012a;	  NBS	  1978b).	  As	  a	  result,	  between	  1978	  and	  2012	  much	  of	  Kigamboni	  transitioned	  from	  village	  to	  suburban	  conditions	  (Figure	  32).	  
Figure	  32:	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  Density	  Map,	  1988	  -­‐	  2012	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculation	  based	  Census	  data	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Saumu	  Mwalimu.	  “Kigamboni	  looking	  up	  and	  reaching	  out.”	  The	  Citizen,	  October	  6,	  2012,	  p.	  4.	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The	   land	   use	   history	   in	   Kigamboni	   facilitates	   large	   scale	   planning	   pronouncements	  because	  many	   areas	   are	   undeveloped	  without	   entrenched	  networks	   of	   powerbrokers	  blocking	   development.	  During	   the	   pre-­‐colonial	   and	   colonial	   periods	   outside	   the	   town	  center,	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  was	  sparsely	  populated	  due	  to	  harsh	  agricultural	  conditions	  and	  the	  slave	  trade	  (Briggs	  1991;	  Bryceson	  2010).	  During	  Ujamaa,	  villagization	  opened	  peri-­‐urban	   land	   to	   urbanites	   and	  new	  migrants	   (Kombe	  2005).	  As	  migrants	  moved	   to	   the	  fringe,	   the	   indigenous	   villagers	   charged	   fees	   for	   land	   use	   or	   outright	   sale,	   which	  minimized	  displacement,	  conflict	  or	  organized	  resistance	  to	  land	  conversion	  (Bryceson	  2010;	   Tripp	   1997).	   Thus,	   the	   villagization	   policy	   inadvertently	   led	   to	   the	  commercialization	   of	   land	   markets	   by	   giving	   outsiders	   access	   to	   use	   and	   ownership	  rights.	   Individuals	   invested	   in	   infrastructure	   and	   service	   provision	   creating	   urban	  neighborhoods	   out	   of	   the	   rural	   hinterland	   (Owens	   2010).	   The	   commercialization	  process	   created	   a	   large	   rental	   inventory	   developed	   through	   additions	   to	   houses	  completed	   as	   financing	   became	   available	   (Halla	   &	   Mang’waru	   2004).	   Improved	  transportation	  networks	   and	  better	   living	   conditions	  made	   inventory	   viable	   as	   rental	  properties.184	  	  Since	   2002,	   private	   investors	   developed	   four	   residential	   development	   projects.	   The	  house	   prices	   range	   from	   about	   $30,000	   to	   $250,000.185	  NHC	   developed	   one	   project	  targeted	   at	   low-­‐income	   families.	   NSSF	   developed	   another	   targeted	   at	   pension	   fund	  members.	   Mutual	   Developers	   Limited	   (MDL),	   a	   private	   development	   company,	  developed	  the	  other	  two	  projects.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  projects	  represent	  an	  increase	  in	  formal	  development	  with	  648	  units	  throughout	  the	  Kigamboni	  Area	  (Table	  10).	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   the	   results	   are	   paltry	   compared	   to	   population	   growth	   in	   the	   area.	   The	  projects	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  community	  amenities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  184	  The	   privatization	   of	   public	   transportation	   unleashed	   a	   well-­‐developed	  market	   for	   private	  mini-­‐bus	  services	   throughout	   the	   city.	   Although,	   the	   safety	   and	   comfort	   of	   the	   buses	   leaves	   room	   for	   huge	  improvements	  the	  routes	  serve	  the	  most	  distant	  parts	  of	  the	  city.	  185	  I	  conducted	  site	  visits	  as	  well	  as	  the	  following	  interviews:	  Cosmas	  Kimario,	  Director	  of	  Treasury	  and	  Corporate	  Strategy	  at	  NHC,	  Deo	  Mponeja,	  Mtoni	  Kijichi	  Project	  Manager	  at	  NSSF,	  and	  Maximillian	  Matala,	  CEO	  at	  MDL.	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Table	  10:	  Formal	  Residential	  Developments	  in	  Kigamboni	  












Kigamboni	  Estates	   NHC	   182	   min	   56	   	  $29,365	  	   	  $524	  	   	  $47,374	  	  max	   72	   	  $33,606	  	   	  $467	  	   	  $54,217	  	  
Mtoni	  Kijichi	   NSSF	   300	   min	   75	   	  $42,500	  	   	  $567	  	   	  $68,565	  	  max	   125	   	  $73,750	  	   	  $590	  	   	  $118,981	  	  
Kisota	  Homes	   MDL	   56	   min	   110	   	  $45,000	  	   	  $409	  	   	  $72,598	  	  max	   110	   	  $65,000	  	   	  $591	  	   	  $104,864	  	  
South	  Beach	   MDL	   110	   min	   150	   	  $130,000	  	   	  $867	  	   	  $209,729	  	  max	   150	   	  $250,000	  	   	  $1,667	  	   	  $403,325	  	  *Financial	  Assumptions:	  10-­‐year	  term,	  30%	  down	  payment	  and	  19%	  interest	  rate	  (based	  on	  2012	  interviews	  with	  local	  banks)	  Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  Central	  government	  projections	  of	  power:	  satellite	  city	  initiatives	  Two	   large-­‐scale	   urban	   development	   initiatives	   in	   Kigamboni	   reveal	   a	   more	   cohesive	  governance	  regime	  than	  in	  Upanga.	  The	  central	  government	  dominates	  governance	  but	  creates	   chaos	   and	   speculation	   through	   piecemeal	   planning	   initiatives.	   MLHHSD	   has	  ultimate	   approval	   authority	   over	   all	   land	   use	   and	   development	   plans	   in	   the	   Dar	   es	  Salaam	  region,	  which	  leads	  to	  cooptation	  by	  central	  government	  agencies.	  The	  Temeke	  Municipality	  has	   the	  power	   to	   initiate	  development	  and	  zoning	  plans.	  However,	  plans	  developed	  by	  the	  municipality	  must	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  City	  Council	  and	  MLHHSD	   (Bersaglio	   &	   Kepe	   2013).	   The	   cumbersome	   approval	   process	   reduces	  incentives	  for	  comprehensive	  planning	  and	  increases	  incentives	  to	  seek	  short-­‐term	  cash	  producing	  programs.	  As	  a	  result,	  urban	  development	  initiatives	  reflect	  national	  goals	  of	  modernization	  and	  improving	  transparency	  instead	  of	   local	  demand	  for	  property.	  The	  first	  initiative,	  known	  as	  the	  20,000	  plots	  program,	  provided	  titled	  plots	  throughout	  Dar	  es	   Salaam.	   The	   20,000	   plots	   program	   required	   coordination	   between	   all	   three	  municipalities	  and	  the	  MLHHSD.	  The	  second	  initiative	  is	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  satellite	  city,	  New	  Kigamboni	  City.	  The	  New	  Kigamboni	  City	  plan	  oversteps	  local	  regulation	  and	  municipal	   regulation.	   The	   result	   of	   these	   initiatives	   is	   chaos	   and	   limited	   private	  investment.	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The	  three	  municipalities	  and	  MLHSSD	  jointly	  managed	  the	  country’s	  largest	  urban	  land	  titling	  project,	   the	  20,000	  plots	  program	  between	  2002	  and	  2010.	  The	  program	  grew	  out	   of	   an	   anti-­‐corruption	   action	   plan	   developed	   for	   the	   land	   sector	   in	   2000,	   with	  objectives	  of	   reducing	  poverty,	   controlling	   speculation	  and	  developing	   satellite	   towns	  (Lugoe	  2007).	   The	  program	  expected	   to	  meet	   these	   objectives	   by	   selling	  market	   rate	  plots	   to	   developers	   to	   kick	   start	   affordable	   housing	   construction	   and	   satellite	   city	  development	   through	   access	   to	   secure	   titled	   land	   (URT;	  MLHHSD	   2007).	   The	   20,000	  plots	  program	  offered	  MLHHSD	  an	  opportunity	  to	  claim	  improved	  urban	  management	  (Lugoe	  2007;	  Silayo	  2009;	  DILAPS	  2006).	   	  Meanwhile,	   it	  also	  presented	  municipalities	  with	   a	   means	   to	   increase	   cash	   flow	   (Tanzania	   Cities	   Network	   2010).	   The	   program	  aligned	   municipal	   and	   national	   objectives	   resulting	   in	   implementation	   success.	   The	  program	   providing	   approximately	   40,000	   titled	   plots	   across	   the	   city	   (URT;	   MLHHSD	  2007;	   UN-­‐HABITAT	   2010b).	   Given	   success	   with	   the	   20,000	   plots	   program	  municipalities	   are	   replicating	   the	   program	  without	   assistance	   from	   the	  MLHHSD.	   For	  instance,	  in	  2012	  the	  Temeke	  Municipality	  offered	  a	  1,800	  titled	  plots	  in	  the	  Gezaulole	  ward	  just	  south	  of	  Kigamboni.	  With	  12,000	  applications	  for	  the	  plots	  and	  an	  application	  fee	  of	  $20	  the	  new	  program	  exceeded	  municipal	  goals.186	  	  In	   practice,	   the	   20,000	   plots	   program	   led	   to	   land	   market	   speculation	   and	   limited	  development.	   While	   demand	   for	   titled	   plots	   is	   highest	   in	   the	   city	   center,	   it	   was	  prohibitively	   expensive	   to	   acquire	   the	   plots	   given	   the	   compensation	   provision	   in	   the	  1999	  Land	  Law.187	  As	  a	  result,	  most	  of	  the	  plots	  were	  in	  peri-­‐urban	  areas	  where	  it	  was	  possible	   to	   establish	   ownership	   and	   achievable	   compensation	   rates.	   In	   particular,	  Kigamboni	   had	   easy	   to	   acquire	   larger	   undeveloped	   tracts	   of	   land.188	  Therefore,	   20	  percent	  of	  the	  20,000	  plots	  program	  is	  in	  Kigamboni.	  The	  municipality	  distributed	  the	  plots	   through	   an	   opaque	   application	   process	   instead	   of	   a	   public	   auction	   or	   lottery	  system.	  Opacity	   opened	   the	   program	   to	   speculative	   land	   grabbing	   by	  well-­‐positioned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  Bilham	  Kimati.	  “Gezaulole	  Plot	  Applicants	  Over	  Applied.”	  Daily	  News,	  June	  23,	  2012,	  p.	  4.	  187	  Interview	  with	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHHSD,	  on	  July	  15th	  2012	  188	  Interviews	  with:	  Tabitha	  Sewale,	  Director	  of	  WAT	  Human	  Settlements	  and	  former	  Minister	  of	  Lands,	  March	  8,	  2012;	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHHSD,	  on	  July	  15th	  2012..	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individuals	  (Mwita	  &	  Yan	  2011).	  The	  newly	  titled	   land	  became	  a	  mechanism	  for	   long-­‐term	  estate	  planning	  instead	  of	  an	  investment	  in	  the	  current	  housing	  market.	  189	  Many	  of	  the	  plots	  are	  vacant.	  The	  program	  did	  not	  create	  more	  affordable	  satellite	  cities	  or	  even	  a	  measurable	   increase	   in	  construction	  activity.	  The	  program	  results	  demonstrate	   that	  the	   issue	   with	   land	   markets	   is	   not	   the	   number	   of	   titled	   plots.	   The	   issue	   is	   the	  distribution	  of	  ownership	  opportunities	  (Keivani	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Given	   the	   limited	   increase	   in	   formal	   investment	   from	   the	   20,000	   plots	   program,	  MLHHSD	  announced	  a	  sweeping	  plan	  to	  implement	  a	  full-­‐scale	  satellite	  city.	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  is	  part	  of	  a	  MLHHSD	  program	  to	  construct	  of	  a	  series	  of	  six	  satellite	  cities	  in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   (Figure	   33).	   Satellite	   cities	   are	   the	   central	   government’s	   planning	  solution	  to	  current	   land	  use	   issues	  (CCM	  2010).	   In	  CCM’s	  2010	  election	  manifesto	  the	  government	   committed	   to	   beginning	   construction	   on	   the	   project	   (CCM	   2010).	   The	  rhetoric	   in	  both	  planning	  documents	  and	  program	  announcements	   is	  hopeful	   that	   the	  satellite	   cities	   will	   overcome	   the	   imperfections	   of	   limited	   information,	   ambiguous	  institutions,	  unclear	  development	  rules	  and	  limited	  financial	  capacity	  (URT	  2010a;	  URT	  2012a;	   URT	   2013d;	   URT	   2014).	   The	   Kigamboni	   New	   City	   plan	   provides	   rhetorical	  evidence	   of	   actions	   to	   correct	   urban	   development	   issues.	   Focusing	   on	   satellite	   cities	  allows	  the	  central	  government	  to	  abandon	  the	  trenchant	  problems	  of	  the	  urban	  core	  by	  claiming	   to	   provide	   services	   and	   housing	   at	   an	   unprecedented	   scale	   on	   the	   urban	  periphery.190	  MLHSSD’s	  plan	  for	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  reflects	  the	  same	  modernist	  ideals	  that	   motivated	   the	   Dodoma	   project191	  in	   the	   1970’s.	   Much	   like	   modernist	   planning,	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  has	  zones	  for	  specific	  uses	  including:	  tourism,	  business,	   industry,	  education,	   residential	   and	  mixed-­‐use	   (Error!	   Reference	   source	   not	   found.).	  Within	  the	  residential	  areas	  a	  total	  of	  83,000	  housing	  units	  would	  be	  constructed	  for	  a	  six-­‐fold	  increase	   in	   population	   from	   approximately	   80,000	   to	   500,000	   by	   plan	   completion	   in	  2030	  (LH	  Consortium	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Interview	   with	   Professor	   Nnkya,	   Director	   of	   Housing	   at	   Ministry	   of	   Lands,	   Redevelopment	   and	  Housing,	  July	  29th	  2012.	  	  190	  Correspondent.	  “Kigamboni	  City	  ‘Is	  for	  Real’”.	  Daily	  News,	  May	  28,	  2013.	  191	  The	  Dodoma	  project	  refers	  to	  Tanzania’s	  attempt	  to	  build	  a	  new	  capital	  city	  see	  Chapter	  3	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Figure	  33:	  MLHHSD	  Plan	  for	  Satellite	  Cities	  	  
Source:	  MLHHSD,	  2010	  presentation	  on	  the	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  
Figure	  34:	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  Land	  Use	  Plan	  
Source:	  LH	  Consortium,	  Kigamboni	  New	  City	  Plan,	  2011	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MLHHSD	   uses	   rhetorical	   devices	   about	   development	   to	   claim	   progress	   on	   project	  implementation	  but	  financially	  the	  New	  City	  is	  still	  inconceivable.	  Project	  cost	  estimates	  range	   from	  $6	  billion	   to	  $12	  billion.	  192	  The	   cost	   estimates	  are	  at	   least	  $2	  billion	  more	  than	   the	   Government	   of	   Tanzania’s	   total	   expenditures	   in	   2011-­‐12	   (NBS	   2013).	   The	  financing	  gap	  between	  MLHHSD’s	  budget	  and	  project	  costs	   is	   large.	  MLHHSD	  recently	  announced	  compensation	  of	  $85,000	  per	  acre	  with	  an	  option	   to	   invest	   ten	  percent	   in	  shares	   of	   the	   New	   City	   development	   authority	   (URT	   2014).	   Assuming	   that	   MLHSSD	  buys	  about	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  land	  in	  the	  project	  area	  the	  compensation	  could	  easily	  be	  more	  than	  $400	  million.	  The	  ultra-­‐modern	  residential	  and	  business	  developments	  will	  attract	   investment	  and	   tourism	  cash	   flows	   (LH	  Consortium	  2010).	  The	  New	  City	  plan	  suggests	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   with	   MLHHSD	   will	   finance	   development	   (LH	  Consortium	  2010).	  	  Yet,	  there	  is	  no	  precedent	  for	  a	  large-­‐scale	  partnership	  with	  either	  local	  or	  international	  investors.	  MLHHSD’s	  Minister,	  Professor	  Anna	  Tibaijuka	  recognizes	  the	  gap	  and	  claims	  that	   “modern	   techniques”	  will	  maintain	   the	   plan’s	   scale	   and	   timeline	   (URT	  2012a).193	  These	   techniques	   include	   investment	   from	   international	   investors,	   local	   businesses,	  pension	  funds	  and	  selling	  bonds	  (LH	  Consortium	  2010).	  None	  of	  these	  techniques	  have	  been	  tested	  in	  Tanzania.	  MLHHSD’s	  planning	  announcements	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  assert	  control	   they’ve	   failed	   to	   project	   in	   the	   central	   city.	   MLHHSD	   has	   neither	   identified	  partners	  nor	  provided	  debt	  offering	  materials	  in	  the	  seven	  years	  since	  the	  Kigamaboni	  New	  City	  project	  was	  first	  announced.	  Thus,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  if	  any	  phase	  of	  the	  plan	  will	  be	  financed.	  For	  instance,	  MLHHSD	  promised	  to	  complete	  compensation	  and	  begin	  clearing	  land	  in	  2013.	  Yet,	  MLHHSD	  only	  managed	  to	  create	  an	  administrative	  structure,	  set	   up	   an	   office	   and	   hold	   several	   public	   hearings	   (URT	   2014).	   The	   shortfall	   provides	  MLHHSD	   grounds	   to	   request	   additional	   central	   government	   budget	   allocations	   to	  address	  major	  urban	  planning	  failures	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  The	  total	  project	  cost	  estimates	  fluctuate	  a	  great	  deal	  reducing	  predictability.	  The	  cost	  estimates	  vary	  in	  newspaper	  reporting,	  official	  planning	  documents	  and	  speeches	  by	  MLHHSD	  Minister	  Anna	  Tibiajuka.	  Therefore	  I	  show	  the	  range	  of	  prices	  because	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  reliable	  source.	  	  193	  Frank	  Kimboy.	  “Sh60bn	  for	  new	  Dar.”	  The	  Citizen,	  July	  12,	  2012,	  pp.	  5-­‐6.	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The	   plan	   references	   experience	   in	   Asia	   instead	   of	   integrating	   local	   experience.	  	  Development	   on	   the	   20,000	   plots	   program	   sites	  will	   be	   integrated	   into	   the	  New	  City	  Plan	   but	   the	   remainder	   of	   units	   will	   be	   cleared	   (Nyerere-­‐Inyangete	   2010).	   Since	   the	  plans	   announcement,	  MLHSSD	   clarified	   that	   residents	  will	   have	   the	   option	   to	   buy	   in	  “resettlement	  city”	  in	  Kibada	  (URT	  2013d).	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  residents	  perceive	  that	  the	  aim	   of	   the	   project	   is	   to	   attract	   international	   investors	   and	   mimic	   large-­‐scale	  development	  projects	  in	  Asia	  instead	  of	  improve	  existing	  conditions.194	  The	  plan	  draws	  on	   recent	   experience	   with	   new	   city	   planning	   in	   Seoul,	   Korea	   and	   Kuala	   Lumpur,	  Malaysia	  (LH	  Consortium	  2010).	  These	  “best	  practice”	  experiences	  provide	  justification	  for	   the	  Kigamboni	   plan	  developed	  by	   a	  Korean	  design	   firm,	   LH	  Consortium.	  Planning	  included	   site	   visits	   to	   Korea	   and	   three	   stakeholder	   meetings.	   MLHHSD	   recently	  announced	   Chinese	   urban	   planners	  would	   guide	   the	   next	   phase	   of	   the	   project.195	  The	  announcement	  of	  the	  New	  Kigamboni	  city	  was	  met	  with	  little	  organized	  local	  resistance,	  yet	  the	  resettlement	  process	  is	  a	  source	  of	  confusion	  (Mramba	  &	  Joseph	  2012).	  The	  two	  initiatives	  spur	  speculation	  instead	  of	  satellite	  city	  development.	  Small	  scale	  failure:	  a	  private	  response	  to	  satellite	  city	  initiatives	  	  The	  failure	  of	  a	  private	  sector	  housing	  project,	  Kisota	  Homes,	  reveals	  the	  difficulties	  of	  development	   on	   Dar’s	   peripheries.	   To	   date,	   MDL’s	   Kisota	   Homes	   is	   the	   only	   private	  response	   to	   the	  MLHHSD	  satellite	  city	  development	   initiatives.	   In	  2006	  MDL	  obtained	  15	   hectares	   from	   the	   20,000	   plots	   program.	  196	  	   The	   original	   project	   design	   included	  three	  phases	  with	  a	   total	  of	  169	  units	  on	  400	  m2	  plots,	   several	   community	  amenities	  and	   a	   retail	   development.	   MDL	   was	   encouraged	   to	   move	   forward	   with	   speculative	  development	   at	  Kisota	  Homes	  because	  MDL’s	   first	   project,	   South	  Beach,	   is	   a	   financial	  success.	  South	  Beach	  was	  a	  high-­‐end	  gated	  community	  on	  the	  beach	  in	  Kigamboni	  (MDL	  2005).	  With	   Kisota	   Homes,	   MDL	   wanted	   to	   compete	   with	   middle-­‐income	   housing	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Correspondent.	  “We	  expect	  a	  lot	  from	  the	  Kigamboni	  Bridge.”	  	  The	  Citizen,	  September	  23,	  2012.	  195 Abdulwakil Saiboko. “Kigamboni City ‘no pipe dream’”. Daily New, May 29th, 2014, p. 1. 196	  The	  details	  of	  MDL’s	  prjects	  arose	  from	  a	  series	  of	  interviews	  on	  April	  4th	  2012	  with	  Dorothy	  Masawe,	  Principal	   at	  Mutual	  Developers	   and	  Dede	   Investments,	  Maximmilon	  Matala,	  CEO	  at	  Mutual	  Developers,	  and	  David	  Christian,	  Director	  at	  Mutual	  Developers.	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high-­‐density	   informal	  areas.	   In	  2008,	  MDL	  built	  phase	  one	  56	  units	  without	  pre-­‐sales	  but	  after	  six	  years	  the	  project	  is	  only	  70	  percent	  sold	  out	  (Figure	  35	  &	  Figure	  36).	  The	  failure	  at	  Kisota	  Homes	  forced	  MDL	  to	  declare	  bankruptcy	  and	  indefinitely	  suspend	  the	  remaining	  phases	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
Figure	  35:	  Kisota	  Homes	  Phase	  One	  Site	  Plan	  
Source:	  MDL	  Kisota	  Homes	  Brochure	  
Figure	  36:	  Kisota	  Homes	  Examples	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  2012	  Kisota	  Homes	  demonstrates	  that	  fully	  complying	  with	  formal	  development	  rules	  made	  the	  final	  product	  unprofitable	  for	  developers	  and	  unattractive	  to	  buyers.	  Between	  2005	  and	   2012,	   there	   was	   limited	   development	   outside	   of	   Kisota	   Homes	   on	   the	   formally	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titled	   land	   from	   the	  20,000	  plots	  program	   (Figure	  37).197	  Only	  11	  percent	   of	   the	   total	  area	   was	   developed	   over	   the	   period.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   total	   land	   area	   of	   the	   informal	  settlements	  surrounding	  the	  site	  grew	  by	  80	  percent.	  The	  limited	  formal	  development	  provides	  several	  insights	  about	  the	  failure	  of	  Kisota	  Homes.	  First,	  it	  illustrates	  Kisota’s	  remoteness.	   Kisota	   Homes	   is	   not	   connected	   to	   social	   infrastructure	   including	   health	  centers,	   schools,	   retail	   and	   the	   private	   bus	   system.	   Second,	   it	   reveals	   formal	   land	  development	   adds	   costs.	   MDL’s	   prices	   increased	   because	   they	   provided	   electricity,	  water	   connections,	   plumbing,	   solid	   waste	   collection	   and	   drainage	   systems.	  MDL	   also	  paid	  building	   and	  permitting	   fees	   that	   large	  well-­‐connected	  developers	   in	   the	   central	  city	   avoid.	   In	   the	  CBD	  developers	  use	  partnerships	  with	  parastatals,	   other	  businesses	  and	  bribes	  to	  avoid	  fees	  and	  permitting	  delays.	  198	  The	  increased	  price	  made	  the	  houses	  unattractive	  to	  potential	  buyers	  in	  comparison	  to	  informal	  areas.	  	  	  
Figure	  37:	  Land	  Use	  Change	  in	  Kisota,	  2005	  –	  2013	  
	  
Source:	  Historic	  satellite	  images,	  site	  visits	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   development	   surrounding	  Kisota	  Homes	   I	   collected	   field	   notes	   and	  GPS	  data	  on	  current	  development	  between	  March	  and	  August	  2012.	  As	  part	  of	   the	  process	   I	   inquired	  about	  the	  construction	  date	  when	  possible.	   I	  digitized	  the	   information	   from	  fieldwork	  to	  create	  a	  snapshot	  of	  development	  in	  2012.	  I	  then	  used	  Google	  Earth’s	  historical	  imagery	  to	  check	  against	  fieldwork	  notes	  and	  construct	  a	  historical	  snapshot	  from	  2005.	  	  The	  2005	  date	  was	  selected	  because	  it	  is	  one	  year	  after	  titling	  began	  in	  Kisota.	  198	  The	   interviews	   that	   confirmed	   these	   tactics	   included:	   Mwaka	   Arch,	   Temeke	   Municipality,	   Ilala	  Municipality,	  CRB,	  AQRB,	  Construction	  Council,	  developers.	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Kisota	   Homes	   also	   reveals	   that	   construction	   and	   mortgage	   financing	   makes	   formal	  project	   pricing	   uncompetitive	   in	   comparison	   to	   informal	   development.	  MDL	   dropped	  prices	  from	  $110,000	  to	  either	  $45,000	  for	  an	  unfinished	  unit	  or	  $65,000	  fully	  finished	  in	  2011	  (MDL	  2008;	  MDL	  2012).	  The	  price	  dropped	  resulted	  in	  a	  few	  sales	  completions	  but	   not	   as	   many	   sales	   as	   MDL	   expected.	   Part	   of	   the	   issues	   was	   that	   with	   mortgage	  financing	   the	   total	  cost	   for	  buyers	  was	  between	  $72,000	  and	  $105,000,	  nearly	  double	  MDL’s	  advertised	  sales	  price	  per	  unit.	  The	  sales	  and	   financing	  costs	  made	   the	  project	  unaffordable	   to	   MDL’s	   target	   buyer	   and	   uncompetitive	   with	   incremental	   informal	  construction.	   MDL	   was	   unable	   to	   drop	   pricing	   further	   because	   Commercial	   Bank	   of	  Africa	   gave	   them	   a	   construction	   loan	   requiring	   minimum	   sales	   prices.	   MDL’s	  speculative	  model	  within	  formal	  rules	  resulted	  in	  a	  product	  that	  was	  too	  expensive	  to	  respond	   to	   demand	   for	   middle	   or	   low-­‐income	   housing.	   The	   failure	   of	   Kisota	   Homes	  demonstrates	  that	  titled	  land	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  foment	  successful	  private	  sector	  led	  urban	  development.	  	  The	   success	   of	   the	   government	   parastatal	   housing	   projects	   reinforces	   the	   difficulties	  MDL	   faced	   in	   developing	  middle-­‐income	   housing.	   NSSF	   and	   NHC	   developed	   adjacent	  housing	   estates	   on	   20,000	   plots	   land	   (Figure	   38).199	  The	   parastatal	   projects	   sold	   out	  within	   eight	   months	   at	   lower	   price	   points	   than	   Kisota	   Homes.	   Pricing	   was	   lower	  because	   the	   parastatals	   did	   not	   pay	   for	   infrastructure,	   services	   or	   construction	  financing.200	  The	   project	   design	   and	   remoteness	   is	   strikingly	   similar	   to	   Kisota	  Homes.	  Parastatals	   used	   their	   Government	   supported	   balance	   sheet	   to	   finance	   the	   projects.	  Subsequent	  to	  completing	  the	  Kigamboni	  Estates	  project,	  NHC	  took	  out	  a	  line	  of	  credit	  from	   a	   consortium	   of	   eight	   banks,	   but	   the	   financing	   is	   not	   tied	   to	   any	   project	   and	   is	  collateralized	   by	   the	   parastatal’s	   large	   real	   estate	   portfolio.201	  A	   line	   of	   credit	   with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  Interviews	  with:	  Deo	  Mponeja,	  Mtoni	  Kijichi	  Project	  Manager	  at	  NSSF,	  Cosmas	  at	  NHC,	  Temeke	  Urban	  Planning.	  200	  In	   the	   most	   recent	   communication	   with	   project	   managers	   in	   2013	   on	   both	   projects	   less	   than	   10	  percent	  of	  buyers	  had	  obtained	  mortgages	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  if	  that	  statistic	  would	  change	  by	  the	  time	  all	  the	  units	  were	  settled.	  201	  Alvar	  Mwakyusa.	  “NHC	  Gets	  165	  Billion	  /	  Loan	  for	  Housing	  Units”.	  Daily	  New,	  July	  2,	  2012,	  p.	  4.	  
	  	   138	  
attractive	   terms	   would	   not	   be	   available	   to	   a	   smaller	   scale	   developer	   trying	   to	   start	  investing	   in	   the	  property	  market.	  The	  pricing	  at	   the	  parastatal	  projects	   is	  competitive	  with	   informal	   housing	   in	   the	   area	   and	   does	   not	   require	   financing	   for	   many	   middle-­‐income	   buyers.	   The	   parastatals	   achieved	   a	   larger	   project	   scale	  with	   a	   combined	   482	  units.	   Supporting	   community	   infrastructure	   includes	   a	   convenient	   store,	   dispensary,	  nursery	   school	   and	   recreational	   areas.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	  Kisota	  Homes	  project,	   these	  amenities	   helped	   the	   parastatal	   projects	   overcome	   the	   remoteness	   of	   their	   location.	  	  The	   parastatal	   supported	   projects	   have	   an	   inherent	   advantage	   over	   private	   sector	  developments	   because	   they	   can	   demand	   results	   from	   other	   government	   authorities.	  	  The	   parastatal	   agencies’	   efforts	   do	   not	   support	   or	   enhance	   the	   private	   sector.	  Parastatals	   are	   in	   direct	   competition	  with	   private	   projects	   but	   with	   several	   inherent	  advantages.	  	  As	  NHC’s	  development	  ambitions	  grow	  they	  are	  increasingly	  crowding	  out	  private	   sector	   investment.	  Under	   these	   conditions,	   the	  private	   sector	   cannot	   compete	  with	   parastatal	   projects	   without	   subsidies	   similar	   to	   those	   implicitly	   offered	   to	  parastatals.	  
Figure	  38:	  NHC	  Site	  Plan	  for	  Kigamboni	  Estates	  
Source:	  NHC,	  Kigamboni	  Housing	  Estate	  Brochure,	  2012	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Chaos	  and	  speculation:	  Community	  Response	  	  To	  date	   the	  New	  City	  and	  20,000	  plots	   initiatives	  created	  uncertainty	  and	  speculation	  demonstrating	   central	   government	  manipulation	   in	  Kigamboni.	  The	  announcement	  of	  the	  New	  City	  Plan	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  subsequent	  development	  stop	  order	  correspond	  to	  a	  rapid	   increase	   in	   land	  sales	  prices	  (Figure	  39).	  The	  price	   increase	   implies	  speculation	  about	  future	  compensation	  and	  investment	  from	  the	  central	  government.202	  Then	  when	  MLHHSD	   released	   the	   detailed	   plan	   in	   2011,	   land	   sales	   prices	   within	   the	   project	  decreased	  rapidly	  as	  speculation	  continued	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  areas	  directly	  around	  the	  project.	  The	  price	  decrease	  reflects	  more	  limited	  compensation	  than	  expected.203	  	  Land	   titling	   and	   satellite	   city	   planning	   encouraged	   speculative	   development	   without	  improving	   the	   local	   housing	   and	   land	   markets.	   The	   only	   successful	   projects	   receive	  support	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  central	  government	  and	  municipal	  agencies.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  land	  titling	  project	  are	  haphazard,	  unresponsive	  to	  local	  needs,	  and	  unlikely	  to	  change	  the	   status	   quo.	   Formal	   residential	   construction	   projects	   do	   not	   improve	   affordability	  because	  the	  total	  stock	  pales	  in	  comparison	  to	  population	  growth.	  	  
Figure	  39:	  Land	  Price	  Changes	  in	  Kigamboni,	  USD	  2001	  	  
Source:	  Author’s	  own	  calculations	  from	  Advertising	  Dar	  Archives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  202	  Interview	  with	  Salim	  Ahaadi,	  Urban	  Planner	  with	  Temeke	  Municipality,	  July	  21,	  2012.	  203	  Saumu	  Mwalimu.	  “Kigamboni	  looking	  up	  and	  reaching	  out.”	  The	  Citizen,	  October	  6,	  2012,	  pp.6–8.	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Conclusion	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   translates	   as	   “harbor	   of	   peace”	   referencing	   the	   well	   protected	   port	  prompting	  its	  founding	  in	  1862	  and	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  social	  integration	  (Abebe	  2011;	  Brennan	  &	  Burton	  2007;	  Bryceson	  2010;	  Lerise	  et	  al.	  2004).	  Yet,	  recent	  redevelopment	  implies	   that	   peaceful	   social	   integration	   is	   slipping	   away	   as	   modular	   urbanism	  increasingly	  segregates	  neighborhoods.	  The	  role	  of	  various	  stakeholders	  shifts	  with	  the	  underlying	  land	  market	  and	  potential	  to	  leverage	  informal	  rules.	  The	   redevelopment	   of	   central	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   reveals	   an	   entrenched	   urban	   regime	  investing	   in	   high-­‐end	   residential	   projects.	   National	   agencies	   compete	   for	   regulatory	  control	  and	  aim	   to	   improve	   their	   financial	  position.	  The	  resulting	   regulatory	  plurality	  encourages	   redevelopment	   that	   is	   isolated	   from	   local	   demand.	   Plurality	   encourages	  complex	   ownership	   structures	   removing	   developers’	   personal	   liability.	   Without	  personal	  liability,	  developers	  alter	  project	  designs	  to	  maximize	  profit	  without	  regard	  to	  effect	   on	   the	   neighborhood.	   The	   national	   agencies	   made	   few	   financial	   gains	   from	  redevelopment	   because	   a	   network	   of	   elite	   developers	   captured	   the	   benefits.	   	   Lack	   of	  enforcement	   and	   vague	  policy	   programs	   created	   a	   development	   cascade	  where	   elites	  capture	   benefits	   and	   infrastructure	   remains	   inadequate.	   A	   combination	   of	   disjointed	  privatization,	   financial	   liberalization	   and	   central	   government	   coercion	   created	   the	  perfect	   opportunity	   for	   money	   laundering	   and	   price	   speculation	   through	   real	   estate	  investment.	  As	   a	   result,	   in	   central	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	   the	  private	   sector	   engages	   in	   urban	  development	   projects	   contradicting	   government	   policy	   goals.	   The	   city	   center	   needs	  stronger	  regulation	  and	  a	  low-­‐income	  housing	  requirement.	  In	   contrast,	   satellite	   city	   initiatives	   in	  Kigabmoni	  expose	  central	  government	  agencies	  making	   political	   announcements	   and	   investments	   that	   crowd	   out	   private	   investment.	  MLHSSD	  claims	  support	  for	  a	  more	  organized	  and	  modern	  city	  center	  while	  maintaining	  regulatory	   control	   and	   creating	   competition	   among	   government	   entities.	   Parastatals	  take	  advantage	  of	   the	   regulatory	   complexity	  and	  unclear	  vision	   to	  extract	   cash	  out	  of	  land	  without	   providing	   benefit	   to	  middle	   or	   low-­‐income	   individuals.	   NHC	   abandoned	  their	   mandate	   to	   provide	   affordable	   housing,	   which	   was	   justified	   by	   their	   other	  mandate	  to	  be	  financially	  solvent.	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Chapter	  6:	  Mwanza	  
Introduction	  Mwanza	  exhibits	  different	  urban	  development	  outcomes	  than	  Arusha	  or	  Dar	  es	  Salaam.	  The	   scale	   is	   smaller,	   more	   responsive	   to	   local	   demands,	   connected	   to	   existing	  infrastructure	  and	  built	  incrementally	  as	  resources	  become	  available.	  The	  difference	  in	  outcome	   is	   partially	   explained	   by	   a	   singular	   governance	   structure,	   a	   liner	   business	  sector	  and	  no	  constraints	  on	  the	  land	  market.	  In	  Mwanza	  private	  development	  and	  land	  management	  are	  relatively	  coordinated	  even	  if	  corruption	  is	  a	  problem.	  There	  are	  few	  incentives	   for	   speculation	   or	   demands	   for	   the	   appearance	   of	   policy	   reform.	   While	  informal	   settlements	   are	   pervasive,	   new	   development	   does	   not	   restrict	   access	   to	  affordable	  housing	   and	   land.	  The	  Mwanza	   case	   confirms	   the	   importance	  of	  particular	  pre-­‐existing	   conditions	   in	   creating	   urban	   development	   outcomes	   that	   increase	  inequality	  and	  fragility.	  Mwanza’s	  redevelopment	  is	  small-­‐scale	  and	  locally	  driven	  because	  key	  ingredients	  are	  missing	   to	   encourage	   large-­‐scale	   modular	   development.	   Mwanza	   has	   a	   singular	  governance	  regime	  facilitating	  more	  locally	  responsive	  urban	  development.	  Singularity	  reduces	  competition	  among	  government	  agencies	  as	  well	  as	  overall	  market	  speculation.	  Pension	   funds	   invest	   in	   formal	   development	   without	   competition	   from	   other	  parastatals	  or	  the	  MLHHSD.	  Mwanza	  has	   limited	  outside	  influences	  facilitating	  a	  more	  cooperative	   policy	   environment	   between	   local	   government,	   the	   private	   sector	   and	  parastatals.	  The	  local	  business	  structure	  is	  linear	  with	  few	  informal	  development	  tactics.	  As	  a	   result,	  development	   is	  not	  modular	  because	   it	   is	   locally	   informed	  and	   integrated	  into	  existing	  urban	  fabric.	  	  Elite	   capture	   is	   more	   difficult	   to	   distinguish	   with	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   business	   owners	  engaging	   in	   redevelopment.	   The	   more	   responsive	   development	   also	   reflects	   a	   more	  open	   fluid	   land	   use	   history	   that	   does	   not	   encourage	   widespread	   speculation	   and	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overbuilding.	   Finally,	   Mwanza	   has	   fewer	   critical	   urban	   planning	   issues	   that	   present	  opportunities	  for	  raising	  revenue	  or	  projecting	  efficacy	  through	  project	  implementation	  than	   in	   either	  Dar	  es	   Salaam	  or	  Arusha.	  Nonetheless,	  Mwanza’s	  urban	   fabric	   changed	  with	  onset	  of	  liberalization	  policies.	  In	  the	  central	  city,	  many	  buildings	  are	  redeveloped	  as	  high-­‐rise	  mixed-­‐use	  buildings.	  Private	  sector	  ownership	  is	  linear	  without	  networked	  businesses	   or	   vertical	   integration	   of	   other	   aspects	   of	   construction.	   In	   fact,	   the	   most	  active	   investor	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   private	   business	   owners	   in	   the	   city	   who	  contributes	  to	  public	  goods	  to	  maintain	  good	  will.	  Parastatal	  redevelopment	  plans	  are	  consistent	  with	  municipal	   urban	   plans.	  Meanwhile,	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   the	   city	   large-­‐scale	  investment	  is	  locally	  responsive	  and	  connected	  to	  infrastructure.	  	  As	   the	   fastest	   growing	   city	   in	   Tanzania,	   the	   chapter	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   how	  Mwanza’s	   urban	   form	   is	   changing	   over	   time	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   important	   economic	  drivers.	   Then	   I	   will	   examine	   the	   redevelopment	   of	   central	   Mwanza	   as	   a	   coalition	  between	   varies	   state	   agencies	   and	   private	   business	   owners.	   The	   results	   of	  redevelopment	  are	  modest	  with	  little	  evidence	  of	  informal	  tactics	  but	  rather	  adherence	  to	   formal	   planning	   codes.	   Given	   the	   local	   nature	   of	   redevelopment	   in	   Mwanza,	  construction	   of	   multi-­‐story	   buildings	   is	   often	   an	   incremental	   process	   that	   evokes	  informal	   settlement	   development	   more	   than	   it	   does	   modular	   development.	   The	  redevelopment	   results	   are	   dispersed	   across	   the	   central	   business	   district	   and	   do	   not	  emulate	   wealthy	   enclaves.	   Finally,	   I	   will	   analyze	   attempts	   to	   develop	   satellite	   cities	  uncovering	  more	   small	   scale	   investments.	   In	   contrast	   to	   redevelopment	   projects,	   the	  private	   sector	   is	   not	   engaged	   but	   rather	   parastatals	   attempt	   to	   meet	   constituent’s	  national	   demands	   for	   formal	   development.	   The	  Parastatal	   Pensions	   Fund’s	   (PPF)	   low	  cost	  housing	  project	  in	  Kiseke	  is	  a	  unique	  attempt	  to	  accommodate	  traditional	  building	  practices	   through	   formal	   development.	   Yet,	   the	   project	   provided	   negligible	   financial	  returns	   highlighting	   the	   difficulty	   of	   building	   profitable	   low-­‐income	   housing	   even	   for	  central	  government	  agencies.	  	  
Overview	  of	  Mwanza’s	  Urban	  Form	  Lake	   Victoria	   and	   the	   rocky	   hills	   rising	   from	   it	   confine	   Mwanza’s	   urban	   structure	  (Figure	  40).	  Initial	  development	  followed	  three	  roads	  to	  the	  north,	  south	  and	  east,	  but	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over	   time	   infill	   development	   has	   made	   the	   fingerlike	   structure	   of	   the	   city	   less	  distinguishable	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  2012a).	  The	  town	  center	  sits	  on	  the	  relatively	  flat	  shore	  of	  the	  Lake	  providing	  good	  port	  access.	  Both	  formal	  and	  informal	  settlements	  are	  scattered	  across	  the	  hills	  surrounding	  the	  center	  (Tassel	  2011).	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  60	  percent	  of	   the	  housing	   is	   in	  unplanned	  areas	  accommodating	  about	  70	  percent	  of	   the	  population	   (Batare	   &	   Karangwa	   2002;	   Mwanza	   City	   Council	   2012b).	   Nonetheless,	   in	  2006	   about	   20	   percent	   of	   land	   was	   urbanized	   implying	   that	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   land	  available	  for	  urban	  development	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  2012a;	  Kyessi	  &	  Kyessi	  2007).	  	  
Figure	  40:	  Mwanza	  Density	  2002	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  calculations	  based	  on	  2002	  URT	  Village	  Census	  Statistics	  Between	  1992	  and	  2002,	  Mwanza	  was	  one	  of	  the	  fastest	  growing	  cities	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  with	   an	   average	   5	   percent	   annual	   growth	   rate	   (UN-­‐HABITAT	   2008b).204	  Rapid	  growth	  translated	  into	  an	  average	  density	  increase	  from	  8.7	  people	  per	  hectare	  to	  18.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  204	  Note	  that	  part	  of	  Mwanza’s	  growth	  trajectory	  over	  time	  is	  related	  to	  administrative	  boundary	  changes,	  which	  more	  than	  tripled	  the	  size	  of	  the	  city	  between	  1978	  and	  1988.	  	  Taking	  these	  boundary	  changes	  into	  consideration,	  the	  city’s	  population	  has	  been	  rapidly	  increasing.	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people	   between	   1988	   and	   2002.	   Urban	   density	   now	   goes	   beyond	   the	   core.205	  The	  density	   increase	   was	   larger	   than	   in	   Arusha	   or	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   over	   the	   same	   period	  (Figure	   41).	   In	   particular,	   density	   more	   than	   doubled	   in	   the	   first	   three	   kilometers.	  Density	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  port	  functions,	  which	  are	  largely	  scattered	  along	  the	  northern	  and	  southern	  shores.	  The	  share	  of	  population	  remained	  relatively	  consistent	  between	  the	   core	   and	   the	   periphery.	   Even	   though	   the	   population	  within	   20	   kilometers	   of	   the	  center	  more	  than	  doubled	  it	  did	  not	  dramatically	  change	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  city.	  Although,	  the	  largest	  increase	  in	  density	  over	  the	  period	  was	  7	  kilometers	  from	  the	  city	  center.	  At	  7	   kilometers	   density	   increased	   from	   4	   people	   per	   hectare	   to	   19	   and	   the	   share	   of	  population	  increased	  from	  4	  percent	  to	  7	  percent.	  Only	  a	  small	  share	  of	  the	  city’s	  land	  use	   is	   urbanized	   presenting	   both	   challenges	   and	   opportunities	   for	   future	   urban	  planning.	   For	   instance,	   seven	   of	   Mwanza’s	   21	   wards	   are	   categorized	   as	   rural	   and	  account	  for	  about	  34	  percent	  of	  the	  city’s	  2012	  population	  (NBS	  2012a).	  
Figure	  41:	  Density	  Profiles:	  1988	  and	  2002	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rate	   slowed	   slightly	   with	   a	   total	   population	   of	   700,000.	   Within	   the	   city,	   the	   Ilemela	  District,	   which	   contains	   many	   of	   the	   peri-­‐urban	   growth	   areas,	   population	   growth	  slowed	   to	  nearly	  half	   of	  what	   it	  was	  between	   the	  previous	   censuses.206	  	  Meanwhile	   in	  the	   suburbs	   population	   growth	   continued.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Kiseke	   the	   population	  quadrupled	  between	  1978	  and	  2012	  from	  about	  23,000	  to	  more	  than	  100,000	  in	  2012	  (NBS	  2012a).	  Regional	  trading	  and	  fish	  processing	  drive	  Mwanza’s	  economy	  and	  the	  property	  market.	  Mwanza	  is	  an	  inland	  port	  transporting	  about	  100,000	  tons	  of	  cargo	  annually	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  2011).	  The	  port	  connects	  to	  Kampala	  and	  Nairobi,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  African	  towns.	  A	  railroad,	  completed	  in	  1920,	  connects	  Mwanza	  with	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  1993).	  These	  infrastructure	  endowments	  make	  Mwanza	  a	  regional	   trading	   and	   transportation	   hub	   without	   formal	   industrial	   development	  (Murphy	  2003).	  Businesses	  related	  to	  trading	  tend	  to	  be	  locally	  owned	  with	  small	  space	  requirements.	  In	  addition,	  eight	  fish	  processing	  plants	  directly	  exporting	  fish	  to	  Europe	  and	   distributing	   throughout	   the	   country	   (URT	   2013e).	   In	   2006,	   approximately	   28	  percent	  of	  the	  work	  force	  was	  employed	  in	  the	  fishing	  industry,	  which	  provided	  about	  39	   percent	   of	   Mwanza’s	   GDP	   (Mwanza	   City	   Council	   2012a).	   The	   plants	   operate	   well	  below	  capacity	  resulting	  in	  no	  demand	  for	  additional	  space	  (URT	  2013e).	  These	  drivers	  insulate	  Mwanza’s	   property	  market	   from	   external	   investors.207	  For	   instance,	   between	  2007	  and	  2012	  there	  were	  no	   international	   investments	   in	  Mwanza	  properties.208	  The	  economic	   base	   creates	   a	   private	   sector	   that	   is	   depends	   on	   local	   regulation	   and	  investment	  more	  than	  national	  or	  international	  agencies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  206	  At	   lower	   levels	   of	   aggregation	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   track	   population	   growth	   across	   the	   peri-­‐urban	   area	  because	  the	  wards	  and	  villages	  have	  been	  re-­‐categorized	  and	  renamed	  due	  to	  rapid	  population	  growth.	  207	  Gold	  mining	  is	  the	  region’s	  source	  of	  FDI	  but	  it	  has	  almost	  no	  impact	  on	  Mwanza	  City.	  The	  largest	  gold	  mines	  are	  about	  37	  miles	  from	  the	  Mwanza	  in	  Geita	  with	  modular	  development	  by	  international	  mining	  firms.	   The	   Mwanza	   City	   Council	   does	   not	   collect	   taxes	   directly	   from	   the	   mining	   businesses.207	  Mining	  improves	  the	  national	  economy	  more	  than	  directly	  benefiting	  Mwanza	  City	  or	  shaping	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  within	  the	  city’s	  private	  sector.	  208	  Data	  from	  TIC	  on	  property	  investments	  revealed	  no	  investments	  by	  international	  investors.	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CBD	  Redevelopment	  Central	  Mwanza’s	  redevelopment	  began	  to	  take	  shape	  in	  2002	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  several	  multi-­‐story	  buildings.	  In	  1990	  there	  were	  only	  seven	  buildings	  with	  five	  or	  more	  floors.	   The	   tallest	   building	   was	   a	   six-­‐story	   building	   close	   to	   the	   lakefront	   and	   the	  majority	  of	  buildings	  were	  single	  story.	  Throughout	  the	  1990’s	  redevelopment	  was	  very	  limited	   and	   the	   city	   center	   continued	   to	   deteriorate	   (Mwanza	   City	   Council	   2012a).	  Redevelopment	  began	  to	  increase	  as	  Mwanza’s	  economy	  grew	  more	  rapidly	  in	  the	  early	  2000’s	  and	  then	  slowed	  down	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  (URT	  2011a).209	  By	  2004	  there	  were	  eighteen	  buildings	  with	  five	  or	  more	  stories	  then	  by	  2013	  there	  were	  eighty-­‐three	  buildings	   (Figure	   42).210	  The	   recent	   pace	   of	   development	   indicates	   a	   development	  cascade	   where	   property	   owners	   witness	   success	   and	   begin	   redeveloping	   their	   own	  properties.211	  There	   are	   an	   additional	   eight	   multi-­‐story	   buildings	   under	   construction.	  The	   change	   implies	   investment	   in	   redevelopment	   at	   a	   higher	   density	   and	   scale	   than	  ever	  before.	  	  Redevelopment	  is	  not	  modular	  but	  is	  driven	  by	  local	  market	  demand.	  Redevelopment	  is	  intertwined	  with	  the	  existing	  fabric	  of	  the	  city	  and	  consistent	  with	  planning	  documents.	  New	  building’s	  height	  average	  only	  six	  stories.	  The	  development	  scale	  does	  not	  require	  large	   infrastructure	   upgrades,	   long	   leasing	   periods,	   or	   professional	   property	  management.	  Redevelopment	  is	  dispersed	  throughout	  the	  central	  city.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	   is	   not	   enclave	   development.	   Redevelopment	   reflects	   overall	   improvement	   in	   the	  building	  stock	  responding	  to	  local	  market	  demand	  for	  office,	  retail,	  residential	  and	  hotel	  space.	  The	  buildings	  are	  often	  mixed	  use	  with	  a	  retail	  shop	  on	  the	  first	  floor	  and	  office,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209	  Interview	   with	   Patrick	   Karanga,	   Head	   of	   Planning	   and	   Statistics	   Department	   at	   the	   Mwanza	   City	  Council,	  June	  6,	  2012.	  210	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  the	  analysis	  I	  collected	  fieldnotes	  on	  all	  buildings	  in	  Mwanza’s	  CBD	  with	  more	  than	  five	  stories.	   I	   then	  used	  Google	  earth	   images	   from	  2004	   to	  compare	   the	  change.	  Note	   I	  was	  not	  able	   to	  locate	   older	   images	   therefore	   I	   relied	   on	   interview	   information	   and	   confirmation	   from	  Lydia	  Nyeme	   a	  local	  researcher	  who	  provided	  me	  with	  historical	  information	  about	  redevelopment.	  	  211	  Interview	   with	   Patrick	   Karanga,	   Head	   of	   Planning	   and	   Statistics	   Department	   at	   the	   Mwanza	   City	  Council,	  June	  6,	  2012.	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residential	  or	  hotel	  use	  above.	  The	  small-­‐scale	  space	  responds	  to	  local	  market	  demand,	  rather	  than	  international	  or	  national	  expectations.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  international	  investment	  or	  flows	  of	  capital	  backing	  redevelopment.	  
Figure	  42:	  Mwanza	  Redevelopment	  between	  2004	  and	  2012	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  June	  2012	  and	  satellite	  images	  from	  2004.	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Singular	  Governance	  Regime:	  A	  Cohesive	  Redevelopment	  Effort	  	  Redevelopment	   reflects	   a	   singular	  urban	  governance	   regime	  where	  national	  pensions	  funds	   assist	   the	   Mwanza	   City	   Council’s	   	   (MCC)	   central	   city	   improvement	   plan.	   As	   a	  result,	  MCC	  had	  some	  success	  in	  responding	  to	  growth	  and	  implementing	  urban	  plans.	  	  MCC’s	  1992	  redevelopment	  plan	  exemplifies	  coordination	  with	  parastatals,	  the	  private	  sector	   and	   MLHHSD.	   Pension	   fund	   investments	   enable	   the	   central	   and	   local	  governments	   to	   project	   power	   and	  demonstrate	   execution	   capacity.	  MCC	   implements	  both	  national	  and	  local	  programs	  without	  significant	  interference	  from	  parastatals,	  the	  district	   or	  MLHHSD.	  MLHHSD	   has	   planning	   jurisdiction	   in	  Mwanza,	   but	   in	   practice	   it	  endows	   MCC	   with	   independence	   partially	   due	   to	   physical	   distance.212	  Nonetheless,	  corruption	  charges	  plague	   the	  MCC.	  According	   to	   interviewees,	  corruption	   in	  Mwanza	  increases	   development	   costs,	   project	   time	   lines	   and	   informal	   payments	   to	   local	  officials.213	  	  Mwanza’s	  master	   planning	   and	   redevelopment	   history	   is	   a	   series	   of	   aspirations	  with	  limited	  implementation.	  The	  British	  designed	  the	  first	  master	  plan	  in	  1950.	  The	  master	  plan	  laid	  out	  basic	  zoning	  regulations	  and	  provided	  the	  road	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  CBD	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  1993).	  The	  first	  plan	  led	  to	  a	  grid	  like	  pattern,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  current	  road	  system,	  a	  small	  sewer	  system	  and	  parks	  along	  the	  Lakefront.	  Then	  in	  1954	  a	  large-­‐scale	  redevelopment	  plan	  laid	  out	  areas	  for	  demolition	  and	  road	  expansion.	  The	  demolition	   plan	   was	   never	   implemented	   and	   the	   city	   grew	   without	   significant	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  (Mwanza	  City	  Council	  1993).	  The	  next	  decade	  saw	  smaller	  scale	   plans	   for	   redevelopment	   of	   specific	   blocks,	   but	   again	  nothing	  was	   implemented	  (Cadstedt	   2006).	   The	   original	   master	   plan	   continued	   to	   guide	   basic	   development	  throughout	  Ujamaa	  with	  no	  urban	  planning	  or	  infrastructure	  investments.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  212	  Interviews	  with:	  Deo	  Kalimenze,	  Urban	  Planer	  with	  Mwanza	  City	  Council,	  June	  15,	  2012;	  Mr.	  Mogella,	  Urban	  Planner	  at	  MLHHSD,	  on	  July	  15,	  2012.	  213	  Nearly	  every	   interview	   in	  Mwanza	  discussed	   issues	  with	   corruption	  at	  MCC	  and	   the	   land	  office	  and	  interview	  with	   Richard	  Munarya,	   Principal	   at	   Mellow	   Architects,	   June	   20,	   2012,	   provided	   particularly	  insightful	  information.	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The	   redevelopment	   plan	   of	   1992	   responded	   to	   past	   planning	   failures	   as	   well	   as	  pressure	   from	   donors	   to	   improve	   Mwanza’s	   environmental	   conditions	   (Batare	   &	  Karangwa	   2002;	   Nnkya	   2003;	   Cities	   Alliance	   2013).214	  The	   resulting	   redevelopment	  plan	   followed	   enabling	   rhetoric	   by	   reducing	   MCC	   role	   in	   construction	   and	   broad	  redevelopment	   guidelines	   for	   the	   private	   sector.215	  In	   1990,	   the	   MCC	   and	   MLHHSD	  formally	   designated	   a	   central	   redevelopment	   area	   (Mwanza	   City	   Council	   1993).	   The	  redevelopment	   area	  was	   a	  mix	   of	   commercial,	   residential,	   retail	   and	   small	   industrial	  uses.	  The	  plan	  focused	  on	  improving	  services	  and	  increasing	  density	  in	  the	  large	  single	  story	  CBD.	  The	  plan	  called	  for	  demolition	  and	  redevelopment	  of	  120	  buildings,	  or	  about	  10	   percent	   of	   properties	   in	   the	   redevelopment	   area	   (Mwanza	   City	   Council	   1993).	  Private	   owners	   would	   redevelop	   the	   sites	   with	   mixed-­‐use	   higher	   density	   structures	  adhering	  to	  broad	  development	  guidelines.	  The	  plan	  set	  minimum	  building	  heights	  for	  new	  construction	  and	  rehabilitation.	  The	  redevelopment	  area	  was	  split	  into	  FAR	  zones	  between	   0.5	   and	   2.0	   with	   a	   range	   of	   floor	   minimums	   from	   3	   to	   8	   (Figure	   42).	   The	  modest	   building	   height	   expectations	   reflect	   local	   needs	  more	   than	  modernization	   or	  modularity.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   density	   requirements	   were	   observed	   the	   plan	   permitted	  owners	   to	  determine	   the	  use,	   style	  and	   timing	  of	   redevelopment.	  Owners	  without	   the	  means	   to	   redevelop	   their	  property	  could	  sell	  or	  enter	   into	  an	   investment	  partnership	  (Mwanza	   City	   Council	   1993).	   These	   partnerships	  would	   respond	   to	   local	   demand	   for	  housing.	   In	   fact,	   the	  plan	  outlined	  the	  provision	  of	  6,000	  new	  apartment	  units	  and	  no	  new	  offices	  since	  the	  office	  market	  was	  saturated.	  	  Meanwhile,	   according	   to	   the	  plan	   the	  MCC	  would	  upgrade	   infrastructure	   and	  utilities	  throughout	   the	   redevelopment	   area.	   MCC	   finished	   upgrading	   roads	   in	   2007	   and	  improved	   four	   covered	  markets	   for	  petty	   traders	   that	  accommodate	  more	   than	  1,000	  small	  businesses.216	  The	  markets	  serve	  a	  majority	  of	   the	  commercial	  needs	  of	   the	  city.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  The	  rapid	  ecological	  deterioration	  of	  Lake	  Victoria	  caught	  donor	  attention	  in	  the	  1990’s	  with	  program	  responses	  by	  DANIDA,	  GTZ,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  UN-­‐HABITAT.	  The	  largest	  program	  was	  the	  Sustainable	  Cities,	  which	  was	  eventually	  closed	  due	  to	  limited	  capacity	  at	  MCC	  and	  accusations	  of	  corruption.	  215	  Interview	  with	  Deo	  Kalimenze,	  Urban	  Planer	  with	  Mwanza	  City	  Council,	  June	  15,	  2012.	  216	  Interview	  with	  Deo	  Kalimenze,	  Urban	  Planer	  with	  Mwanza	  City	  Council,	  June	  15,	  2012.	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MCC	   has	   also	   been	   voted	   the	   cleanest	   city	   in	   Tanzania	   for	   seven	   years,	   which	   is	  attributed	  to	  the	  community-­‐based	  organizations	  with	  contract	  with	  the	  MCC	  through	  PPP’s	  for	  solid	  waste	  collection.217	  Redevelopment	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   the	   area	   focused	   on	   by	   the	   municipal	   plan	   but	  generally	   follows	   MCC’s	   redevelopment	   vision	   and	   investment.	   That	   is,	   by	   2013	   51	  percent	  of	  the	  redevelopment	  projects	  were	  outside	  the	  defined	  redevelopment	  area,	  in	  either	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  CBD	  or	  in	  the	  northern	  outskirts	  of	  the	  CBD	  (Table	  11).	  The	  building	   locations	   suggest	   that	   the	   redevelopment	   plan	   was	   not	   the	   only	   cause	   of	  redevelopment.	  Instead	  redevelopment	  responded	  to	  local	  demand	  for	  more	  space	  and	  higher	  density	  as	  well	  as	  increasing	  income	  of	  local	  investors.	  
Table	  11:	  Buildings	  with	  four	  or	  more	  stories	  in	  Mwanza	  
Area	   1990	   2004	   2013	  
Redevelopment	  Area	   7	  	   11	  	   41	  	  
CBD	   0	   7	  	   37	  	  
CBD	  Outskirts	   0	   0	  	   5	  	  
Total	   7	   	  18	  	   83	  	  Source:	  MCC	  Redevelopment	  Plan	  1993	  and	  author’s	  fieldwork	  notes	  The	   tallest	   redevelopments	   are	   either	   joint	   ventures	   with	   NHC	   or	   pension	   fund	  investments	  demonstrating	  parastatal	  support	  for	  MCC’s	  redevelopment.	  There	  are	  ten	  NHC	  joint	  ventures	  on-­‐going	  all	  with	  local	  owners.	  Three	  of	  the	  buildings	  are	  complete	  with	  the	  remaining	  eight	  still	   in	  development	  (NHC	  2012b).218	  The	  JV’s	  were	  all	  signed	  between	   2005	   and	   2008.	   The	   dates	   reveal	   that	   the	   redevelopment	   plan	   was	   not	   an	  immediate	   impetus	   but	   rather	   rising	   property	   values	   and	   improved	   infrastructure	  throughout	  the	  CBD.219	  The	  private	  partners	  are	  local	  business	  owners	  often	  operating	  in	  the	  building	  before	  redevelopment.220	  The	  two	  tallest	  buildings	   in	  Mwanza	  are	  both	  pension	   fund	   investments.	   The	   eleven	   story	   buildings	   fit	   well	   with	   the	   MCC’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	  Dassu	  Stephen.	  “We	  are	  committed	  to	  making	  Mwanza	  City	  Clean.”	  Daily	  News,	  July	  5,	  2012.	  218	  Interview	  with	  Bwana	  Magai,	  Mwanza	  Regional	  Manager	  at	  NHC,	  June	  6,	  2012.	  219	  Interviews	  with	  Cosmas	  T	  Kimario,	  Director	  of	  Treasury	  and	  Corporate	  Strategy	  at	  NHC,	  March	  7	  220	  Interview	  with	  Bwana	  Magai,	  Mwanza	  Regional	  Manager	  at	  NHC,	  June	  6,	  2012.	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redevelopment	  plan	  but	  again	  were	  developed	  well	  after	  the	  plan	  was	  first	  announced.	  The	  PPF	  Commercial	   Plaza	   includes	   a	   hotel,	   retail	   and	   office	   space.	   The	   building	  was	  competed	   in	   2008	   (PPF	   2008).	   PPF	   Plaza	   sits	   on	   five	   plots	   and	   is	   the	   largest	  development	   in	   Mwanza.221	  PPF	   saw	   shortfall	   of	   office	   space	   in	   Mwanza	   where	   NHC	  rents	  were	  $3/m2	  but	  people	  were	  releasing	  for	  $12/m2.222	  In	  2007,	  NSSF	  completed	  a	  12	   story	   building	   in	  Mwanza	  with	   a	  mix	   of	   hotel	   and	   office	   uses	   (NSSF	   2009).223	  The	  project	   justification	  was	   similar	   to	   PPF’s.	   Both	   buildings	   are	   fully	   leased.	   The	   towers	  project	  pension	  fund	  financial	  power	  but	  also	  provide	  better	  returns	  than	  investment	  in	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	  where	   competition	   for	   land	  makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   develop	   land.224	  These	  investments	  demonstrate	  coherence	  between	  MCC	  and	  parastatals’	  goals.	  Incremental	  Development:	  Private	  Sector	  Investment	  A	   majority	   of	   private	   sector	   redevelopment	   investment	   is	   small-­‐scale	   incremental	  building.	  The	  projects	  are	  individually	  financed	  without	  debt	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  local	  business	  owners.225	  The	  scale	  and	  use	  of	  new	  properties	  reflect	  local	  demand	  for	  small	  office	  space,	  hotels	  and	  residential	  apartments.	   In	  fact,	  most	  of	  redevelopment	  project	  owners	   had	   a	   single	   story	   business	   or	   residence	   on	   the	   property	   that	   they	   chose	   to	  replace	  with	  a	  bigger	  building.226	  The	  owners	  engage	  in	  build	  incrementally	  over	  time	  as	  funding	   becomes	   available	   reflecting	   informal	   construction	   practices	   throughout	   the	  country.227	  Incremental	   construction	   allows	   development	   without	   pre-­‐sales	   or	   debt	  financing.	   The	   developers’	   risk	   is	   reduced	   as	   construction	   proceeds	   when	   there	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  221	  Correspondent.	   “Why	  after	  122	  years,	   lakeside	   city	   is	  well	  on	   the	  way	   to	  bright	   future”,	  The	  Citizen,	  April	  10,	  2014,	  online.	  (http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Why-­‐after-­‐122-­‐years-­‐-­‐lakeside-­‐city-­‐is-­‐well-­‐/-­‐/1840392/2273594/-­‐/15hgjpf/-­‐/index.html)	  222	  Interview	  with	  Godfrey	  Mollel,	  Investment	  Director	  at	  PPF,	  July	  31,	  2012.	  223	  Interview	  with	  Gerald	  Sondo,	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NSSF,	  August	  15,	  2012.	  224	  Interview	  with	  Godfrey	  Mollel,	  Investment	  Director	  at	  PPF,	  July	  31,	  2012.	  225	  Interview	  with	  Philip	  Makota,	  Director	  of	  UNDI	  Engineering	  Consultants,	  August	  13,	  2012.	  226	  Interview	  with	  Deo	  Kalimenze,	  Urban	  Planner	  for	  Mwanza	  City	  Council,	  June	  17th	  2012.	  227	  Interviews	  with	  Patrick	  Karanga,	  Head	  of	  Planning,	  Statistics,	  &	  Monitoring	  Department	   for	  Mwanza	  City	   Council,	   June	   6,	   2012,	   and	   Josa	  Mlinzi,	   News	   and	   International	   Investment	   Relations	   Director	   for	  Municipal	  City	  Council,	  June	  15,	  2012.	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evidence	   of	   demand	   and	   available	   funds.	   Incremental	   development	   does	   not	   lead	   to	  rapid	   large-­‐scale	   transformation	   but	   rather	   a	   gradual	   repositioning.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  number	   of	   redevelopment	   projects	   in	   since	   2004	   does	   indicate	   that	   business	   owners	  witnessed	   redevelopment	   success	   around	   them	   and	   decided	   to	   start	   redevelopment	  projects.	   The	   redevelopment	   cascade	   is	   confirmed	   by	   a	   concurrent	   reduction	   in	  population	  growth	  and	  economic	  growth	  in	  Mwanza’s	  major	  industries.	  
Figure	  43:	  Incremental	  Formal	  Private	  Redevelopment	  in	  Mwanza	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  June	  2012	  An	   example	   of	   a	   local	   investor	   tactics	   is	   VicFish	   Limited.228	  VicFish	   was	   the	   first	   fish	  processing	   factory	   to	   open	   in	   Mwanza	   in	   1993	   (URT	   2013e).	   The	   company	   now	  operates	   two	   factories	   in	   the	  Mwanza	   area.	  When	   the	   price	   of	  Nile	   perch,	   their	  main	  export,	  fell	  in	  the	  mid	  2000’s	  the	  company	  owners	  began	  to	  look	  for	  other	  investments	  (Bagumire	   2009).	   In	   2006,	   through	   a	   holding	   company,	   Leyana	   Enterprises,	   VicFish	  entered	   into	   a	   JV	   with	   NHC.	   Leyana	   Enterprises	   reduced	   Vic	   Fish’s	   risk	   but	   did	   not	  create	   a	   conglomerate	   with	   linkages	   across	   many	   sectors	   related	   to	   property	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  VicFish	  may	   own	   other	   properties	   but	   it	   was	   very	   difficult	   to	   determine	   ownership	   outside	   of	   one	  building.	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development.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  JV	  is	  a	  nine	  story	  mixed	  use	  building	  with	  three	  floors	  of	  commercial	   space	   and	   eighteen	   apartments.229	  The	   apartments	   are	   targeted	   at	   high-­‐income	   residents	   with	   amenities	   that	   include	   a	   generator	   and	   full	   services	   (Figure	  44).230	  The	  building	  was	  designed	  by	  Division	  Space,	  an	  architecture	  firm	  with	  offices	  in	  the	  US	  and	  India.231	  VicFish	  followed	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  JV	  contract	  and	  remains	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  NHC.232	  Furthermore,	  VicFish	  renovated	  and	  maintains	  a	  park	  with	  a	   large	  statue	   of	   a	   Nile	   perch	   in	   the	   center	   of	   town.	   The	   park	   is	   known	   as	   the	   “Vic	   Fish	  Roundabout”	   creating	   goodwill	   towards	   the	   company.	  As	   one	  of	   two	  well-­‐maintained	  green	   spaces	   in	   Mwanza	   it	   creates	   a	   sense	   of	   civic	   pride	   and	   adheres	   to	   the	   MCC’s	  redevelopment	  vision.	  
Figure	  44:	  VicFish	  Apartments	  Nyerere	  Road	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork,	  June	  2012	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  229	  Interviews	  with	  Patrick	  Karanga,	  Head	  of	  Planning,	  Statistics,	  &	  Monitoring	  Department	   for	  Mwanza	  City	  Council,	  June	  6,	  2012	  230	  E-­‐mail	  correspondence	  with	  Andrew	  Morris,	  Real	  Estate	  Agent	  with	  Mwanza	  Estate.	  231	  http://www.divspacearchitects.com/architecture/architecture.html	  232	  Interview	  with	  Lussagana	  Lussagana,	  NHC	  Joint	  Venture	  Project	  Manager	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Satellite	  City	  Development:	  Small-­‐scale	  Planning	  and	  Development	  Development	   on	   the	   peripheries	   of	   Mwanza	   also	   demonstrates	   singular	   governance	  regime	  and	   locally	  driven	  development,	  but	  without	   investment	  by	   the	   formal	  private	  sector.	  The	  largest	  urban	  management	  effort	  is	  MCC’s	  replication	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  the	  20,000	   plots	   titling	   program.	   In	   Mwanza,	   the	   “3,500	   plots	   program”	   surveyed	   9,500	  plots	  in	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.233	  The	  goal	  was	  not	  to	  create	  a	  satellite	  city	  but	  rather	  provide	  titled	   land	   in	   areas	  with	   rapid	   growth.234	  The	  main	   project	   sites	   are	  Bugarika,	   Kiseke,	  Buswelu,	   Nyegezi,	   and	   Nyamhongolo.	   All	   are	   relatively	   close	   to	   infrastructure,	  transportation	  networks,	  other	  informal	  developments	  and	  the	  central	  business	  district.	  Like	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  the	  program	  was	  successful	  because	  it	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  create	  cash	  flow	  for	  the	  MCC	  through	  an	  initial	  loan	  from	  MLHHSD.235	  	  The	   largest	   development	   outcome	   from	   the	   3,500	   titling	   program	   is	   the	   Parastatal	  Pension	   Fund	   (PPF)	   full-­‐scale	   housing	   development	   in	   Kiseke.	   The	   Kiseke	   Ward	   is	  within	  the	  Ilemela	  District	  about	  seven	  kilometers	  north	  of	  Mwanza’s	  central	  business	  district	   (Figure	   40).	   The	   Kiseke	   Ward	   lies	   directly	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   Mwanza’s	   urban	  development	   so	   that	   the	   area	  benefits	   from	  proximity	   to	  urban	  development	  without	  additional	   pressure	   on	   communities	   and	   infrastructure.	   Thus,	   PPF’s	   main	   goal	   was	  providing	   affordable	   housing	   with	   a	   secondary	   goal	   of	   creating	   a	   satellite	   city.236	  The	  project	  was	  a	  response	  to	  requests	   from	  pensioners	   for	  completed	  homes	  rather	  than	  solely	  cash	  transfers.	  Pensioners	  complained	  that	  the	  housing	  development	  process	  was	  too	   risky	   as	   they	   approached	   retirement	   and	   thus	   they	   preferred	   a	   completed	   house	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  Note	  that	  interviews	  and	  document	  review	  revealed	  conflicting	  evidence	  about	  how	  many	  of	  the	  plots	  had	   been	   allocated.	   There	  were	   rumors	   of	   corruption	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   original	   allocation	   system,	  which	   gave	   some	   individuals	   many	   plots	   and	   allowed	   political	   interference,	   but	   the	   specifics	   of	   these	  issues	  could	  not	  be	  confirmed.	  Although,	   several	  months	  after	   the	   interviews	   took	  place	  all	  of	   the	   land	  office	  staff	  was	  replaced	  along	  with	  many	  other	  city	  officials	  due	  to	  charges	  of	  corruption.	  234	  Interview	  with	  Bwana	  Salve,	  Director	  of	  Land	  Titling	  MCC,	  June	  1,	  2012.	  235	  Interview	  with	  Bwana	  Salve,	  Director	  of	  Land	  Titling	  MCC,	  June	  1,	  2012.	  236	  Ernest	  Ambali.	  “PPF	  Launches	  housing	  HP	  scheme	  for	  members.”	  Tanzania	  Business	  Times,	  January	  17,	  2005,	  p.	  2.	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(PPF	  2005).237	  In	  response	  in	  2004,	  PPF	  obtained	  more	  than	  1,100	  plots	  from	  the	  NHC	  who	   originally	   obtained	   the	   plots	   through	   the	   3,500	   plots	   program.238	  PPF	   completed	  construction	  of	  phase	  one	  and	  two	  with	  580	  homes	  in	  2007	  for	  a	  total	  cost	  of	  about	  $7.8	  million	  (Baruti	  2010)	  (Figure	  45).	  The	   project	   is	   different	   than	   modular	   satellite	   city	   development	   because	   it	  accommodates	  local	   incremental	  building	  practices.	  Ardhi	  University	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  designed	  and	  supervised	  the	  project.	  They	  provided	  six	  house	  designs	  with	  a	  core	  unit	  and	  permit	   approved	   expansion	  plans	   allowing	  buyers	   to	   add	   rooms	  when	   resources	  become	  available.	  The	  design	  kept	  sales	  prices	   to	  an	  average	  sales	  price	  $12,500.	  The	  project	   also	   included	   construction	   of	   unpaved	   access	   roads,	   provision	   of	   water,	  electricity,	  schools,	  and	  a	  dispensary.239	  MCC	  facilitated	  the	  project	  by	  providing	  utilities	  and	   connecting	   roads.	   All	   buildings	   were	   constructed	   of	   local	   bricks	   produced	   by	  seventy	  suppliers	  throughout	  the	  area.240	  Six	   local	  contractors	  each	  built	   fifty	  units.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  experience	  two	  of	  the	  contractors	  built	  larger	  businesses	  and	  now	  engage	  in	  bigger	  projects	  (CRB	  2005;	  Wells	  &	  Hawkins	  2008).	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  237	  Ernest	  Ambali.	  “PPF	  launches	  housing	  HP	  scheme	  for	  members.”	  Business	  Times,	  January	  17,	  2005,	  on-­‐line.	  238	  Interview	  with	   Joel	  Mnong’one,	  Mwanza	  District	  Manager	   for	  PPF	  and	  Kiseke	  Project	  Manager,	   June	  14th	  2012	  provided	  the	  project	  details	  in	  the	  discription.	  239	  Site	  visits	  confirm	  these	  services	  but	  project	  documents	  also	  claim	  that	  markets,	  a	  bus	  stand,	  a	  police	  post	  are	  forthcoming.	  	  240	  Interview	  with	   Joel	  Mnong’one,	  Mwanza	  District	  Manager	   for	  PPF	  and	  Kiseke	  Project	  Manager,	   June	  14,	  2012.	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Figure	  45:	  PPF	  Kiseke	  Low	  Cost	  Housing	  Development	  	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  fieldwork	  2012	  PPF	   estimated	   that	   70	   percent	   of	   the	   buyers	   intend	   use	   Kiseke	   as	   their	   primary	  residence	  and	   that	  60	  percent	  were	   from	  Mwanza,	  demonstrating	   that	   the	  project	  benefited	  the	  local	  market	  (Mengele	  2013;	  Shelter-­‐Afrique	  2011).241	  However,	  many	  people	  fully	  dismantled	  the	  original	  housing	  in	  favor	  of	  much	  larger	  homes	  because	  the	  cost	  of	   the	  house	  was	  much	   less	   than	  a	   serviced	  plot	  on	   the	  private	  market.	  A	  comparison	   of	   land	   use	   and	   building	   footprints	   of	   phase	   one	   between	   2005	   and	  2013	  shows	  the	  evolution	  over	  time	  (Figure	  46).	  In	  2005,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  house,	  which	  was	  eventually	  demolished	  to	  make	  room	  for	  the	  project,	  and	  no	  access	  roads.	  By	  2010,	  construction	  was	  complete	  including	  road	  infrastructure.	  	  At	  that	  time,	  all	  of	   the	   units	  were	   the	   same	   size	  with	   similar	   building	  materials.	   By	   2013,	   owners	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  Project	  details	  were	  provided	  through	  interviews	  with	  Joel	  Mnong’one,	  Mwanza	  District	  Manager	  for	  PPF	  and	  Kiseke	  Project	  Manager	  as	  well	  as	  Godfrey	  Greyson,	  Property	   Investment	  Director	  at	  PPF,	   July	  31,	  2012.	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expanded	   more	   than	   half	   the	   homes.	   The	   extensions	   indicate	   owners	   are	   fully	  repositioning	   the	   houses	   rather	   than	   slowly	   expanding	   their	   houses	   as	   originally	  envisioned.	  	  
Figure	  46:	  PPF	  Kiseke	  Land	  Use	  Change	  2005-­‐2013	  
Source:	  satellite	  images	  and	  author’s	  own	  calculations	  	  	  The	   financial	   success	   of	   the	   project	   is	   questionable	   yet	   other	   parastatals	   plan	   to	  pursue	  similar	  projects.	  Based	  on	  annual	  financial	  reporting	  the	  project	  only	  netted	  	  $78,000	  in	  profits	  for	  an	  approximately	  1	  percent	  return	  (PPF	  2008;	  PPF	  2010;	  PPF	  2011;	   PPF	   2012;	   PPF	   2013).	   The	   sales	   pace	   was	   delayed	   because	   many	   of	   the	  potential	  buyers	  did	  not	  qualify	  for	  mortgages,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  subsidized	  by	  PPF.242	  In	  fact,	  1,000	  people	  applied	  to	  the	  original	  sales	  offering,	  but	  most	  were	  not	  financially	   qualified	   for	  mortgages	   through	  Azania	   (Azania	   Bank	   2012).243	  Yet,	   PPF	  suspended	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  project	  and	  will	  likely	  sell	  the	  remaining	  plots	  without	  a	  structure.	  Selling	  undeveloped	  plots	  allows	  PPF	  to	  capture	  increased	  land	  value.	  To	  date	   increased	  value	  benefitted	   surrounding	  property	  owners	  but	  not	   the	  pension	  fund.	  Land	  prices	  in	  the	  area	  have	  increased	  from	  the	  $400	  per	  acre	  purchase	  price	  to	  $5,000	  per	  acre	  since	  the	  project	   first	  began	  in	  2005.244	  These	  price	   increases	   indicate	  community	   improvement	   spillovers	  beyond	   the	  project.	  That	   is,	   the	  MCC	  provided	  an	  additional	   1,000	   titled	   plots	   on	   the	   edges	   of	   PPF’s	   development.245	  For	   PPF	   serviced	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  242	  Interview	  with	  Godfrey	  Greyson,	  Property	  Investment	  Director	  at	  PPF,	  July	  31,	  2012.	  243	  Interview	  with	  Joel	  Mnong’one,	  Mwanza	  District	  Manager	  for	  PPF,	  June	  14,	  2012	  244	  Interview	  with	  Godfrey	  Greyson,	  Property	  Investment	  Director	  at	  PPF,	  July	  31,	  2012.	  245	  Many	  sites	  were	  under	  construction	  as	  of	  fieldwork	  in	  2012.	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plots	  provide	   a	  better	   return	   than	  housing	   creating	  potential	   competition	  with	  MCC’s	  titling	  program.	  Nonetheless,	  NSSF	  obtained	   land	   through	   the	  3,500	  plots	  program	   in	  Bugarika	  where	  they	  plan	  to	  build	  526	  residential	  units	  similar	  to	  PPF’s	  project.246	  PPF’s	  experience	   in	   Kiseke	   demonstrates	   the	   financial	   challenges	   to	   locally	   responsive	  housing	  developments	  in	  Tanzania.	  	  
Conclusion	  Mwanza	  demonstrates	   that	   the	  combination	  of	  a	  singular	  urban	  governance	  regime,	  a	  fluid	   land	  market	  and	  a	   small	   formal	  business	  establishment	  offers	   few	  opportunities	  for	  modular	  urban	  development.	  The	  redevelopment	  of	  central	  Mwanza	  is	  not	  modular	  because	   it	   is	   small-­‐scale	   geared	   towards	   local	   consumers.	   Redevelopment	   reflects	  cohesive	  projections	  of	  power	  by	  the	  central	  government	  agencies	  through	  cooperation	  with	  municipal	  governments.	  A	  few	  projects	  have	  qualities	  of	  modular	  redevelopment	  but	  are	  not	  accompanied	  by	  political	  pronouncements	  or	   leveraging	  of	   informal	  rules.	  Private	  investors	  use	  the	  redevelopment	  projects	  as	  a	  means	  of	  diversifying	  profits	  on	  a	  small	  scale.	  Parastatals,	  particularly	  pension	  funds,	  see	  the	  relatively	  small	  market	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  healthy	  returns	  on	  investments	  with	  little	  competition.	  Meanwhile,	  on	   the	   periphery	   development	   is	   no	  modular	   because	   the	   private	   sector	   is	   absent	   as	  national	   agencies	   attempt	   to	   project	   power	   and	   respond	   to	   local	   demand.	   The	   PPF	  Kiseke	  project	   offered	   an	   innovative	  design	  but	   provided	   small	   financial	   returns.	   The	  minimal	   success	   of	   the	   Kiseke	   project	   is	   not	   deterring	   the	  MCC	   from	   pursuing	   other	  satellite	   city	   projects	   because	   they	   have	   few	   other	   means	   of	   raising	   income.	  Furthermore,	  satellite	  cities	  allow	  the	  MCC	  to	  begin	  planning	  in	  the	  peri-­‐urban	  areas.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  Interview	  with	  Gerald	  Sondo,	  Planning	  Officer	  at	  NSSF,	  August	  15,	  2012.	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Chapter	  7:	  Conclusion	  
Private	  Urban	  development,	  Inequality	  and	  Fragility	  Institutional	   and	   policy	   reforms	   in	   Tanzania	   made	   private	   investment	   in	   urban	  development	  possible.	  To	  date,	   the	  outcomes	  of	   reforms	   increased	   inequality	  without	  improving	  overall	  conditions	  in	  the	  city.	  Instead	  existing	  business	  structures	  and	  plural	  governance	  systems	  produce	  similar	  modular	  urban	  forms	  that	  are	  disconnected	  from	  the	   rest	   of	   the	   urban	   form.	   The	   case	   studies	   showed	   that	   the	   interaction	   of	   these	  preconditions	  drives	   large-­‐scale	  urban	  development	  rather	  than	  responses	  to	  demand	  for	   urban	   space.	   Urban	   development	   is	   a	   negotiated	   process	   rather	   than	   a	   market.	  Enabled	   by	   recent	   reforms	   the	   process	   of	   urban	   development	   became	   a	   vehicle	   for	  elites’	   to	  grab	  power	  and	  politicians’	   to	  demonstrate	   legitimacy.	  The	  existing	  business	  structure	   and	   governance	   system	   drive	   development	   outcomes	   rather	   than	   the	   steps	  involved	   in	   development	   or	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   gain	   approval.	   The	   response	  by	   local	  communities	  to	  large-­‐scale	  development	  varied	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  land	  use	  constraints.	  While	  the	  case	  studies	  are	  not	  broad	  enough	  or	  over	  a	  long	  enough	  time	  to	  generalize,	  it	  is	   clear	  when	   relatively	  well-­‐located	  developable	   land	   is	   scarce	   opposition	  politicians	  used	   urban	   development	   as	   a	   political	   tool	   to	   encourage	   protest	   and	   community	  organization.	  The	  implications	  are	  that	  protest	  and	  increasing	  demands	  to	  the	  right	  to	  the	  city	  are	  not	  guaranteed	  and	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  path	  to	  ensure	  community	  involvement.	  The	   case	   studies	   also	   showed	   that	   demand	   for	   shelter	   remains	   unmet	   without	   a	  qualified	   set	   of	   private	   investors	   to	   produce	   a	   low-­‐income	  or	  middle-­‐income	  housing	  product.	   Liberalization	   and	   privatization	   increased	   dependence	   on	   several	   parastatal	  institutions	  rather	  than	  fomenting	  a	  dynamic	  private	  sector.	  The	  private	  sector	  consists	  of	   a	   few	   well-­‐connected	   businessmen	   capitalizing	   on	   increasing	   land	   value	   and	  opportunities	  to	  leverage	  wealth	  in	  other	  sectors.	  Small	  to	  medium	  scale	  development	  is	  not	  profitable	  because	  infrastructure	  and	  financing	  costs	  are	  prohibitive,	  which	  limits	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the	  actors	  involved	  and	  creates	  very	  high	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  Strategic	  long-­‐term	  planning	  does	   not	   drive	   development;	   instead	   short-­‐term	   opportunistic	   responses	   to	   local	  economic	  conditions	  and	  planning	  stalemates	  enable	  investors	  to	  ignore	  local	  demand.	  	  Investors	   avoid	   locally	   responsive	   urban	   development	   by	   developing	   space	   that	   is	  unaffordable	   and	   detached.	   As	   a	   result,	   fragility	   increases	   as	   affordable	   land	   and	  housing	   options	   are	   formalized	   into	   large-­‐scale	   housing	   communities	   that	   do	   not	  accommodate	   low-­‐income	   or	   even	  middle-­‐income	   Tanzanians.	   In	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   and	  Arusha	   a	   networked	   value	   chain	   model	   uses	   real	   estate	   assets	   as	   a	   commodity.	   In	  Mwanza,	  development	  is	  less	  commodified	  and	  modular	  because	  the	  real	  estate	  market	  is	   linear	  with	   clear	   business	   structures	   and	   few	   opportunities	   to	   remove	   investment	  from	  the	   local	   context.	  For	   instance,	   the	   largest	  developer	   in	  Mwanza	  provides	  public	  goods,	  creates	  good	  will	  and	  is	  clear	  about	  ownership	  structures.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  developers	  create	  business	  structures	  that	  obscure	  ownership	  and	  investments	  that	   deteriorate	  public	   goods.	   	   In	   sum,	  modular	   urban	   forms	   are	   replicated	   in	  Dar	   es	  Salaam	   and	   Arusha	   because	   layers	   of	   regulation	   create	   competition	   between	  government	   agencies,	   allow	   elites	   to	   grab	   power	   and	   set	   up	   an	   opaque	   development	  process.	  	  Local	   government	   entities	   and	  private	  developers	   facilitate	   satellite	   city	   development	  that	  responds	  to	  rising	  land	  values	  rather	  than	  demand	  for	  space.	  In	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  the	  satellite	  city	  effort	  reflects	  politicians’	  response	  to	  increasing	  traffic	  and	  density	  issues.	  Urban	  planners,	  city	  officials	  and	  residents	  recognize	  the	  unsustainable	  and	  inefficient	  conditions	  in	  the	  urban	  center.	  Yet,	  overcoming	  these	  conditions	  is	  politically	  infeasible.	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   South	   Asian	   model,	   Dar	   es	   Salaam’s	   satellite	   cities	   do	   not	   reflect	  access	   to	   capital	   and	   international	   demand	   for	   investment	   opportunities	   (Dieleman	  2011;	   Firman	   2004;	   Webster	   2001;	   Chen	   &	   Wang	   2009;	   Shatkin	   2011;	   Roy	   2009;	  Webster	   2002;	   Douglass	   et	   al.	   2012).	   In	   Arusha	   investors	   have	   access	   to	   capital	   for	  small-­‐scale	   projects	   but	   like	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   the	   larger	   city	   building	   efforts	   remain	  unfunded	   and	   locally	   determined.	   In	   both	   cases	   infrastructure	   constraints	   limit	   the	  financial	  feasibility	  of	  development.	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Satellite	  cities	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  Arusha	  offer	  a	  rhetorical	  fix	  for	  other	  vexing	  urban	  issues	  without	   requiring	   reorganization	   of	   power.	   These	   investments	   are	   justified	   as	  future	   employment	   and	   housing	   centers	   on	   the	   outskirts	   of	   both	   cities.	   The	   planning	  rhetoric	  mimics	   the	  modernist	   ideals	   of	   early	   postcolonial	   city	   building	   projects	   and	  reflects	   current	   projections	   of	   power.	   Politicians	   demonstrate	   action	   by	   building	  satellite	   cities	   to	   satisfy	   their	   constituencies.	   Advocates	   of	   satellite	   cities	   promise	  streamlined,	   transparent	   and	   predictable	   investments	   but	   the	   feasibility	   and	  inclusiveness	   of	   creating	   these	   new	   cities	   remains	   questionable.	   The	   experience	   of	  creating	   satellite	   cities	   offers	   a	   cautionary	   tale	   for	   the	   other	   cities	   across	   the	   global	  south	   investing	   in	   similar	   projects	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   past	   planning	   failures.	   The	  investments	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   successful	   or	   transformative	   if	   supporting	   institutions	  are	  not	  prepared	  to	  actively	  engage	  in	  land	  use	  management.	  Redeveloped	   central	   cities	   also	   contribute	   to	   increasing	   inequality	   and	   fragility.	   The	  investment	   to	   date	   is	  modular	  with	   standardized	   construction	   designs,	   full-­‐amenities	  and	   at	   large-­‐scale.	   In	  Arusha	   and	  Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   a	   few	  networks	  of	  wealthy	  business	  owners	   are	   remaking	   the	   central	   city	   with	   standardized	   investments	   that	   capture	  increasing	  land	  value.	  The	  copycat	  construction	  process	  reiterates	  the	  new	  buildings	  in	  Asia.	  The	  current	  projects	  are	  not	  iconic	  or	  inspirational	  as	  in	  the	  primary	  cities	  of	  Asia	  but	  aspirational	  and	  mundane	   like	   the	  speculative	  projects	  on	   the	  peripheries	  of	  Asia	  (Paling	  2012;	  Goldman	  2011).	  Unlike	  the	  experience	  in	  Dubai,	  where	  the	  construction	  of	   skyscrapers	   is	   symbolic	   of	   the	   drive	   for	   uniqueness	   (Acuto	   2010),	   in	   Tanzania	   the	  high	   rises	   indicate	   a	   copycat	   development	   heralding	   modern	   living.	   Development	  reflects	  postcolonial	  modernist	  ideals	  where	  order	  is	  prioritized,	  development	  is	  high-­‐rise	   and	   infrastructure	   provides	   traffic	   free	   vehicular	   (Watson	   2009;	   Bunnell	   et	   al.	  2012).	  	  The	  resulting	  development	  fails	  to	  address	  urban	  form	  and	  equity	  issues.	  In	  Arusha,	  the	  redevelopment	  area	  covers	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  CBD	  where	  private	  investment	  in	  hotel	  and	  office	  construction	  is	  transforming	  the	  landscape.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  three	  levels	  of	  government	   entities	   are	   competing	   to	   also	   redevelop	   their	   properties	   in	   order	   to	  leverage	   the	   current	   boom	   and	   demonstrate	   political	   effectiveness	   in	   the	   face	   of	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challenges	  from	  the	  opposition	  party.	  In	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  the	  redevelopment	  area	  covers	  Upanga,	   a	   smaller	   neighborhood	   within	   the	   Ilala	   Municipality,	   where	   parastatal	  attempts	   at	   JV	   redevelopment	   play	   a	   larger	   role	   than	   the	   local	   political	   goals	   of	  municipal	  or	  district	  governments.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  huge	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  luxury	  housing	   developed	   by	   a	   complex	   network	   of	   interlocking	   investment	   partners.	   The	  private	  sector	  overcomes	  the	  regulatory	  capacity	  of	  both	  the	  national,	  district	  and	  local	  governments.	  Finally,	  in	  Mwanza	  the	  redevelopment	  area	  also	  covers	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  CBD,	  but	  with	  limited	  interference	  from	  national	  goals.	  The	  municipal	  government	  has	  more	   implementation	   control.	   In	   Mwanza,	   municipal	   planning	   ahead	   of	   population	  growth	   creates	   private	   sector	   urban	   development	   that	   is	  more	   locally	   responsive.	   As	  redevelopment	  proceeds	  around	  the	  world	  policy	  makers	  should	  be	  conscious	  of	  plural	  governance	  structures	  and	  attempt	   to	  reduce	  plurality	  before	  proceeding	  because	   the	  result	  may	  further	  entrench	  existing	  issues	  with	  inequality	  and	  exclusion.	  	  
Governance	  Plurality	  and	  Competition	  Instead	  of	  Strategic	  Planning	  Governance	   plurality	   leads	   to	   competition	   among	   government	   agencies	   and	   private	  sector.	   New	   legislation	   in	   Tanzania	   encouraged	   government	   agencies	   to	   become	  entrepreneurial	  and	  therefore	  pursue	  urban	  development	  projects	  that	  guarantee	  profit	  rather	   than	   improve	   equality	   or	   provide	   a	   safety	   net.	   Government	   agencies	   have	  conflicting	   goals	   and	   plans	   leading	   to	   competitive	   urban	   development	   without	   an	  overall	   strategy.	   In	   Arusha,	   plurality	   and	   competition	   defines	   planning	   stalemates.	   In	  response,	   the	  private	   sector	   goes	   around	  government	  plans.	   In	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	  central	  government	  agencies	  and	  parastatals	  creates	  plurality	  resulting	  development	  outcomes	  in	   direct	   competition	  with	   private	   investors.	   Once	   again,	   the	   private	   sector	   leverages	  plurality	   and	   disregards	   government	   plans.	   In	   contrast,	   in	   Mwanza	   the	   governance	  structure	  is	  singular	  with	  support	  from	  central	  government	  agencies	  and	  local	  business	  owners.	  The	  political	  economy	  in	  Mwanza	  suggests	  that	  corruption	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  development	  issues	  and	  responding	  to	  local	  needs	  is	  easier	  with	  a	  singular	  governance	  system.	  In	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  coalitions	  involve	  national	  agencies	  and	  entrenched	  informal	  tactics.	   In	   Arusha,	   the	   coalitions	   are	   linked	   to	   international	  markets	   and	   competition	  between	  government	  agencies.	  Increasing	  land	  values	  and	  dense	  development	  created	  
	  	   163	  
plural	  governance	  structures	  that	  allow	  informality	  and	  encourage	  elite	  power	  grabs.	  In	  Mwanza,	  a	  coalition	  between	  local	  businesses	  and	  the	  municipal	  government	  reflects	  a	  singular	  governance	  structure.	  In	  both	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  Arusha	  competition	  between	  government	   agencies	   defines	   the	   rapid	   increase	   in	   high-­‐income	   targeted	   urban	  development.	  Meanwhile	   in	  Mwanza	   the	   governance	   system	   is	   singular	   and	   does	   not	  impede	  development	  that	  is	  locally	  responsive	  and	  encourage	  informal	  power	  grabbing.	  Redevelopment	   projects	   reflect	   incremental	   construction	   and	   geographically	   disperse	  locations	  with	  limited	  exclusivity.	  
Elite	  Power	  Grab	  Instead	  of	  Competitive	  Private	  Investment	  Economic	  structure	  and	  land	  use	  history	  facilitate	  an	  elite	  power	  grab.	  The	  three	  case	  study	   cities	   demonstrate	   how	   local	   business	   and	   land	   use	   history	   lead	   to	   different	  coalitions	  and	  thus	  investment	  outcomes.	  Instead	  of	  a	  production	  process	  defined	  by	  a	  constantly	   morphing	   social	   infrastructure	   (Simone	   2004b),	   the	   case	   studies	   reveal	   a	  highly	   structured	   power	   structure	   of	   elite	   investors	   extracting	   wealth	   through	  replication	   and	   reinterpretation	   of	   global	   urban	   models.	   Arusha’s	   land	   use	   history	  increased	   growth	   on	   the	   peripheries	   and	   created	   opportunities	   for	   development	   on	  large	   former	   agricultural	   estates.	   Dar	   es	   Salaam’s	   land	   use	   history	   created	   a	   less	  contiguous	   form	   with	   infrastructure	   constraints,	   which	   create	   opportunities	   for	  speculation.	  That	  is,	  wealthy	  urbanites	  grab	  village	  land	  to	  hold	  for	  future	  development.	  Finally,	  Mwanza	  presents	  fewer	  opportunities	  for	  speculation	  without	  external	  demand	  drivers	   or	   infrastructure	   constraints,	   thus	   development	   is	   not	   modular.	   Urban	  development	   is	   not	   a	   uniform	   partnership	   between	   state	   agencies	   and	   private	  developers	   instead	   redevelopment	   varies	   based	   on	   local	   conditions.	   Redevelopment	  consolidates	   central	   cities	   for	  elite	  profit	  making	  without	  addressing	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  majority.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  elite	  power	  grabbing	  investments	  depends	  on	  the	  local	  business	  structure	  but	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  city	  or	  analysis	  of	  market	  demand.	  The	  development	  process	  is	  opaque	  because	  of	  informal	  rules	  that	  exclude	  community	  input.	  The	  urban	  development	  process	  includes	  many	  steps	  where	  price	  manipulation	  and	  obfuscation	  is	  possible.	  The	  development	  process	  is	  opaque	  in	  all	  three	  case	  studies	  due	  to	  existing	  conditions.	  Tanzania	   lacks	  a	  comprehensive	   land	  registry	  and	  building	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permit	   process.	   Individuals	   leverage	   the	   resulting	   complexity	   and	   grab	   land	   for	   their	  own	  benefit.	  For	  instance,	  to	  inquire	  about	  the	  ownership	  of	  a	  parcel	  you	  must	  have	  the	  approval	   of	   the	   existing	   owner.	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	   no	   information	   on	   stocks	   and	  flows	   of	   construction	   because	   the	   same	   approval	   process	   is	   required	   to	   obtain	  information	  about	  building	  permits.	  Responsiveness	  to	  demand	  differs	  across	  the	  case	  studies.	  In	  Arusha,	  outsiders	  add	  pressure	  to	  land	  markets	  and	  increase	  prices.	  Pressure	  leads	   to	   development	   that	   displaces	   local	   livelihoods.	   In	   Dar	   es	   Salaam,	   central	  government	   agencies	   play	   a	   large	   role	   in	   urban	   development	   and	   regulation.	   In	  response	   developers	   create	   complex	   ownership	   structures	   to	   avoid	   regulation.	   In	  contrast,	  in	  Mwanza	  investment	  is	  locally	  responsive	  but	  not	  successful.	  These	  projects	  indicate	   that	   perhaps	   formality	  was	  not	   the	  major	   barrier	   to	   development	   but	   rather	  site	  location,	  existing	  land	  use	  and	  accessibility.	   	  In	  Arusha	  and	  Dar	  there	  are	  so	  many	  opportunities	   for	   opacity.	   	   	   Once	   the	   system	   is	   opaque,	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   to	   create	  transparency.	  	  In	  Arusha,	  regional	  government	  agencies	  have	  limited	  economic	  power.	  Networked	  ownership	  allows	  developers	   to	  hide	  wealth.	   In	  Mwanza,	  municipality	  has	  greater	  power	  to	  enact	  regulation.	  
Limited	  Insurgent	  Planning	  Protests	  occur	  with	  land	  scarcity	  and	  changes	  in	  informal	  rules.	  As	  actors	  contend	  with	  local	  conditions	  a	   tension	  arises	  between	   increasing	  profits	  and	  enhancing	  benefits	  of	  the	  city	  to	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  population	  (Shatkin	  2007;	  Shatkin	  2008;	  Shatkin	  2011;	  Massey	  2011).	  In	  land	  scarce	  situations,	  modular	  urbanism	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  lack	  of	   political	   voice	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   urban	   dwellers.	   That	   is,	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salam	   and	  Mwanza	   there	   is	   no	   community	   dialogue	   despite	   MLHHSD	   leader’s	   claims	   otherwise	  (Mramba	  &	  Joseph	  2012).	  In	  both	  cases	  new	  developments	  account	  for	  a	  small	  share	  of	  vacant	  land	  and	  are	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  existing	  development.	  In	  Arusha,	  animosity	  towards	  modular	   development	   reflects	   the	   influence	   of	   opposition	   parties	   forming	   in	   urban	  areas	  playing	  into	  the	  “politics	  of	  ownership”	  (Ponte	  2004).	  Protests	  reflect	  questioning	  outside	   ownership	   and	   demanding	   a	   more	   equitable	   ownership	   structure.	   Yet,	   the	  politics	   of	   ownership	   does	   not	   portend	   to	   a	   more	   general	   demand	   for	   the	   right	   to	  services,	   housing	   and	   representation,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   “politics	   of	   the	   poor”	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(Appadurai	   2001).	   Limited	   community	   responses	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam	   are	   partially	  explained	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   acute	   political	   and	   demographic	   pressures	   experienced	   in	  Arusha.	  In	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  new	  developments	  have	  a	  small	  effect	  on	  perceptions	  of	  land	  scarcity	  because	  there	  are	  large	  undeveloped	  areas	  throughout	  the	  city.	  The	   case	   studies	   suggest	   that	   land	   market	   scarcity	   engenders	   stronger	   community	  responses	   to	   modular	   urbanism.	   Arusha	   shows	   conditions	   under	   which	   insurgent	  protests	  happen	  and	  it’s	  not	  happening	  in	  other	  places	  because	  of	  land	  scarcity.	  That	  is,	  community	   protests	   appear	   only	   in	   Arusha	   where	   politicians	   and	   developers	   make	  some	   concessions.	  When	   a	   developer	   builds	   another	   gated	   community	   for	   the	   elite	   it	  becomes	   incendiary	   because	   the	   dispossessed	   families	   can	   directly	   see	   their	  disenfranchisement	  playing	  out	  with	  each	  new	  development.	  In	  Mwanza	  and	  Dar	  even	  though	  inequalities	  are	  playing	  out	  on	  the	  ground,	  because	  density	  is	  still	  low	  with	  wide	  availability	  of	  land	  it	  doesn’t	  create	  the	  same	  community	  reaction.	  Unlike	  Arusha,	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  and	  Mwanza	  opposition	  politicians	  can’t	  leverage	  the	  appearance	  of	  modular	  urbanism	   to	   increase	   their	   own	   political	   capital.	   	   The	   question	   remains	   how	   can	   you	  engage	   communities	  before	   it	   is	   requires	   violent	  protest	   in	  places	   like	  Dar	   es	   Salaam	  and	  Mwanza.	  	  
Some	  Potential	  Policy	  Shifts	  and	  Further	  Research	  Strategic	  planning	  is	  not	  encouraged	  in	  the	  current	  negotiation	  process	  because	  policy	  reforms	   put	   undue	   focus	   on	   creating	   a	  market	   and	   reducing	   the	   steps	   involved	  with	  urban	   development.	   Haphazard	   speculative	   investment	   is	   incentivized	   resulting	   in	  inefficient	   development.	   In	   contrast	   to	   expected	   outcomes,	   investments	   are	  disconnected	   from	   growing	   demand	   and	   in	   many	   cases	   add	   to	   demand	   pressure.	  Instead	   of	   advocating	   private	   or	   public	   dominance	   of	   urban	   development	   process	   a	  more	  sustainable	  urban	  development	  model	  would	  rely	  on	  planning	  coalitions	  that	  go	  beyond	  participation	  and	  recognize	  informal	  practices.	  Local	  factors	  can	  be	  categorized	  to	  account	  for	  potential	  bottlenecks,	  opportunities	  for	  power	  grabbing	  and	  increasingly	  long	   term	   community	   involvement.	   There	   are	   several	   policy	   implications	   that	   might	  address	  some	  of	  the	  current	  issues	  with	  urban	  development	  in	  the	  global	  south.	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The	   primary	   planning	   need	   of	   local	   governments	   is	   to	   lay	   out	   infrastructure	   plans	  before	  development	  and	  population	  growth.	  In	  a	  growing	  city,	  municipal	  governments	  need	  to	  first	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  future	  location	  of	  roads,	  electricity,	  sewers	  and	  other	  services.	  The	  case	  studies	  indicated	  that	  service	  provision	  rather	  than	  titling	  land	  creates	  more	  development	   investment	   and	   unlocks	   bottlenecks.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Dar	   es	   Salaam’s	  20,000	  plots	  program	  merely	  giving	  out	  land	  did	  not	  change	  the	  housing	  market	  when	  the	   plots	   have	   no	   infrastructure	   connection.	   In	   addition,	   speculation	   could	   be	   better	  managed	  through	  a	  simple	  system	  of	  prioritizing	  service	  implementation.	  The	  focus	  on	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  returns	   to	  one	  of	   the	  key	   insights	  of	   the	  enabling	  markets	  theory.	  Yet,	  it	  also	  incorporates	  postcolonial	  theory’s	  suggestion	  that	  governments	  have	  a	  strong	  role	  to	  play	  in	  urban	  development.	  To	  date	  cities	  in	  Tanzania	  have	  the	  wrong	  order	  of	  operations	  in	  urban	  development	  where	  people	  appear,	  firms	  locate	  and	  then	  infrastructure	   (Collier,	   2014).	   The	   disorder	   of	   investment	   explains	   the	   attraction	   to	  modular	  urbanism	  and	  the	  new	  city	  development	  because	  the	  order	  of	  operations	  puts	  a	   strong	   emphasis	   on	   infrastructure	   provision	   before	   population	   growth.	   If	  infrastructure	  and	  services	  are	  not	  provided	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  correct	  after	  the	  city	  is	  established.	  Dar	  es	  Salaam’s	  central	  city	  demonstrates	  the	  difficulty	  with	  choking	  traffic,	  limited	   services	   and	   high	   land	   values.	   The	   problem	   reflects	   the	   anticommons	   where	  control	  is	  split	  between	  so	  many	  people	  that	  it	  is	  not	  to	  anyone’s	  individual	  advantage	  to	  concede	  to	  change	  even	  if	  it	  would	  benefit	  the	  city	  as	  a	  whole	  (Heller	  1998).	  	  Urban	  development	  becomes	   a	   resources	   curse	  when	  urban	  planning	   is	   avoided	   and	  people	  respond	  to	  land	  scarcity	  rather	  than	  inequality.	  Then,	  municipalities	  need	  to	  prioritize	  provision	  of	  infrastructure	  to	  reduce	  speculation	  and	  set	  expectations.	  Another	   area	   for	   potential	   policy	   engagement	   is	   providing	   subsidies	   for	   low-­‐income	  housing	  construction	  and	  rental	  housing.	  It	  might	  be	  beneficial	  to	  provide	  place-­‐based	  subsidies	   that	   target	   particular	   neighborhoods	   to	   integrate	   with	   infrastructure	  investment.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam	  the	  municipal	  government	  is	  completing	  the	  first	   phase	   of	   a	   bus	   rapid	   transit	   (BRT)	   system.	   The	   municipality	   could	   provide	  subsidies	   to	   developers	   who	   provide	  mixed	   use	   and	   income	   developments	   at	   higher	  densities.	   The	   experience	   to	   date	   in	   Tanzania	   indicates	   that	   entirely	   low-­‐income	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development	  does	  not	  provide	  sufficient	   financial	   returns,	   thus	  subsidies	  could	   target	  mixed	  income	  development	  so	  that	  private	  investors	  can	  still	  make	  financially	  feasible	  return	   while	   contributing	   to	   more	   equitable	   housing	   provision.	   Private	   and	   public	  developer	  capacity	  varies	   through	  out	   the	  case	  studies.	  Assuming	  a	  uniform	  ability	   to	  implement	   market	   driven	   projects	   by	   private	   developers	   misses	   that	   urban	  development	   is	   a	   learning	   process.	   For	   instance,	   Kisota	   Homes’	   developers	   failed	   to	  understand	   local	  demands	  while	  Kiseke’s	  developers	  used	   local	  materials	  and	  designs	  to	  provide	  middle-­‐income	  housing.	  The	  projects	  demonstrate	   learning	  by	  private	   and	  public	   developers.	   Nonetheless,	   financial	   returns	   at	   the	   projects	   suggest	   stronger	  support	  for	  subsidies	  and	  infrastructure	  provision	  to	  reduce	  costs.	  An	  additional	  area	  is	  to	  encourage	  financing	  for	  municipalities	  rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  mortgages	  for	  individuals	  or	  obtaining	  financing	  from	  pension	  funds.	  Mortgages	  failed	  to	  take	  off	  in	  Tanzania	  because	  most	  individuals	  are	  too	  poor	  and	  the	  banking	  sector	  is	  too	   thin.	   A	   majority	   of	   housing	   is	   still	   constructed	   through	   the	   self-­‐help	   model.	   The	  result	  is	  that	  most	  of	  the	  assets	  are	  hard	  to	  sell	  with	  few	  buyers	  willing	  to	  displace	  their	  neighbors	   that	  might	   have	   defaulted	   (Habitat	   interview).	   Furthermore,	   direct	   project	  management	   in	   urban	   development	   by	   pension	   funds	   requires	   the	   ability	   to	   pick	  projects	  and	  manage	  development	   that	   is	  not	  appropriate	   for	  pension	   funds.	  A	  better	  solution	  might	  be	   to	   create	  a	  bond	   financing	  market	  or	  urban	  development	   fund	   that	  would	  provide	  other	  means	   for	   individual	   to	   invest	  excess	   cash	  and	  pension	   funds	   to	  avoid	  implementation	  risk.	  Finally	   addressing	   opaque	   development	   processes	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   politically	   very	  sensitive	   but	   increasing	   data	   transparency	   remains	   essential.	   Informal	   practices	   are	  encouraged	   by	   lack	   of	   transparency	   in	   ownership	   and	   development	   planning.	   The	  current	  system	  protects	  the	  privacy	  of	  investors	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  public	  awareness.	  In	  order	   to	   increase	  participation	   and	   ensure	   that	   urban	  development	   responds	   to	   local	  needs	   better	   access	   to	   information	   could	   increase	   civic	   awareness	   and	   community	  participation.	  Central	  and	  local	  government	  agencies	  need	  to	  work	  together	  to	  create	  an	  active	   and	   open	   database	   that	   offers	   information	   about	   property	   sales,	   construction	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costs,	   and	   valuations.	   Timely	  market	   information	  would	  underpin	   a	  more	  democratic	  and	  equitable	  urban	  development	  process.	  The	   research	   provides	   insights	   into	   the	   current	   process	   of	   large-­‐scale	   urban	  development	   in	   Tanzania	   but	   it	   also	   opens	  many	   questions	   for	   further	   research.	   One	  potential	   area	   is	   to	   better	   understand	   how	   and	  who	   is	   using	   the	   new	   developments.	  Another	   area	   is	   to	   uncover	   the	   construction	   process,	   particularly	   as	   it	   relates	   to	  international	   investment	   from	   China.	   The	   amount	   of	   potential	   construction	   through	  urbanization	   in	   Tanzania	   offers	   a	   means	   to	   creating	   jobs,	   but	   the	   industry	   seems	  unprepared	   to	   locally	  handle	  development.	  Yet	  another	   issue	   the	  connection	  between	  insurgency	   and	   new	   urban	   development	   in	   the	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   African	   context.	   The	  Tanzanian	  case	  suggests	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions	  protest	  is	  emerging	  but	  gaining	  a	  better	  understanding	  across	  other	  contexts	  might	  help	  better	  inform	  theory	  and	  policy	  making.	   Finally,	   all	   of	   the	   recommendations	   require	   a	   better	   and	   deeper	   analysis	   of	  institutional	  issues.	  Each	  area	  offers	  a	  fruitful	  area	  for	  further	  research.	  Tanzania	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  example	  of	  urbanization	  as	   it	   is	  unfolding	  across	  the	  global	  south,	  particularly	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  because	  it	  is	  rapid,	  low	  income	  and	  defined	  by	  informality.	  While	  many	   of	   the	   findings	   are	   idiosyncratic	   they	   are	   also	   generalizable.	  Similar	  modular	  urban	  forms	  across	  the	  continent	  suggest	  that	  enabling	  markets	  theory	  created	   opportunities	   for	   elite	   power	   grabs	   and	   plural	   governance	   regimes.	   The	  resulting	  inequality	  suggests	  that	  the	  future	  of	  the	  city	  is	  divided	  for	  those	  who	  can	  pay	  for	  benefits	  and	  those	   that	  cannot.	  Tanzania’s	  experience	   is	  useful	   for	  other	  countries	  because	   it	   reflects	   the	   experience	   of	   ordinary	   cities	   mentioned	   by	   the	   postcolonial	  theorists.	  Tanzania’s	  difficulties	  creating	  a	  private	  sector,	  improving	  access	  to	  services,	  providing	   infrastructure	  and	  regulating	   land	  use	  management	   is	  not	  unique.	  The	  case	  studies	  reveal	  the	  outcomes	  of	  following	  a	  piecemeal	  approach	  to	  urban	  planning	  that	  relies	   on	   private	   sector	   investment.	   The	   resulting	   competition	   between	   government	  agencies	  with	  plural	  governance	  structures	  is	   likely	  to	  be	  replicated	  in	  other	  locations	  without	  better	   sequencing.	  This	   reality	  begins	   to	  explain	  how	  ordinary	  cities	  operate.	  What	   becomes	   clear	   from	   Tanzania’s	   recent	   experience	   is	   that	   plural	   governance	  systems	  and	  entrenched	  existing	  businesses	  determine	   the	   structure	  of	   the	   city	  more	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than	  demands	   for	  space.	  Urban	  development	   is	  a	  negotiated	  process	   that	   responds	   to	  local	   factors	   but	   those	   can	   be	   categorized	   and	   understood	   so	   that	   predicting	   likely	  bottlenecks	  and	  potential	  areas	  for	  power	  grabbing	  are	  foreseeable.	  The	  experience	  of	  these	  ordinary	  cities	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  creating	  unifying	  strategic	  goals,	  simplifying	  governance	  structures,	  offering	  opportunities	  for	  small	  scale	  investors	   to	   enter	   into	   real	   estate	   development,	   and	   pursuing	   small-­‐scale	   urban	  planning	  capacity	  building	  before	  attempting	  large	  scale	  development.	  A	  more	  feasible	  urban	  planning	  path	  might	  be	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  few	  key	  areas	  in	  need	  of	  development	  and	  create	   a	   hierarchical	   plan	   that	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   large-­‐scale	   coordination	   and	  investment.	   This	   might	   offer	   a	   means	   to	   a	   more	   sustainable	   city	   that	   requires	   less	  negotiation	  and	  reduces	  fragilities.	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